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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the nature, status and 
determinants of international law in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist atacks upon 
the US. More specificaly, I am interested in the variation of legal responses of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to policies of counter-terrorism adopted by states, which 
have been victims of atacks launched by non-state actors. What does this variation imply 
are the nature, status and determination of international law? Thus, meetings of the UNSC 
and statements delivered by representatives of five states that are the permanent members 
of this international body constitute the main empirical focus of my study. Although there 
admitedly are limitations to such an approach, the study wil suggest that the UNSC can 
usefuly be treated as a proxy of international society as understood by Hedley Bul in that 
regard. 
Although the reasons for undertaking military interventions in question were 
related to national security as wel as the inherent right of self-defence, international 
society responded to these interventions in diferent ways. In relation to 1982 Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon in order to fight the PLO, international society condemning Israeli 
actions did not recognise its right to self-defence. In 2006, however, when Israel launched 
a military operation on Lebanese teritory in order to fight Hezbolah, the response of 
international society was the opposite, in that Israel’s right of self-defence was recognised. 
By looking at the subject from various International Relations theoretical perspectives my 
thesis analyses the possible reasons behind the decision of international society to treat 
these two Israeli operations in diferent way. In order to deliver coherent conclusions, 
iv 
further analyses of the 9/11 atacks and the response of international society towards the 
US-led invasion of Afghanistan constitute the second case study. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the status of international law 
through the lenses of diferent theoretical standpoints. A study of the interventions in 
question from the angle of international provision governing the use of force alows for a 
more in-depth and a comprehensive analysis of the role of international law in the 
contemporary world. It also enables a thorough scrutiny and critique of traditional IR 
perspectives and a greater appreciation of the comparative, explanatory merit of the 
English School theory of International Relations and Constructivism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the nature, status 
and determinants of international law in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist atacks 
upon the US. More specificaly, I am interested in the variation of legal responses of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to policies of counter-terorism adopted by 
states, which have been victims of atacks launched by non-state actors. What does this 
variation imply are the nature, status and determination of international law? Thus, 
meetings of the UNSC and statements delivered by representatives of five states that are 
the permanent members of this international body constitute the main empirical focus of 
my study. Although there admitedly are limitations to such an approach, the study wil 
suggest that the UNSC can usefuly be treated as a proxy of international society as 
understood by Hedley Bul in that regard.1 
This study looks at the ways in which the UNSC has responded towards instances 
where counter-terorist policy has compeled states to invade another state. More 
specificaly, I investigate three instances namely those concerning Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 (Peace for Galilee), the USA’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 
(Enduring Freedom) and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006 (Change Direction). What 
is significant in relation to these policies is the fact that international society treated them 
diferently. Why was that the case, and what does this tel us about international law? 
1 Bul H, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (3rd edn Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmilan, 2002), 13. 
 2 
   In other words, the thesis investigates what was the reason behind the decision of 
international society to treat the policies based on the same justification in diferent ways. 
Such variations can have a significant impact. It is widely recognised that the general 
prohibition of the use of force belongs to ius cogens and comprises a part of international 
customary law. It is conceived that rules derived from international customary law are not 
very flexible in that the practice from which custom develops take time and, therefore, it is 
seen as ‘too slow a means of adapting the law to fast-changing circumstances’.2 However, 
it should also be noted that, in certain circumstances ‘customary rules can develop fairly 
rapidly’3 and, thus, a change that occurs in customary law does not necessarily have to be 
evolutionary but punctuated. According to Hay: 
 
[i]n moments of crisis (…) the pace of change quicken as one consensus is 
overturned and atempts are made to establish a new one. Such crises tend 
to  be characterised  by a  growing frustration  with the  governing  paradigm 
(the ruling ideas) and by the perceived need for an alternative.4 
 
   My empirical research suggests that this has, indeed, been the case after 9/11. 
There has been a change in the approach of the UNSC and the international society 
towards the use of military force as a response to non-state actors responsible for terrorist 
atacks. Such change in approach has had an impact on the existing rules governing the use 
of force in international politics. More specificaly, the threshold of what actions can 
constitute an armed atack and, therefore, the basis for exercising the right of self-defence 
in accordance with the Article 51 of the UN Charter has been lowered. Moreover, this 
                            
2 Jennings R Wats A, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (9th edn London and New York: Longman, 
1996), 30. 
3 ibid 30. 
4 Hay C, Political Analysis. A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 162-163. 
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change of approach has also had an impact on the rules governing the atribution of acts 
commited by non-state actors to a state. While prior to the 9/11, the UNSC had been 
reluctant to recognise the legality of the use of force against the teritory of a state, which 
wilingly or unwilingly alowed its teritory to be used as a base for non-state actors, in the 
aftermath of 9/11 there has been growing acceptance of the lawfulness of such use of 
force. 
 
    This change of approach is evident when comparing the UNSC responses to the 
practices of the US and Israel in dealing with international terorism. Both the US and 
Israel have had a long practice in dealing with terorist atacks and undeniably they 
asserted the lawfulness of their responses towards these atacks. However, what had been 
lacking, especialy in relation to Israel, was the recognition of such lawfulness by the 
UNSC and the international society. The recognition was forthcoming, however, when the 
US was atacked by al-Qaeda and the subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan was 
seen as a legitimate and lawful reaction. The evidence suggests that such a diferent 
response was not merely a one-step exception, and, in fact, it highlighted the change in the 
general international approach towards the use of force in relation to terorist atack. Such 
a change of approach is evident when Israel’s right to intervene in Lebanon was 
recognized by the UNSC in 2006, in marked contrast to 1982 and indeed instances before 
and after 1982. 
 
As it wil be demonstrated, the change in the approach towards the right to use 
force directed against non-state actors has been influenced by the change in distribution of 
power within international arena in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The 
international system based on the notion of balance of power, ‘by which is understood such 
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a disposition of things, as that no one potentate be able absolutely to predominate, and 
prescribe laws to the others’5 was replaced by a unipolar world, where a position of a 
single state and its capabilities are too strong ‘to be counter-balanced’.6 For over the last 
two decades, that position in the contemporary world has been occupied by the United 
States. According to Krauthammer, ‘[t]he center of world power is the unchalenged 
superpower, the United States, atended by its Western alies’.7 The special international 
position enjoyed by the US has had a great influence on world politics. It can be observed 
in that, although Israel has had a long practice in dealing with international terorism, it 
was not able to convince the international society to change its approach and opt for the 
acceptance of wider definition of the right to self-defence. What needs to be pointed out is 
that, although the changed approach occured in the aftermath of the 9/11 atacks, the 
UNSC did not merely provide a reply on a one-off basis to the US postulates but, in fact, it 
recognised the necessity of changing the rules governing the use of force in relation to acts 
of terorism, and states that wilingly or unwilingly permit the non-state actors to operate 
within their teritories. Thus, the 9/11 atacks should be seen as seting a new precedence.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that it was the US which was able to influence such 
change needs to be emphasised and should not be disregarded. As was already mentioned, 
the US has been occupying a very distinctive place within the international arena since the 
end of the Cold War. The international status of the US has been variously characterised. 
While some refered to it as ‘empire’, others characterised the US as a ‘hegemon’. Such a 
position, however, not only gives the US an ability to force through its standpoints 
                            
5 Vatel E de, Le Droit Des Gens. Ou Pricipes De La Loi Naturale, Apliqués À La Conduite & Aux Afaires 
Des Nations & Des Souverains (the Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and Afairs of Nations and Sovereigns). Edited and with an Introduction by B Kapossy and R 
Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 1758, 2008), bk. III, ch. i, section 47, 496. 
6 Wohlforth WC, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 9. 
7 Krauthammer C, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign afairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 23. 
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internationaly, but it also imposes on it international responsibility. The impact or the role 
that the most powerful states play in world politics is not a novelty. Throughout the 
centuries such positions were occupied by various states, usualy refered to as the great 
powers, either colectively or unilateraly. According to Bul, the role of great powers is to 
promote international order ‘by pursuing policies that work for it rather than against it’.8 
This can be achievable ‘by managing their relations with one another; and by exploiting 
their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the afairs of 
international society as a whole’.9 Thus, he caled them “great responsibles” or “great 
indispensables”.10 Bul had in mind world afairs where a certain number of states 
possessed similar power and status. However, taking into consideration the curent 
international environment, it may be assumed that such responsibility, although not limited 
to, lies on the US to a great extent. 
Although the US possesses great advantage over other powerful states, it 
nevertheless needs, as the war on teror exemplified, the cooperation between itself and 
other members of the international society. Neo-realists, such as Gilpin and Mearsheimer11 
suggest that such a situation gives the dominant state a possibility to project its power and 
pursue their own interests. It wil be demonstrated, however, that even though the US is 
capable of forcing through its views and policies, international society stil needs proof that 
policies, which aim is to change existing rules, are indeed essential for maintaining 
international order. For rules, especialy those identified as ius cogens, to be changed 
international society needs to recognise them as, in fact, being altered. States regard 
8 Bul (n 1) 200. 
9 ibid 200. 
10 ibid 49. 
11 See for example: Gilpin R, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 1981). - "The Theory of 
Hegemonic War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613. Mearsheimer JJ, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
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themselves as comprising international society and for the change of existing rules to occur 
the members of such an international society need to accept and acknowledge such change. 
The US, although it possesses indisputable influence on world politics, is not in a position 
of imposing the policy with which other members of international society do not agree or 
are not wiling to adhere. This, undoubtedly, was the case with the response towards the 
9/11 atacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. 
 
The support for the US was delivered at various international forums such as the 
United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union as wel as 
even organisations, which were traditionaly reluctant to the policy of the US, such the 
Organization of African Unity and the Arab League. Importantly NGOs, such as Amnesty 
International, also condemned the atacks and caled ‘in the strongest terms for those 
responsible to be brought to justice’.12 This, as it wil be shown, suggest that international 
society accepted the rationale underlying the justification of the US and that the existing 
rules governing the use of force needed to be changed. Further evidence suggesting the 
widespread acceptance and recognition of the necessity of altering the existing rules 
governing the use of force can be observed by looking at the 2006 Operation Change 
Direction instigated by Israel within the teritory of Lebanon. As it wil be demonstrated, 
Israeli right of self-defence was recognised for the first time since 1968, when the Israeli 
armed forces launched their first military campaign in Lebanon. This, in turn, suggests that 
9/11 did not constitute an exception from existing rules but in fact set up the precedence, 
which created grounds for the alternation of existing principles governing the use of force. 
 
                            
12 Amnesty International, “Amnesty International: Human Rights Backlash” (4 October 2001) in 
htp:/www.globalissues.org/article/263/amnesty-international-human-rights-backlash (accessed 1 December 
2012). 
 7 
The fact that international rules can change does not mean that international law is 
weakened and its role reduced. Instead, it suggests that international law does not remain 
passive and adapts to new circumstances. Although the rules change seldom, the 
possibility of change does exists. What is necessary for such an alternation to take place is 
recognition and acceptance of it by members of the international society. The importance 
of international law can be observed in that even the US, as the most powerful state, 
implements international rules and norms. It can be seen in that the US after the 9/11 
atacks relied on legal provisions governing the use of force. Its military response was 
based on the right of self-defence and the perception of an imminent terorist threat. The 
response of international society clearly supports the assumption that states in their actions 
take into account international norms and rules. This is in agreement with Dunne, who 
argues that ‘[t]he fact that the wider society of states accepted the legality of the US 
position suggests that at this point the hyperpower was acting within the boundaries of 
international society’.13 It is argued then that, although the US acted in accordance to what 
was perceived as necessary and in the national interest, at the same time the US 
acknowledged the importance of international law. Furthermore, the events folowing the 
9/11 demonstrated the importance of international cooperation in facing international 
threats such as international terorism. The US favoured multilateral response to a terorist 
threat rather than just simply using its military power to suppress such threat. 
 
This thesis is placed within the theoretical debate on the role that both international 
society and international law play in world politics. It provides an analysis of diferent 
theoretical traditions and their perspectives on whether or to what degree the 
aforementioned concepts actualy influence states’ actions. The thesis begins by looking at 
                            
13 Dunne T, "Society and Hierarchy in International Relations," International Relations 17, no. 3 (2003): 311. 
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realist tradition, which either negates the very existence of international society and thus it 
minimises its power or underestimates its influential role even if it accepts that to a certain 
degree an entity such as international society may exist.  
 
This is folowed by an analysis of the Liberal Theory of International Relations and 
its utilitarian ofshoot. Both traditions recognise the role that both international society 
and international law play in world politics and thus their standpoints contribute 
significantly to this thesis. At the same time, however, both have their downsides and 
provide a limited portrait of both international law and international society. While the 
former puts too much emphasis on the domestic systems of governments, which although 
playing an important role in determining foreign policies does not provide suficiently 
complex answers to the questions raised in the thesis, the later whilst acknowledging the 
importance of both international law and institutions, though its emphasis on their 
utilitarian character diminishes or underestimates their actual role.  
 
It wil be demonstrated that the most important contribution to the study of the 
status of international law can be found in the writings of scholars associated with the 
English School of International Relations. This theoretical perspective does not negate the 
insights of the aforementioned theories. What it does, however, is use some of their core 
assumptions to formulate a more comprehensive understanding of international law 
through its thorough study of the notion of international society. The scrutiny of the status 
of international law wil be further enriched by reference to the constructivist scholarship, 
which provides an insightful contribution to the study of international norms. The chosen 
theoretical approach does not negate the fact that states create norms out of their own 
interest. What this perspective emphasises is that norms not only reflect the interest of 
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individual states but also of a society states belong to. It wil be shown, that the changed 
international approach towards the use of force in general evident since the end of the Cold 
War as wel as the change approach towards the use of force in relation to acts of terrorism 
noticeable since 9/11 signalise the development of the meaning of the very notion of 
international society. It wil be shown that as states’ interests reflect the interest of 
international society, once the later is altered so are the interests of the former. 
 
Moreover, the case studies wil demonstrate, that the normative and authoritative 
character of international law cannot be underestimated. This is not to say that 
international law does not have a utilitarian nature. It certainly does.14 However, as Bul, 
the leading representative of the English School, observed ‘[t]he importance of 
international law does not rest on the wilingness of states to abide by its principles to the 
detriment of their interests, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interests to 
conform to it’.15 States acknowledge the importance of norms and rules that influence 
international coexistence and cooperation, which, in turn, enable the preservation of 
international order. 
 
Both Constructivists and theorists associated with the English School emphasise 
the importance of norms and rules that influence states’ actions. Rules and norms possess 
two prominent roles, namely the role of constraining and the role of enabling. The former 
is ‘designed to constrain choices and/or as parameters within which individual agents 
pursue their own preferences’. 16 The later refers to the assumption that rules and norms 
                            
14 See a short discussion of Bul’s approach towards the international law in Simmons BA, "Compliance with 
International Agreements," Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 75-93. 
15 Bul (n 1) 134. 
16 Hurrel A, "”There Are No Rules” (George W. Bush): International Order after September 11," 
International Relations 16, no. 2 (2002): 186. 
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also are created in order to ‘enable and empower action’.17 What folows is that ‘[n]orms 
are therefore central to understanding the power to mobilize, to justify and to legitimize 
action’.18 This is the case in the post-9/11 picture of international politics. Moreover, this 
also supports the assumption that international norms are not stifly fixed and embedded 
but may possibly evolve and adjust to new circumstances. The 9/11 atacks and the US 
response influenced the notion of what is now understood as the right of self-defence. For 
the first time since the establishment of the UN Charter legal order, the right of self-
defence has been credited to the state responding to terorist atack. Moreover, taking into 
consideration that the military intervention in Afghanistan was justified, it wil be shown 
that there has been a growing support for the relaxation of rules governing the 
responsibility of states for the acts of non-state actors. According to one scholar, law and 
policy ‘have shifted dramaticaly in the post-9/11 era – ushering in new, enhanced 
acceptance of the use of military force to counter terorism’.19 The thesis ofers empirical 
support to this assessment. 
 
My thesis makes an original contribution to the understanding of the status of 
international law through its analysis of the ways international society responded towards 
the Israeli and the US policies of counter-terrorism. Although various authors focus on the 
policies of these two countries they do not provide a comparative analysis and the 
subsequent response of international society towards them. Such contribution is conducted 
here through empirical structured-comparative research. The conducted research is 
interdisciplinary, in that it explores the topic from the angle of both international law and 
international relations. This, in turn, alows for comprehensive and thorough investigation 
                            
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 Lietzau WK, "Old Laws, New Wars: Jus Ad Belum in an Age of Terrorism," Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations 8 (2004): 386. 
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and analysis. In other words, the originality of this thesis resides in that it approaches 
international norms towards the use of force through the comparative analysis of three 
military interventions. This delivers evidence of the change in international approach 
towards the actions, which can be regarded as lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. 
Although some authors highlight such change they do not look at its origin and its 
consequences on the existing international system. They either emphasise the hegemonic 
status of the US, which is in the position of dictating its wil and policy upon the rest of 
international society or they claim that it can break international law whenever it suits its 
national interest.20 These authors also point to the lack of the efectiveness of international 
law but, at the same time, they fail to acknowledge the role of international society in 
emphasising the ilegality of particular policies through various forums, most importantly 
the UN Security Council. As the international legal system difers from domestic systems, 
the role of international law does not lie only in whether or not it is executed. Its role also 
lies in that it enables states to co-exist in the anarchical system of world politics. 
International law provides a set of rules and norms, which alows for and prohibits certain 
actions. Its strengths lie in overal states’ recognition and acceptance of such legal system. 
As states are aware of the limitations and boundaries for their actions, the international 
spectrum can be described as becoming, to a certain extent, less conflictual. The end of the 
Cold War has brought new light onto the international system, in that there is bigger 
potential for international cooperation, which was evident in the way in which international 
society responded to 9/11. As it wil be demonstrated, such cooperation and solidarity 
                            
20 See, for example: Herz JH, "The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present 
Problems," International Relations 17, no. 4 (2003): 411-416. Jervis R, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and 
Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 42-63. Mearsheimer JJ, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. -- "Hearts and Minds," National Interest 69 (2002): 13-16. Solomon H, 
"In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Falen Idealist," African Security Review 5, no. 2 (1996). Waltz 
KN, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 5-41. 
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delivers further evidence that an international society does exist. States acknowledge that 
they comprise the international society and that they are bound by certain rules and norms. 
In pursuit of this argument, the dissertation is organised as folows. Chapter One 
provides a scene-seting exercise for the folowing assessment of the status of international 
law in the aftermath of 9/11. This is conducted through an analysis of Natural and 
Positivist Schools of International Law. An inclusion of a scrutiny of main international 
legal doctrines is essential as it alows for a thorough investigation of the development of 
the role and scope of international law throughout the centuries. The chapter further aims 
to introduce the reader to the most important points of history that contributed to the 
development of modern international law. Such an overview is narowed to those events 
and developments that influenced the proliferation of provisions governing the use of force 
as observed in contemporary international law. It involves looking not only at those 
provisions regarding the prohibition of the use of force but also, most importantly, at the 
right of self-defence. Here, it is also essential to evaluate the notion of international 
society, its origins and evolution, which constitutes an integral part of this chapter. 
Assuming, arguend, that the existence of international law is ‘the most essential proof of 
the very existence of international society’21 analyses of both are, indeed, essential and 
inseparable for this study. 
Moreover, the fact that this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the 
status of international law through an analysis of the response of international society 
towards counterterorist policy of Israel and the US and therefore, it constitutes means 
through which this research is undertaken, the evolution of international society itself is 
21 Souza EM de, "Re-Evaluating the Contribution and Legacy of Hedley Bul," Brazilian Political Science 
Review 2, no. 1 (2008): 97. 
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indispensible for this thesis. Finaly, this chapter also looks at the provisions of 
international law regarding the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. It involves an 
analysis of whether or when a terrorist atack can constitute an armed atack, and when a 
state can be held responsible for such an act. This, in turn, is folowed by identifying the 
place that non-state actors occupy within the international arena. It investigates the 
developments that occured throughout the second part of the twentieth century that led to 
a shift in treatment of non-state actors from marginal groups with limited scope to actors 
which are capable of obtaining essential resources that threaten the national security of 
states.  
The aim of Chapter Two is to provide an overview of the key concepts and 
hypotheses of the chosen theories of International Relations. It begins with looking at the 
mainstreams of IR theories, broadly associated with liberal and realist traditions and their 
perspectives on the role of international law. An outline of their broad scholarship wil 
provide an essential foundation for the subsequent analysis of case studies. Importantly it 
also alows for an appreciation of richness of the English School Theory of International 
Relations. As this theory of International Relations values insightfulness of both realist and 
liberal traditions it can, therefore, be viewed as a synthesis of these theoretical approaches. 
It wil be demonstrated that the English School’s understanding of the role of international 
law through its broad scholarship on the notion of international society can be further 
enriched by reference to scholars associated with Constructivism. The aim of an adoption 
of such symbiotic approach is to contribute to the study of both theories on international 
society through a sustained analysis of international law as an institution and medium. 
14 
In addition, Bul with his significant contribution to the study of both the 
international society and international law is chosen as a leading theorist, whose writings 
are treated as a point of departure for the analysis. Although his studies are devoted to the 
period of world politics prior to the end of the Cold War, they acknowledged the 
possibility of change. Such deduction can be derived from the fact that Bul had been 
investigating the evolution and various shifts associated with notions such as order, 
system, society and law within the international arena. 
An important contribution and supplement to the writing of Bul is delivered by 
Clark. His analysis of the notion of hegemony and positioning of the US as the world’s 
superpower is crucial for this study. Moreover, as Clark focuses on the curent and recent 
world afairs his analysis can significantly contribute to the scrutiny of the international 
approach towards the use of force since the end of the Cold War. The analysis is further 
enriched by the writings of Constructivists, who emphasise the pivotal role of norms, 
which influence states’ actions. As this thesis argues that these theoretical perspectives 
deliver the most comprehensive account of both international law and international society 
it is important to provide a comprehensive foundation for the subsequent analysis. To this 
end separate subsections are dedicated solely to understanding of international law and 
international society. Apart from looking at various theories of International Relations and 
their possible approaches to the topic in question, this chapter also delivers reasoning 
behind choosing the UN Security Council as a proxy of international society. An overview 
of the research methods chosen for this research is provided in the final section of this 
chapter. This section delivers an explanation behind a choice of qualitative methods as the 
most appropriate methodology, a selection of three case studies and the notion of change in 
international customary law. 
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Chapter Three sets out the first case study of this research, which investigates the 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, launched by Israeli forces within Lebanese teritory and 
the subsequent response of international society towards this intervention. The choice of 
this operation for comprising the case study was dictated by its scope and international 
agreement to regard it as the unlawful use of force. In addition, this military operation can 
be seen as constituting the biggest Israeli intervention within Lebanese territory when 
compared with other operations carried out by Israel since 1968 until 1996. Although the 
target of the military operations difered during that period, al of them were based on the 
same justification and international society treated them in particular way. Therefore, most 
of other interventions can be seen as constituting a background through which Operation 
Peace for Galilee can be analysed.  
The general patern observed in the way international society responded to these 
operations was condemnation and non-recognition of Israeli right to self-defence. Here, an 
analysis of the responses of the members of the United Nations Security Council is 
provided. In order to scrutinise the reasons behind the decision of the UNSC to condemn 
Israeli military actions, this chapter needs to include an analysis of whether the initial 
atack that triggered Israeli justification constituted an armed atack and whether Lebanon 
could have been held responsible for actions of insurgent groups operating from its 
teritory. It also looks at the Israeli policy and approach towards the actions of non-state 
actors and whether it had a right to undertake military actions in order to invoke 
international law provisions regarding the right of self-defence. 
Chapter Four presents the second case study, namely the response of international 
society towards the US-led military Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001. 
16 
It begins by providing an overview of the justification of the US government to launch this 
military intervention. This overview includes scrutiny of the foundations to treat the 9/11 
atacks that were instigated by al-Qaeda on American soil as triggering the right to self-
defence. This is folowed by the way in which international society responded to both the 
atacks and the subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan. 
Although the main focus is towards the reaction of United Nations Security 
Council, the responses of other UN bodies and international organisations is brought up in 
order to emphasise the gravity of solidarism and support for the US action. Taking into 
consideration the fact that for the first time explicitly the right of self-defence was 
recognised in relation to a terorist atack, which, in turn, suggests that a change occured 
in states perception of instances when a force can be used. In order to investigate this 
change, a comparison between the ways in which international society responded to 
Operations Peace for Galilee and Enduring Freedom is undertaken. This, in turn, leads to 
scrutiny of whether the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan met the international legal 
requirements as had been known prior to 9/11. This part involves comparison between the 
atacks that led those two countries to launch military operations and whether 9/11 
constituted an armed atack in accordance with international law. This is folowed by a 
comparative analysis of the relationships between two hosting states, namely Lebanon and 
Afghanistan and non-states actors. It involves looking at whether the relationship of al-
Qaeda with the Taliban regime was of such a level as to imply a responsibility to 
Afghanistan for these atacks, which in turn would give a basis for a lawful exercise of the 
US right to self-defence. The significance of this case study can be seen explicitly in that it 
provides evidence of change in states’ approaches towards both non-state actors and states, 
which alow wilingly or unwilingly their teritories to be used as bases for these actors. 
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Chapter Five analyses the two case studies through a reference to diferent IR 
theories. It provides a comparative analysis of the possible theoretical explanations for the 
change that occurred since 2001 in the international approach towards the use of force. It 
wil be demonstrated that in fact some of theoretical perspectives refered to throughout 
this thesis point to the hegemonic status of the United States and its ability to influence 
world politics. It wil be shown that a position the hegemon holds on international arena 
was an underlying factor behind the changed international approach towards the use of 
force since the 9/11 atacks. What wil be established, however, is that the theories referred 
to throughout the thesis comprises of diferent understanding of the notion of hegemony. It 
wil be argued that the ES analysis of the international society delivers a significant 
contribution to realist and neo-liberal perceptions of the curent position of the US. As 
such conclusion is reached, an inclusion of the third case study and its theoretical analysis 
is crucial for the presentation of a comprehensive and coherent account of the change and 
the status of contemporary international law.  
Chapter Six sets out the final case study, namely the response of international 
society towards the 2006 Israeli Operation Change Direction instigated in Lebanon. In a 
similar manner to preceding chapters, it begins with the presentation of the Israeli 
justification to launch a military intervention in a neighbouring country and the subsequent 
response of the international society. The investigation is undertaken from the angle of the 
preceding two case studies. It provides a comparative analysis of international response 
with a central aim to emphasise the change that occured in a way international society 
treated Operations Peace for Galilee and Change Direction, when for the first time Israeli 
right to self-defence achieved international recognition. This change is also analysed from 
18 
the angle of 9/11 and the growing acceptance of a wider definition of the right to self-
defence.  
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the 2006 Operation Change Direction from 
diferent IR theoretical perspectives. It sets the aforementioned operation within the 
international environment surounding both the end of the Cold War and new 
developments regarding the use of force that occurred since the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom. It wil be demonstrated that although the hegemonic status of United States was 
a crucial factor underlying the change in international approach towards the use of force in 
the aftermath of 9/11, it was not the sole reason. In addition, it wil be shown that this 
change can be viewed through the angle of a broader spectrum, i.e. the change within the 
notion of international society itself. An analysis of a broad scholarship of both the English 
School of IR and Constructivism wil alow the present author to formulate the claim that 
the curent international society cannot be easily positioned either within pluralist or 
solidarist conceptions of international society. What wil be argued instead is that 
international society is in a transitional phase, somewhere between these two conceptions. 
The Conclusion is structured in the folowing way. Firstly, it delivers a summary of 
findings relied upon throughout this thesis. This involves firstly merging of the 
problématique of this thesis, namely the variation of international responses towards three 
case studies in question. This is folowed by a provision of the synopsis of the main 
arguments presented throughout this study. The second part of the conclusion looks at 
implications of findings of this thesis on international law. By outlining main assumptions 
delivered by theoretical perspectives refered to throughout this study it provides an 
analysis of the status of international law in the aftermath of 9/11 atacks. Lastly, it 
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specifies a terain for further research exploring the role and power of the hegemon. Prima 
facie evidence suggests that both international law and international society do possess 
constraining powers over the hegemon. And for its sustainability, hegemony as a potential 
institution of international society needs recognition and legitimacy, which can only be 
maintained if the hegemon acts in accordance with an accepted rules and norms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Introduction 
 The September 11 atacks upon the United States of America have had an impact 
upon the existing legal order governing the use of force. Although the decade folowing the 
end of the Cold War had already put into question notions such as the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic afairs by bringing back an idea of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds, the events folowing 9/11 deepened the alternations 
even further by broadening the scope of the right of self-defence in instances of terorist 
atacks. Although the rules dealing with international terorism existed prior to 9/11, the 
significance of this event can be observed in that for the first time the right of self-defence 
in relation to terorism was recognised. This recognition coupled together with the 
overwhelming support for the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom launched in 
Afghanistan indeed suggest that the approach of international society towards the 
traditional principles and provisions treating the use of force has been altered.  
 It wil be argued throughout this thesis that 9/11 constitutes a momentous event 
afecting the modern international legal system. Firstly it needs to be noted that not only 
the right of self-defence was recognised in relation to terorist atack but also a terorist 
atack was identified as constituting a threat to international peace and security.1 By 
recognising the right of self-defence, international society acknowledged that a victim state 
has a right to use force in order to protect itself. Moreover, it also meant that a terorist 
1 See UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368 and UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) 
UN Doc S/RES/1373. 
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atack was of such gravity as amounting to an armed atack in accordance with Article 51 
of the UN Charter. The recognition of the right to self-defence in relation to a terorist 
atack has also signified that the use of force could be used against the teritory of a hosting 
state. This, treated together with the recognition of the constitution of the threat to 
international peace and security, which implied the possibility of implementation of the 
provisions embodied within the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, has indeed chalenged the 
typical international approach towards the hosting states. Such development has had 
consequences upon the existing international legal order governed by the principles such as 
respect for states’ sovereignty and non-intervention. 
In addition, various interventions taking place during the 1990s had already put the 
traditional approach towards the above principles into question. International responses to 
the first Gulf War and internal crises exemplified in cases such as Somalia and Former 
Yugoslavia suggested a wider recognition of the provisions listed within Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter. Such recognition in turn may imply that international society reflects and 
expresses greater solidarity2 between its members than it was possible during the Cold 
War. The changed approach of international society towards the use of force suggests the 
rebirth of thinking associated with the Natural School of International Law. This school of 
thought postulated the existence of general principles and rights that derive from human 
reason. The set of these principles constitutes the law of nature, which governs internal and 
external afairs of a state alike. One of the most important assumptions of this school was 
the distinction between just and unjust wars. Importantly for this thesis, the use of force in 
2 It is a characteristic of an international society ‘with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and 
institutions among states, where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition, but also on 
cooperation over a wider range of issues, whether in pursuit of joint gains (e.g. trade), or realisation of shared 
values (e.g. human rights)’ (Buzan B, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xvii.) 
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self-defence was treated by representatives of this school as one of the just causes to wage 
war. Moreover, they also advocated a possibility of using force for humanitarian reasons. 
    
    Such alternation in international approach has had various consequences. Firstly, it 
has chalenged the international system established in the aftermath of the Peace of 
Westphalia. This system, also refered to as the modern states system, was based on the 
notions of sovereignty and non-interference within domestic afairs of independent states. 
As a state was treated as possessing an absolute power over its teritories and no higher 
authority was recognised, the internal situation was the concern only of the state in 
question and no other state could interfere within afairs of that state.3 
 
     Secondly, it has put into question international legal order based on the prohibition 
of the use of force established after the Second World War and embodied within the UN 
Charter. The general prohibition of the use of force, unless in instances governed by the 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, has been rightfuly seen as one of the major achievements 
of international society. When the international legal system governed by the prohibition of 
the use of force embodied within the UN Charter is looked upon, its origins lie in the 
desire of international society to minimise conflicts and endorse peaceful resolution of 
disputes between states. The comparison of this legal system with the system governing 
the relations between states during the earlier century when war was an acceptable means 
to achieve a state’s goals further supports an argument that international society, since the 
adoption of the UN Charter and mindful of the destruction caused by two World Wars, 
wanted to create an international system where states could resolve their disputes 
peacefuly. This can be further supported by the growing international support for the 
                            
3 See, for example: Gross L, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," American Journal of International Law 
42, no. 1 (1948): 27-29. 
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narow scope of the right to self-defence, as wil be exemplified by the first case study of 
this thesis. The creation of such a legal system with the UN as its guardian, gave evidence 
that international society recognised the restrictive character of international law. 
However, when the world politics since the end of the Cold War are scrutinised it can be 
seen that the international society has stopped being explicitly reluctant towards the use of 
force.  
 
     As the use of force always constituted the most important aspect of world politics, 
the evolution of international law can be seen as miroring the developments of legal 
provisions treating the use of force. Throughout the period of the last four centuries world 
politics has always influenced and had a significant impact on international law. As 
international law always reflected the changes and was affected by the events occuring 
within the international sphere so did the writings of theorists who devoted their time to the 
analysis of the status of law in international relations. There have been two main schools 
of thought, namely the Natural and Positivist Schools, which focused on the merits of 
international law. Both schools, although diferently, tried to establish and scrutinise the 
role of international law in world politics with special emphasis on the use of force. While 
the first one emphasised more the bonds that existed between states comprising an 
international society and therefore highlighted the notion of justness even in relation to 
war, the later stressed the regulatory nature of international law providing the guidelines 
for the conduct in the time of peace and in the time of war alike. As war became a 
legitimised instrument of states, which meant that states could use it whenever it was in 
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their national interest, the jus in belo, instead of the jus ad belum,4 prominent within 
natural law tradition, was emphasised.  
 
    The purpose of this chapter is to provide a scene-seting for the assessment of the 
status of international law in the aftermath of 9/11. To that end, the chapter is divided into 
three main parts. Part One provides a scrutiny of two main schools of international legal 
thought. The scrutiny of both Natural and Positivist Schools of International Law is 
essential as it delivers foundation for the analysis of the ways in which international law 
was portrayed throughout the centuries and the extent to which these theories remain 
relevant in the twenty-first century and whether they can stil adequately interpret the role 
of international law. Moreover, these schools of legal thought ofer theoretical 
underpinning for the two conceptions of international society developed by scholars 
associated with the English School of International Relations. As wil be demonstrated, 
while pluralist conception of international society reflects positive principles, solidarist 
one echoes those advocated by thinkers associated with Natural Law tradition. Part Two 
scrutinises the developments of international law that occurred throughout the twentieth 
century in regards to the use of force in international relations. The main objective of this 
part is to discuss the atempts of international society to limit the war and the use of force 
in general through the creation first of the League of Nations and then the United Nations. 
Further, it introduces the reader to the legal seting established in the aftermath of the 
Second World War relevant to the discussion about the right to self-defence in relation to 
terorism. Part Three presents initial inquiries into the status of the contemporary 
international law. 
 
                            
4 For detailed definitions and differences between the two concepts, see for example: Kolb R Hyde R, An 
Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008). 
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Part One: Schools of International Legal Thought 
 
a) The Natural School of International Law and the Just War 
 
     According to writers associated with this school of thought, relations between 
humans as between states are governed by a certain higher law, which is caled the law of 
nature. As opposed to the positive law which is based on the free wil of sovereign, which 
can be altered, the natural law is unchangeable and remain constant. 5 It consists of certain 
general principles, which can be deduced by reason. Due to the fact that individuals and 
similarly states are seen as rational entities they can deduce from their rational nature 
which behaviour and actions are right or wrong. In addition, the ability to distinguish 
between good and evil enables human beings to recognise what actions can be seen as just 
or unjust. Grotius, the leading representative of this school, defines natural right as 
 
the dictate of right reason, shewing the moral turpitude, or moral necessity, 
of any act from its agreement  or  disagreement  with a rational  nature, and 
consequently that such an act is either forbidden or commanded by God, the 
author of nature.6 
                            
5 For general information about natural law, see for example: Elbe J von, "The Evolution of the Concept of 
the Just War in International Law," American Journal of International Law 33, no. 4 (1939): 665-688. 
George RP, "Natural Law," Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 31, no. 1 (2008): 171-196. Hal S, "The 
Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism," European Journal 
of International Law 12, no. 1 (2001): 267-307. Kunz JL, "Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of 
International Law," American Journal of International Law 55, no. 4 (1961): 951-958. O'Brien WV, "Natural 
Law and International Law in the American Tradition," World Afairs 141, no. 2 (1978): 104-117. Remec PP, 
The Position of the Individual in International Law According to Grotius and Vatel (The Hague Martinus 
Nijhof, 1960). 
6 Grotius H, The Rights of War and Peace. Including the Law of Nature and of Nations (Transl. By Ac 
Campbel) (Washington & London: Elibron Classics, 1901, 2005), bk. I, ch. i, section X, 21. This definition 
of natural right in a different edition reads: ‘the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, shewing the Moral 
Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a 
reasonable Nature, and consequently, that such an Act is either forbid or commanded by GOD, the Author of 
Nature’ (emphasis in original) Grotius H, The Rights of War and Peace (Ed. By R Tuck) (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, Inc., 2005), bk. I, section X.1., 150-151. 
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   In other words, human beings are capable to deduce from their right reason to 
recognise which actions are or are not in accordance with the law of nature. Although al 
human beings show an inclination for self-preservation, which derives from their instincts 
common to al animals, the principles which are in agreement with reason, ‘which is the 
basis of propriety, should have more weight than the impulse of appetite; because the 
principles of nature recommend right reason as a rule that ought to be of higher value than 
bare instinct’.7 
 
   A very distinctive place in the classic school of natural law is indeed reserved for 
Hugo Grotius, whose original contribution was seen in that he delivered a comprehensive 
legal framework for international relations.8 Because of his unique contribution he is 
usualy refered to as ‘the father of international law’.9 According to him the law of nature 
should govern the relations between states as it governs relations between individuals. 
Although he recognizes the value and importance of positive law, which he refered to as 
volitional law (ius voluntarium),10 its role is subordinate to that of natural law, which is 
                            
7 Grotius (n 6 [1901, 2005]) bk. I, ch. i, section I, 31. 
8 For further information on Grotius and his writing, see for example: Anonymous, International Law and the 
Grotian Heritage. A Commemorative Coloquium Held at the Hague on 8 April 1983 (Hague: TMC Asser 
Instituut, 1985). Brown Scot J, "‘Grotius’ De Jure Beli Ac Pacis Libri Tres: The Work of a Lawyer, 
Statesman and Theologian," American Journal of International Law 19, no. 3 (1925): 461-468. Edwards CS, 
Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holand. A Study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hal Inc., 
1981). Higgins R, "Grotius and the United Nations," International Social Sciences Journal 1 (1985): 119-
127. Lauterpacht H, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law 23 
(1946): 1-53. Midgley EBF, The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations (London: 
Elek Books Ltd, 1975). Murphy C, "The Grotian Vision of World Order," American Journal of International 
Law 76 (1982): 477-498. Pound R, "Grotius in the Science of Law," American Journal of International Law 
19, no. 4 (1925): 685-688. Reeves JS, "The First Edition of Grotius’ De Jure Beli Ac Pacis, 1625," American 
Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (1925): 12-22. Volenhoven C van, "Grotius and the Study of Law," 
American Journal of International Law 19, no. 1 (1925): 1-11. -- Grotius and Geneva (Bibliotheca 
Visseriana, 1926). Vreeland H Jr, " Hugo Grotius, Diplomatist " American Journal of International Law 11, 
no. 3 (1917): 580-606. Yasuaki O ed., A Normative Approach to War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo 
Grotius (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
9 Shaw MN, International Law (5th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23-24. 
10 According to Remec, the volitional law is the best translation of the Latin term used by Grotius as it refers 
to law that it ‘originates in the wil of a lawgiver while the addresses of that law are in no way free to decide 
whether they wil or wil not folow a given, particular rule. They are obliged to obey as the particular rule is 
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superior and unchangeable. The superiority of the law of nature can be seen in its 
immutability. The positive law based on the free wil of states is inclined for changes. The 
law of nature, on the other hand, is characterised by constancy and therefore it cannot be 
changed.  
 
     The immortality and importance of the writings of Grotius can be observed in that 
even during the twentieth century, three centuries after his death, his ideas are stil very 
influential although his emphasis on morality and justness in international relations 
constitutes an ultimate and ideal conception of world afairs. The continuing interest in his 
writing is not only reserved to his understanding of the law of nations with special concern 
dedicated to the notion of war. His idea of international society has led writers associated 
with the English School of International Relations to create a conception of a solidarist 
international society based primarily on the writings of Grotius. This idea of international 
society implies that members of such a society show an inclination for belonging to such a 
society and their commitment to it and its institutions’ sustainability and maintenance.11 
The solidarist factor can be observed in that members of such a society express ‘solidarity, 
or potential solidarity (…) with respect to the enforcement the law’.12 Although in his 
treatise, Grotius did not explicitly refer to international society as a solidarist one,13 the 
                                                                                    
binding regardless of their express consent to it’ ((n 5) note 6, 69). The term voluntary on the other hand ‘has 
a connotation of arbitrariness and refers primarily to those who are supposed to folow the law voluntarily, 
i.e. out of their own wil’ (ibid.). 
11 Kingsbury B Roberts A, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations, ed. Bul H et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8. 
12 Bul H, "The Grotian Conception of International Society (1966)," in Hedley Bul on International Society, 
ed. Alderson K Hurrel A (Basingstoke and London: Macmilan Press Ltd, 2000), 97. 
13 Indeed the very definition of how the term international society was understood by him is not provided. In 
fact his usage of such term may be quite confusing as he referred to it as ‘great society of states’ (Grotius H, 
Prolegomena to the  De Jure  Beli  ac  Pacis, reprinted in Wilson  GG, "Grotius:  Law  of  War and  Peace," 
American Journal  of International  Law 35,  no.  2 (1941): section  17,  212.) Or  on the  other time as an 
‘association  which  binds together the  human race,  or  binds  many  nations together’ (ibid, section  23,  214) 
which in turn suggests that for him these concepts were synonymous (Remec (n 5) 78). It may, nevertheless, 
be assumed that whereas ultimately he had in mind a wider concept which signified a society of mankind, the 
concept of society of states was a tool, which he used while treating the issues accustomed the law of nations 
and the notion of war.  
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principles comprising the basis of such a society are explicit in his writings. In addition, he 
argued that states on an international scale, similarly to individuals on a local scale, show 
an inclination for living in a society. In a similar manner, as nations are seen as ‘larger 
aggregations of individuals’, which show inclination for good and justice, so is the society 
of nations, which similarly ‘needs the recognition of rights as much as mere local 
communities’.14 Moreover, Grotius claimed that the existence of the law of nations could 
be proved by the fact that nations accept that some rules constitute rules of the law of 
nations.15 Further, he advocated the idea that a state, which in its domestic afairs complies 
with the law, should behave in the same way at the international arena.16 
 
As at a municipal level states possessed rights, which are solely reserved for them, 
similarly on an international level, the actions of states and not individuals are governed by 
the law of nations. In his treatment of the law of nations, Grotius advocated an idea that 
legal rules should be extended and applicable to ‘al nations and tribes of the earth’ without 
any discrimination.17 His universal application of the law of nations is clear already in the 
Prolegomena to the De Jure Beli ac Pacis, where he stated that, 
 
[b]ut just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage of that state, 
so  by  mutual consent it  has  become  possible that certain laws should 
originate as between al states, or a great many states; and it is apparent that 
the laws thus originating had in view the advantage, not of particular states, 
but of the great society of states.18 
                            
14 Hil DJ, ‘Introduction’ to H Grotius, the Rights of War and Peace. Including the Law of Nature and of 
Nations (Washington & London Elibron Classics, 1901, 2005), 9. 
15 Remec (n 5) 77. 
16 Volenhoven (n 8 [1926]) 13. 
17 ibid 14. 
18 Grotius (n 13) section 17, 212. 
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   As the title of his famous treatise reads The Rights of War and Peace, Grotius 
devoted a substantial part of his study to the concept of war and its possible legality and 
justness. Although he was of an opinion that war in its essence is not in accordance with 
the law of nature, he noted that in some instances the use of force could be permited. 
 
For the preservation of our lives and persons, which is the end of war, and 
the possession or acquirement of things necessary and useful to life is most 
suitable to those  principles  of  nature, and to  use force, if  necessary, for 
those  occasions, is  no  way  dissonant to the  principles  of  nature, since al 
animals are endowed  with  natural strength, suficient to assist and  defend 
themselves.19 
 
    In addition,  not al forms  of force are forbidden  but  only those  which are 
‘repugnant to society, by depriving another of his right’.20 Grotius, indeed, considered war 
as a  useful and adequate tool  by the authority and  hence  he acknowledged its  utilitarian 
character  when  he asked: ‘what can  be  opposed to force,  but force?’.21 The evidence for 
that, according to him, can be found in that war was not outlawed by the volitional law of 
nations.22 In addition, the force used in order to enforce rights is not ‘in a conflict with the 
nature of society’23 and is permited and in accordance with the law of nature. Here the just 
and  moral elements  of  Grotius’s  perception  of the just  war are clearly  observable.  The 
word just should  be  understood as moraly just. If the  war is  waged in  order to execute 
justice and is kept within the ‘bounds of law and good faith’24 than such a just war is ‘the 
                            
19 Grotius (n 6) bk. I ch. i, section I, 32. 
20 ibid 33. 
21 ibid 34. 
22 ibid 36. 
23 Remec (n 5) 93. 
24 Grotius (n 13) section 25, 215. 
 30 
ultimate outward sanction of the law of nature’.25 According to him there are three reasons 
for waging a just war in accordance with the law of nature, namely: defence, recovery of 
property and  punishment.26 A right  of sovereign  power  was  not  only limited to the 
instances when it had to defend itself once it had been atacked or when it is under an on-
going atack.  Sovereign  power as  opposed to individuals  has the right to  prevent and 
punish the  wrong  doers.  Although in instances  where there is an immediate threat (‘the 
suspicion  of  hostile intentions’) a  potential  victim cannot justifiably  wage ‘actual  war’ it 
can nevertheless resort to preventive measures including defence.27 
 
    For  Grotius,  war should  be  used as a tool to achieve the  preservation  of society. 
Thus  when a society is in  danger then ‘moral leaders’  of  universal  human society could 
wage war in order to serve the justice. In addition, states are ‘moraly and legaly obliged’ 
to consider not only the rights and interests of their own people but also those of the whole 
mankind.28 This should also be governed and limited by the law of nature.29 By giving the 
moral representatives  of international society the  power to  wage  war in  order to serve 
justice,  Grotius advocated the  possibility  of  defending  other  nations.  According to  him 
‘kings who measure up to the rule of wisdom make account not only of the nation which 
has been commited to them, but of the whole human race’.30 From his writings it can be 
observed that Grotius admited the possibility of humanitarian intervention as long as it is 
governed  by  morality and justness and is in accordance  with the law  of  nature.31 The 
solidarist conception  of international society,  which vests the  power to its  members to 
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judge when the use of force can be used, as wil be further explained later in this chapter, 
has been very influential during the period folowing the end of the Cold War. 
 
     Such a conception of international society, which postulated the possibility of 
intervention on humanitarian grounds, was not a unified concept among writers associated 
with the Natural Law School. Before elaborating on that it is necessary to stress that even 
this school of thought was not unified. According to Remec, there are two distinctive 
schools of natural law, namely the classic and the modern.32 The classic school, with 
Grotius as its representative, postulated the notion of the law of nature described above. 
The modern, egalitarian school of natural law, on the other hand, provided a diferent 
conception of natural law. Writers within this circle claimed that ‘the moral principles of 
good and evil could not realy be conceived with absolute certainty by our reason, or (…) 
wisdom and justice thus conceived could never be realized in life at al’.33 For them, 
human beings are selfish and do not show in the state of nature an inclination for life in 
society, which was the main dogma of the classic school. 
 
    Emer de Vatel (1714-67), the leading representative of the modern school argued 
that states, similarly to individuals, show an inclination for self-preservation. This in turn 
implies that a state’s foremost obligation is towards its nation and its prosperity and safety. 
In addition, ‘a nation owns herself in the first instance, and in preference to al other 
nations, to do every thing she can to promote her own happiness and perfection’.34 The 
obligation that states possess towards themselves is internal and immutable and derives 
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from the law of nature. Such duty does not, however, exclude an existence of other duties 
that states possess towards each other. According to him, an ‘individual nation is bound to 
contribute every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of al the others’.35 For 
instance, an obligation to assist other states in their achievement of preservation and 
happiness is external and inferior to an obligation a state would have towards its nation. 
 
     Such a distinction between the internal and external duties and the obligations of 
states influenced Vatel’s conception of international society. His ‘universal society of 
human race’ is defined as ‘an institution of nature itself, that is to say, a necessary 
consequence of the nature of man, - al men, in whatever stations they are placed, are 
bound to cultivate it’.36 Such society, however, difers from the one observed at the 
domestic level. According to him, ‘[n]othing of this kind can be conceived or supposed to 
subsist between nations’.37 States, at the international level, are capable only of conceding 
‘to each other very limited but perfect rights’ based on ‘a certain implied or presumed 
consent’.38 The most fundamental perfect rights are those of equality and liberty.39 These 
rights are fundamental as without them a society of nations could not prosper as nations 
would not have an equal chance to fulfil their fundamental duties, namely the duty of self-
preservation and self-perfection.40 Due to the fact that states agree that they are al equal 
and independent, each of them can decide which actions suits best their obligation to self-
preservation and self-perfection. What folows is that the decisions of a state when its 
needs are taken into consideration are always right and just and cannot be condemned by 
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other members of the society.41 Vatel’s perception of international society was so 
influential that writers within the English School of International Relations distinguished it 
from the solidarist conception of international society based on the teaching of Grotius. 
Indeed such a description of international society, as it wil be treated later in this chapter, 
was seen as the most coherent and was adopted by writers associated with positivism. 
 
    A significant part of Vatel’s treatise is devoted to the notion of war. As the 
fundamental duty of self-preservation and self-perfection places on a state an obligation to 
do everything in its power of such state to secure its nation ‘against every thing that 
threatens its safety and its happiness’,42 a state, expectedly, may use force when it is 
necessary to protect its nation. As states are independent and equal and therefore enjoy the 
freedom of actions, the judgement of whether the use of force is just or not lies within the 
conscience of the state. Nevertheless, similarly to Grotius, he distinguished three just 
causes of war, namely, self-defence, reparation of an injury, and punishment. In addition, a 
state may lawfuly resort to force in order to, firstly, ‘recover what belongs or is due to 
[it]’; secondly, ‘provide for [its] future safety by punishing the aggressor or ofender’ and 
lastly, ‘defend [itself], or (…) protect [itself] from injury, by repeling unjust violence’.43 
 
    Vatel’s international society lacks the powers and authority as existing within the 
solidarist conception of international society. For him, the most important principles are 
those of sovereignty and liberty, therefore neither one nor a group of members of such 
society can vest upon themselves a right to breach these principles. Indeed in his treatise, 
Vatel explicitly disagreed with Grotius in terms of the possibility of intervention within 
domestic afairs even on humanitarian grounds. In his own words: 
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[i]t is strange to  hear the learned and judicious  Grotius assert, that a 
sovereign may justly take up arms to chastise nations, which are  guilty of 
enormous transgressions of the law of nature, which treat their parents with 
inhumanity.44  
 
    Such an emphasis on the respect of states’ sovereignty and liberty places Vatel 
more within the circle of writers associated with positivism, the curent dominating 
throughout eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In addition, the law of nations based on 
natural law was gradualy replaced by law based on the wil of states, which was 
‘predominately positivist and consensual’.45 This, in turn, is said to give the law of nations 
‘a new and totaly different significance’.46  
 
b) The Positivist School and the Regulatory Nature of International Law47 
 
    The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have marked a change not only in the 
international environment but also in the teaching of and writing about the law of nations. 
This period was described as ‘the heyday of unlimited state sovereignty’48 and was 
characterised by the rise in significance of the rights of self-preservation and self-help. As 
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states were sovereign and equal as wel as not recognising a higher authority above them it 
was their responsibility to protect and advance their own national interests rather than the 
interests of international society. An international society based on the notion of solidarism 
and unity characterised by the existence of special bonds between its members was 
replaced by an international society explicit in the writings of Vatel and theorists 
associated with positivism. Such a conception of an international society, later named the 
pluralist one, was based on the recognition of principles such as sovereignty, equality, self-
preservation and self-help. Relations between states until the First World War can be 
characterised as seeking to maintain an international order via the sustainability of balance 
of power, recognition of spheres of influence and realpolitik. Within such an international 
realm states, apart from obligations they imposed upon themselves, were free to do 
whatever seemed to be in their interest. As their actions were not constrained by any higher 
authority the notions of justice and righteousness disappeared from international afairs. 
To this end, the role of the law of nations was to provide a framework of rules that would 
make the co-existence of members of such a society possible.49 
    
    The advocates of this notion of international society negated the existence of the 
solidarist conception as according to them, ‘states do not exhibit solidarity of this kind, but 
are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fal short of that of the 
enforcement of the law’.50 As the relations between states did not resemble the notion of 
unity and solidarity postulated by the representatives of the Natural Law School, which 
implied the possibility of existence of an international legal order based on the notions of 
justice and righteousness, the role of international law was to provide an environment 
suitable for states’ co-existence. As states did not recognise a higher authority above 
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themselves international obligations were imposed by states themselves. What folows was 
that obligations based on the free wil of states became ‘the fundamental cornerstone – or 
even the central dogma – of international law’.51 Apart from being obliged to respect 
contracts, customs and conventions, states actions were considered free from any external 
power. As Fenwick puts it:  
 
[n]o  obligations can  be imposed  upon them,  by  whatever  majority  of the 
international community, against their individual  wils.  Each remains the 
guardian  of its  own interests and the  ultimate arbiter  of its  own claims. 
Sovereignty is here seen in its purest form, as a theoretical position of legal 
isolation from  which the state can  be brought to emerge  only  by its 
voluntary acts.52 
 
    The regulatory nature of international law was the most evident in the treatment of 
war. As war was perceived as unavoidable and a certain characteristic of international 
relations at the time, as ‘friction was an inevitable and permanent feature of a mechanical 
system’,53 the role of international law was to provide a body of rules when it occured. 
And as war was ‘a fact of life’ there was no place in international law for deliberation on 
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whether such a war was just or unjust.54 Similarly those writers, who saw war as ‘the legal 
remedy of self-help’ for one state to seek redress, which was unachievable through other 
means for the wrong sufered from another state, were criticised.55 Although, this example 
of a purpose of war was not negated, what was emphasised was the fact that many other 
wars were fought in order to overpower another state and thus international law should 
regulate ‘al wars, whether just or unjust’.56 As war was seen as an international reality, 
which cannot disappear from international politics, the role of international law was to 
regulate the inevitable rather than to question its justness. Therefore, the right of self-
defence did not play any significant role. 
 
    As war was generaly accepted as a means to achieve a state’s goals and was not 
outlawed by international law the justness or unjustness behind waging war was of litle 
relevance. As opposed to the Natural Law School, the Positivist School did not pay much 
atention to when but how the use of force can be used. Such international situation made 
the notion of the right to self-defence ‘swalowed up by’57 by the right of self-preservation 
and self-help and thus played ‘only a shadowy and peripheral role in international law’.58 
What folowed was that ‘[t]he tribute paid to self-defence was in the nature of lip-service, 
and litle legal significance can be atached to it’.59 
    
   Nevertheless, there was one event, namely the 1837 Caroline incident, also refered 
to as the Caroline case, which is noteworthy. Although at the time of its occurence this 
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incident was not perceived as greatly significant and did not resemble the general practice 
of states in the nineteenth century60 its importance and value has been appreciated during 
the twentieth century.61 Indeed it can be argued that this incident was ahead of its time. Its 
significance lies in that it imposed certain limitations on a state exercising its right to self-
defence. In short, this case refers to correspondence notes between the representatives of 
the US and Great Britain, in which the later claimed that it had been exercising its right to 
self-defence.62 In addition, the leters were exchanged in response to a pre-emptive strike 
by the British troops in Canada against a ship named Caroline controled by Canadian 
rebels organising an atack from the US teritory.  
 
    This event showed that a state which acts in self-defence must show ‘necessity of 
self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation’.63 Not only there must be ‘an imminent threat’, leaving a state ‘no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation’ but also the force used by a victim state had to be 
proportionate to the actual threat.64 Accordingly, the action undertaken by a victim state 
must involve ‘nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of 
self-defence, must be limited by the necessity, and kept clearly within it’.65 It is argued that 
the Caroline case ‘has atained a mythical authority’.66 Significantly this incident occurred 
during the nineteenth century dominated by the positivist understanding of international 
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law, which did not pay much atention to the jus ad belum so emphasised by the Natural 
Law School. What should be pointed, however, is that at the time of its occurence this 
incident did not resemble actual state practice, as the right to self-defence was not of 
relevance. However, the principles of necessity and proportionality have been widely 
recognised during the twentieth century as principles imposing limitation on the use of 
force.  
 
   The authoritative character of these principles was accepted by the International 
Court of Justice during the last century in a number of cases, inter alia in the Nicaragua 
case,67 in an advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons68 
and in the Congo case,69 in which the Court sustained the opinion that these principles 
constitute a limitation on the use of self-defence. This, in turn, points to their longevity and 
universal recognition within international legal spectrum. It is also agreed that these 
principles are not controversial and what folows is that ‘necessity and proportionality 
mean that self-defence must not be retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be to halt and 
repel an atack’.70 McCormack while writing on the importance of these principles argues 
that ‘without these limitations, individual states could rely on a spurious claim to be acting 
in self-defence to justify any use of force that was in their own political interests’.71 What 
folows is that the recognition of these principles imposed certain restrictions on states 
acting in self-defence. States had to show that they are under an on-going atack or threat 
and therefore the use of force is necessary in order to protect themselves. This, as the first 
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case study wil demonstrate, has been very controversial in relation to acts of terorism, 
when it was dificult for Israel to prove that it was in fact under an on-going threat from 
non-state actors. The principle of proportionality, on the other hand, imposes upon states a 
limitation as to the amount of force used in self-defence.72 In short, states acting in self-
defence are obliged to act proportionaly to an actual threat. If the use of force is 
overwhelming and indeed exceeds the threat then military action in self-defence is deemed 
to be condemned and loses its lawfulness.  
 
Part Two: The Twentieth Century and the Use of Force 
 
     The general prohibition of the use of force can be seen as one of the biggest 
achievements of international society in the twentieth century. It took, however, two very 
destructive World Wars for international society to impose limitations on the use of force. 
The restrictions regarding the use of force were codified in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. The creation of the United Nations and the adoption of the UN Charter 
became a legal framework for the relations between states. Although during the first half 
of the twentieth century there had been atempts to restrict the resort to force, such as the 
adoption of the Kelogg-Briand Pact73 and the creation of the League of Nations,74 the 
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eruption of the Second World War proved that they were not efective mechanisms. On the 
other hand, it needs to be emphasised that the Pact together with the Covenant of the 
League of Nations expressed the trend and desire of international society, even if 
ultimately not very successful, to create a legal order based on the limitation of the use of 
force. Compared with general acceptance of war and the use of force in the nineteenth 
century as the legitimate method of self-help, both the 1928 Pact and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations can be regarded as a considerable success for international society.75 
 
    The most significant development in relation to the use of force and international 
legal system at large was the establishment of the United Nations in aftermath of the 
Second World War. The organisation, which became the only truly universal international 
body,76 came into existence on October 24, 1945 when the UN Charter was ratified.77 The 
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United Nations succeeded the League of Nations and absorbed its responsibilities. The 
scrutiny of the broad system of United Nations is beyond the scope of this study.78 One 
aspect which is crucial and needs to briefly elaborated, however, was the creation of the 
United Nations Security Council.79 The primary responsibility of the Council is 
maintenance of international peace and security.80 In addition, the UNSC is mandated, 
inter alia, to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international 
friction,81 to recommend methods of adjudicating such disputes,82 to determine the 
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existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression,83 to cal on member states to apply 
economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force,84 and finaly, to 
instigate military action in order to restore international peace and security.85 By vesting 
the function to maintain international peace and security to the UNSC, the founding 
member states recognised that the powers of individual states to use force would be 
limited. Such acceptance was not surprising taking into the consideration the horors of the 
Second World War and a desire to prevent the reoccurence of the conflict on such a scale 
in the future. 
 
    According to the UN Charter states have an obligation to refrain from the use of 
force,86 unless in an instance when a state has to defend itself87 or when the UN Security 
Council decides that a situation is threatening international peace and security. Thus, the 
war and in fact any use of force by individual states became outlawed88 and the only 
situation in which states could lawfuly use force was in an instance of self-defence. The 
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of Military Force to Counter Terrorism," Brooklyn Journal of International Law 31, no. 2 (2006): 1-58. 
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principle of sovereignty was stil sustained and respected and indeed remained a central 
feature characterising international order. Although the power to use force or to employ 
other measures, if necessary for the maintenance of peace and security, was vested in the 
UNSC, members of this international body expressed restraint and therefore respect for 
states’ sovereignty was seen of greater importance. Such an approach was influenced by 
international rivalry between two blocs. Moreover, as it is the UNSC which has the power 
to authorise the implementation of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the actual usage of 
these provisions was significantly restricted due to the veto powers exercised by the 
Permanent Members of this founding body. By the same token, the Permanent Members 
tended to use their veto power in situations relating to their spheres of influence. 
 
     The restriction of the use of force only to instances when a state has to defend itself 
suggests the return of the notion of just cause, so central to the writers within the Natural 
Law School’s circle. However, as opposed to the heyday of natural law a few centuries 
before, the notion of just cause is now embodied within an international treaty, inevitably a 
positive endorsement. Apart from the right to self-defence, the Charter also includes a 
possibility to use force colectively in instances when international peace and security is 
threatened, thus giving an international society a chance to be both a judge and an agent. 
Indeed, Chapter VI of the UN Charter - by giving the power to the UN Security Council 
to decide which dispute can constitute a threat to international peace and security and 
therefore giving basis for the implementation of various actions or sanctions - delivers 
evidence that that the Council acts as a judge and an agent. A creation of such a legal 
framework gives an explicit power to members of international society for an active 
involvement. This in turn suggests the relevance of the assumptions found in the solidarist 
conception of international society. Although the UN Charter gave a possibility for 
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international society to become more active, it was not until the end of the Cold War when 
the provision embodied within Chapter VI was implemented on such a scale. Such 
reluctance of international society can be explained by the existence of the conflict 
between the two superpowers and their desire to sustain the balance of power and the 
status quo. Therefore it can be argued that during the second half of the twentieth century 
although the solidarist assumptions were embodied within the UN Charter, the existing 
international environment was not suitable for the solidarist conception of international 
society. This in turn suggests that international society during that period can be viewed as 
resembling the characteristics of the pluralist conception of international society. That 
society, although governed by the existing rules and legal obligations, did not express a 
great level of solidarity uniting its members. 
 
     The role of international society as a judge can be also observed in relation to the 
states’ military actions undertaken in self-defence. As the first case study wil demonstrate, 
the UNSC held meetings after each Israeli intervention in Lebanon. These meetings 
involved presentations of various states’ statements and were usualy ended with an 
adoption of resolutions, which demanded Israeli withdrawal from the teritory of the 
neighbouring country. This case study and the folowing paragraphs also demonstrate that 
the notion of the right to self-defence was treated narowly in that a state, which was 
implementing this right, had to fulfil certain restrictive criteria.  
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    a) The Right of Self-defence in the Post-Second World War International Legal 
Order 
 
    As mentioned, according to international law a state that has been atacked can 
exercise its right to self-defence. The right to self-defence per se is not questioned. What is 
problematic, however, is the meaning of the term “an armed atack”. What action can and 
cannot constitute an armed atack is subject to major controversy. As the UN Charter was 
created at the time when the disputes were usualy between states, an armed atack was 
logicaly treated as launched by and against a state. As this thesis concentrates on states 
responses to atacks undertaken by non-state actors, such atacks wil constitute the main 
focus of this part. The case studies analysed in this thesis involve atacks launched by non-
state actors. In relation to the case study concerning Israel they were Hezbolah and PLO 
operating from Lebanon. In relation to the case study regarding the US military action in 
Afghanistan it was al-Qaeda. Both victim states claimed that the fact that non-state actors 
launched atacks did not deprive them from exercising their right to self-defence. 
Moreover, both states also blamed the governments of the states from whose teritory those 
groups operated.  
 
     The assumed guilt and blame of both Lebanon and Afghanistan, either de facto or 
de jure, point to the wel-established rule that an atack by a non-state actor had to be 
linked to a state in order for the victim state to lawfuly exercise its right to self-defence. 
Although the UN Charter does not refer to an atack launched by non-state actors, other 
legal documents constitute useful points of departure.89 For example, Article 3(g) of the 
                            
89 See, for example: Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UNGA Res 49/60 (17 
February 1995) A/RES/49/60. ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts 
(2001) Oficial Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10).  
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1974 Definition of Aggression, which has been recognised by the International Court of 
Justice as constituting part of customary law, reads: 
 
[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, iregulars 
or mercenaries, which cary out acts of armed force against another State of 
such  gravity as to amount to the acts listed above [such as invasion, 
occupation, annexation, bombardment, blockade, atack] or its involvement 
therein 
 
constitutes an indirect aggression. 90 In addition, armed bands can fal within these 
provisions once their actions are of such gravity that can be compared with action of 
regular forces.91 What needs to be emphasised is the relationship between a state and a 
non-state actor. Although during the second half of the twentieth century atacks by non-
state actors were not uncommon, the majority of scholars held the view that such atacks 
should be dealt with in accordance with more traditional ways, including municipal 
criminal law and other international legal instruments.92  
 
    For these atacks to fal within the scope of the provisions treating the right to self-
defence, the gravity of an atack has to be on scale comparable with an atack launched 
                            
90 Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974).  
91 Cassin V et al., "The Definition of Aggression," Harvard International Law Journal 16, no. 3 (1975): 597. 
92 Rogers APV, "Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and Its Aftermath" (2001) in 
www.crimesofwar.irg/expert/atack-apv.html [accessed 1 December 2012]. For example, Schmit argues that 
‘actions by non-State actors (..) might be criminal in nature and/or represent threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace or acts of aggression, but not be of a scale sufficient to implicate the international law right of self-
defence’ (Schmit MN, "Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law " The Marshal Center 
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involve apprehending of terrorists from a particular state (O’Connel ME, "Lawful Responses to Terrorism" 
(2001) in www.jurist.law.pit.edu/forum/forumnew30.html [accessed 1 December 2012]). 
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traditionaly by regular forces93 and the relationship between the state and non-state actors 
has to be proved. Both requirements were analysed by the International Court of Justice in 
the Nicaragua case, when the Court decided that according to customary international law 
for the action of non-state actors to be treated as an armed atack, they must be of ‘such 
gravity’ as if they were ‘conducted by regular forces’.94 The term “armed atack” wil be a 
subject of further, detailed analysis in chapter three, however certain issues need to be 
highlighted at this point. It is generaly argued that acts of revolutionary or armed groups 
of smal gravity and on smal scale cannot be classified as an armed atack.95 Nevertheless, 
as Brownlie argues ‘it is conceivable that a co-ordinated and general campaign by 
powerful bands of iregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity of the government 
of a state from which they operate, would constitute an “armed atack”’.96 In terms of their 
relationship, what needs to be proved is not only that non-state actors are connected to the 
state but that in fact their relationship was so close as to be characterised as dependent.  
 
    Such a view is supported by international case law. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ 
adopted a narow approach deciding that ‘even the general control by [a state] over a force 
with a high degree of dependency on it’97 would not mean that such a state is responsible 
for non-state actors’ actions. In addition, for that to be the case, ‘it would in principle have 
                            
93 According to Brownlie it should be understood as ‘some grave breach of the peace, or invasion by a large 
organised force acting on the orders of a government’ (Brownlie I, "International Law and the Activities of 
Armed Bands," International & Comparative Law Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1958): 731.) 
94 Nicaragua case (n 67) section 195, 103. 
95 Brownlie (n 65) 278-279. See also Wright Q, "Intervention, 1956," American Journal of International Law 
51, no. 2 (1957): 257-276. 
96 Brownlie (n 65) 278-279. 
97 Nicaragua Case (n 67) section 115, 64. The ICJ further decided that state’s ‘participation, even if 
preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the 
selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and planning of the whole of its operation, is stil insufficient 
in itself’ for that state to be held responsible for the actions of non-state actors (ibid [115] 64.) 
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to be proved that [such] a State had efective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations’.98 
 
    The atacks launched by non-state actors constituted very dificult cases for a 
victim state to exercise its right to self-defence.99 As was mentioned above, there is a 
necessity of a proof of existence of a relationship between non-state actors and a state.100 
Nevertheless, even if such a relationship had been established it remained unclear whether 
it might trigger a lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. Moreover, the very meaning 
of the term “relationship” constituted a subject of a debate. Although as mentioned above, 
the ICJ decided that a state had to possess an efective control, some authors and states, as 
wil be shown in the case study devoted to Israeli policy of counter-terorism in 
Lebanon,101 claimed that a state, which alows its territory to be used by non-state actors 
bears responsibility for the actions of such actors. The general opinion together with the 
ICJ, however, did not agree with such a view and although in principle accepted that such 
a state should exercise due diligence and not alow its teritory to be used by non-state 
actors, which aim was to commit a wrongful act against another state, did not share an 
                            
98 ibid (emphasis added). The ICJ judgment in this case was met with a substantial criticism (See, for 
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99 See, for example: Kammerhofer J, "Uncertainties of the Law in Self-defense in the UN Charter" 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 35 (2004): 143-204. 
100 See. for example: Ruys T Verhoeven S, "Atacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence," 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10 (2005): 289-320. 
101 See, chapter three, part one. 
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opinion that such a situation gives a victim state a right to use force.102 Moreover, some 
authors also emphasised the principle of necessity and that it was dificult to see how the 
threat in the case of an act of terorism was imminent, especialy when the atack already 
had taken place.103 
 
b) The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era 
 
     The two decades folowing the end of the Cold War give evidence of a more active 
involvement of international society. Indeed, as already mentioned, various interventions, 
including those on humanitarian grounds, that took place during this period suggest that 
the end of the Cold War not only ended the rivalry between the two superpowers but 
provided also a more suitable international environment for a greater cooperation between 
states and greater involvement. Examples such as the first Gulf War, as wel as 
interventions in Somalia and later in Kosovo suggest that the international environment in 
the aftermath of the Cold War was in favour of a changed approach towards the use of 
force.  
 
    International society, since then, paid more atention to the possibility of an 
implementation of provisions embodied within Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the 
possibility of intervention on humanitarian grounds.104 Although the later is not explicitly 
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included within the framework of the Charter, advocates of humanitarian intervention 
emphasise the provisions listed in Articles 41105 and 42.106 The authorisation of the UNSC 
has, nevertheless, always been essential and interventions without such an explicit 
authorisation, as the example of Kosovo demonstrated, were controversial.107 The gradual 
acceptance of the notion of humanitarian intervention, that international society should not 
remain silent about atrocities commited by states against their own population, gives 
evidence of the revival of the natural law thinking and the concept of just wars. This, in 
turn, suggests that the passive role of international society limited to acting as a judge 
                                                                                    
and Force (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1997) pp. 147-165. Chesterman S, Just War or Just 
Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001). Dingot Alkopher T, "The 
Role of Rights in the Social Construction of Wars: From the Crusades to Humanitarian Interventions " 
Milenium – Journal of International Studies 36 (2007): 1-27. Erickson MJ, "The United States and the Case 
for Humanitarian Intervention," Student Scholarship. Paper 339 (2013): 1-26. Evans G et al, 
"Correspondence. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect," International Security 37, 
no. 4 (2013): 199-214. Farer TJ et al, " Roundtable: Humanitarian Intervention after 9/11," International 
Relations 19, no. 2 (2005): 211-250. Franck TM NS Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force," American Journal of International Law 67, no. 2 (1973): 275-305. Franck 
TM, Recourse to Force. State Action against Threats and Armed Atacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). Hehir A Murray R, ed., Libya. The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2013). Holzgrefe JL Keohane RO, ed., 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: CUP, 2003). Janzekovic J, 
The Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention. Morality and Practicalities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
Kuperman AJ, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign, " International 
Security 38, no. 1 (2013): 105-136. Lilich RB, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 
(Charlotesvile: University Press of Virginia, 1973). Nardin T, "From Right to Intervene to Duty to Protect: 
Michael Walzer on Humanitarian Intervention," European Journal of International Law 24, no. 1 (2013). 
Pape RA, "When Duty Cals: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention," International Security 
37, no. 1 (2012): 141-180. Schmit MN, "The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law 
Justifications," International Law Studies 89 (2013): 744-756. Stahn C, "Between Law-Breaking and Law-
Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be," Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 19, no. 1 (2014): 25-48. Tesón FR, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (2nd 
edn Transnational Publishers Inc . 1997). Terry F, The Paradox of Humanitarian Intervention. Condemned to 
Repeat? (New York: Cornel University Press, 2002). Welsh JM, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
105 Article 41 reads: ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to five efect to its decisions, and it may cal upon the Members of the United Nations to 
apply such measures (…)’ UN Charter (n 77). 
106 Article 42 reads: ‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by ait, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary (…)’ UN Charter (n 77). 
107 See, for example: Boyle A, "Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Commitee 4th Report, June 
2000," International & Comparative Law Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2000): 876-905. Brownlie I Apperley CJ, 
"Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects," International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2000): 878-905. Chinkin C, "The Legality of NATO's Action in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) under International Law," International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4 
(2000), pp. 910-925. Greenwood C, "International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo," 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2000), pp. 926-934. Lowe V, "International 
Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Crisis," International & Comparative Law Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2000): 
934-943. 
 52 
derived from the notion of unlimited states’ sovereignty during the Cold War was replaced 
by a more active role as an agent. Such alternation suggests that the approach of 
international society towards the use of force changed in comparison with the Cold War. It 
may be argued that by accepting the rationale behind intervention on humanitarian 
grounds, international society acknowledges the existence of certain bonds between its 
members.  
 
   The existence of such bonds demonstrates a certain level of unity between states, 
which in turn creates the rationale for an active approach of international society. Although 
the use of force on humanitarian grounds became widely recognised and accepted, during 
the same period the use of force in self-defence in relation to terorist atacks, as the first 
case study wil show, was stil restricted and the requirements analysed in the preceding 
section had to be fulfiled.108 It took the 9/11 atacks upon the US for international society 
to change its approach towards these restrictions. As wil be demonstrated in the 
subsequent chapters such an alternation was possible because of the international 
environment surounding the end of the Cold War. 
 
     Moreover, the end of the Cold War, as wil be shown in more detail in the 
proceeding chapter as wel as in the case study devoted to the US policy of counter-
terorism in Afghanistan,109 has led to the rise both in power and number of non-state 
actors using terorist tactics within international arena, which has influenced a shift in 
general opinion regarding the use of force in response to terorist atacks. As non-state 
actors have became more self-suficient and not dependent on a state to such degree as in 
the past, more forceful measures to deal with their activities became more acceptable. The 
                            
108 See, chapter three. 
109 See, chapter four. 
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culmination of such a shift has been exemplified by the reaction of international society 
toward the US intervention in Afghanistan as a response to the terorist atacks that 
occured on September 11, 2001. The overwhelming acceptance of military intervention 
and the recognition of the right to self-defence in relation to a terorist atack for the first 
time have marked a significant change to the existing practice of states in dealing with 
terorism. 
 
Part Three: Introductory Notes on the Status of International Law 
 
    International law, with special emphasis on the provisions treating the use of force, 
as this chapter has shown, has undergone many alternations throughout the centuries. 
Although it was not until the twentieth century when the use of force was generaly 
prohibited, thinkers even during the preceding centuries had focused primarily on the ways 
in which the use of force might have been limited. The Natural School of International 
Law, which emphasised the existence of a special relationship between states, claimed that 
there are certain bonds that unite states, which in turn give evidence of the existence of 
international society. In such a society, according to representatives of this School, the use 
of force should be limited only to the instances associated with the notion of just war. 
Writers, belonging to the Positivist School of International Law, on the other hand, 
emphasised the lack of these special bonds between the members of international society 
and as war was unavoidable and a constant feature of international affairs the role of 
international law should be to provide regulations of how the war should be conducted. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on when a war may be waged, they concentrated on rules 
that should govern states, which were already engaged in combat with each other. This 
conception of international law, which would regulate the unavoidable, was present among 
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both the practitioners and writers until the second decade of the twentieth century.110 The 
destructive nature of two World Wars delivered a reason of returning to the thinking of the 
Natural Law School and the notion of just war. International society during the twentieth 
century through the creation of the United Nations and the adoption of the UN Charter had 
limited the use of force to two instances, namely in self-defence and after the authorisation 
from the UN Security Council. 
 
    The scrutiny of development of international law throughout the centuries gives 
evidence that states recognise the importance of rules governing their relations. The fact 
that states acknowledge that they are bound by certain rules in their relations with each 
other indicates the significance of international law and its special place within 
international arena. This in turn suggests the adequacy of the group of writers, who 
advocate the idea that international law, although diferent from the municipal law, is stil 
the law properly so-caled.111 Such an approach is criticised by another group of writers, 
for whom international law should not be treated as law per se. These authors claim 
further that international law in fact does not play a significant role in international 
afairs.112 Authors, who share this very approach towards the status of international law, 
are numerous. Indeed, writers such as Hobbes, Pufendorf and Austin can be considered as 
belonging to this circle.113 For Austin, ‘[t]he so-caled law of nations consists of opinions 
or sentiments curent among nations generaly. It, therefore, is not law properly so-
                            
110 See, for example: Neff (n 58) 160-172. 
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112
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caled’.114 What can be observed in the writings of Austin is that for him, international law 
possesses ethical rather than legal character. The central argument of representatives of this 
circle is that international law lacks sanctions and enforcement measures. The reason for 
such a weakness can be found in the structure of international affairs, namely international 
anarchy. As states are sovereign and do not recognise any higher authority but their own 
and because those states, which possess great power and capabilities can always use force 
in order to protect their interests and because no other authority can impose on them 
refrainment ‘international law cannot be considered true law’.115 
 
    Others point out also the weakness or lack of an imperative character as observed 
within municipal systems. According to Brierly:  
 
the  weakness  of international law lies  deeper than any  mere  question  of 
sanctions. It is not the existence of a police force that makes a system of law 
strong and respected, but the strength of the law that makes it possible for a 
police force to be efectively organized.116 
 
    On a national level, the imperative nature of law can be easily observed and its 
obedience became habitual. And due to that, its enforcement evolved without obstacles and 
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enforcement’(Morgenthau HJ, Politics among Nations (6th edn New York: McGraw-Hil, Inc., 1985), 312-
313.) 
116 Brierly JL, The Law of Nations (1963) reprinted in Harris D, Cases and Materials on International Law 
(7th edn London: Thomson Reuters Ltd, 2010), 2. 
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its efectiveness can be seen in that it ‘generaly works smoothly’.117 Similarly, on 
international level, if the nature of international law became imperative then ‘the institution 
of definite international sanctions would easily folow’.118 What needs to be noted 
however, is that although Brierly points to the weakness of international law, he does not 
negate its very existence. In his view, ‘[t]he best evidence for the existence of 
international law is that every actual state recognises that it does exist and that it is itself 
under obligation to observe it’.119 In similar fashion, Jessup observed that overal 
international law is obeyed even under dificult and inconvenient circumstances.120 
 
   Those, who claim that international law is corectly refered to as “true law” argue 
further, that it does not lack enforcement measures as it provides sanctions. According to 
Kelsen, these sanctions include reprisals, war and generaly the use of force.121 Supporters 
of this view disagree with those for whom the existence of war in international afairs 
proves that international law is not “true law”. These authors emphasise that the existence 
of ‘the institutions of reprisals and war’ is in itself evidentiary to the very existence of 
international law. 122 According to Kunz, ‘[f]or every juridical order must in the last 
analysis be backed by the employment of physical force; this is the point which 
distinguishes a juridical from an ethical norm, law from morals’.123 Indeed as the period 
since the end of the Cold War has demonstrated, the notion of sovereignty is no longer an 
absolute one and states may be subject to the use of force if the international society 
decides to do so. 
                            
117 ibid 2. 
118 ibid 2. 
119 Brierly JL, The Outlook for International Law (1944) cited in Brierly (n 116) 2 (note 5). 
120 Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948) reprinted in Harris (n 116) 5. 
121 Kelsen H, Principles of International Law (Clark: Lawbook Exchange, 1952, 2003), 18-39. See also: 
Kunz (n 74) 633. 
122 Kunz (n 74) 633. 
123 Ibid 633. See also: Roxburgh (n 74) 26-37. Snow AH, "International Law and Political Science," 
American Journal of International Law 7, no. 2 (1913): 315-328. For an opposite view, see: Borchard (n 
112). 
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Although, as the first study wil demonstrate, a state may continue to use force even 
if it faces condemnation by international society, it does not mean that international law is 
irelevant. It wil be shown that even in such instances, a state, in this case Israel, justified 
its actions as in accordance with international law. During every intervention in Lebanon, 
Israel invoked principles relating to the lawful use of force and claimed it was acting in 
self-defence and therefore in accordance with international law.  
Although Israel for decades advocated the idea of a broader conception of self-
defence, it was not able to persuade other members of international society. As wil be 
demonstrated, the notion of power is an important factor underlying the possibility of 
change. However, as the second case study wil show, for rules of international law to be 
changed, international society must recognise the rationale behind such a change. The 
overwhelming support firstly for the recognition of the right to self-defence in relation to 
terorism, secondly for the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom and finaly an international 
recognition of Israeli right to defend itself in 2006 suggest that a wider conception of self-
defence is now being internationaly accepted. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the development of 
international law with special reference to the notion of war and the use of force in general. 
As was observed although there is a disagreement as to the status of international law, this 
chapter has given evidence to the adequacy of the statement that international law is an 
important feature of world politics. Its gradual development from the time when war and 
the use of force were perceived by states as methods of self-help to the establishment of an 
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international legal order based on the general prohibition of the use of force indicates that 
international society needed and accepts limitations on their freedom of actions. 
This chapter also provided a scrutiny of the main schools of thought, which 
emphasise the significance of international law and the limitation of the use of force 
between states. The importance of the analysis of these two schools can be observed in that 
even contemporarily they occupy a principal place within academia and are stil the subject 
of debates and controversies. The rationale of an inclusion of this chapter in this thesis is 
that it firstly introduces a reader to some of the crucial notions and legal principles treating 
the use of force and secondly it gives an essential foundation for further analysis of the 
status of international law. A detailed scrutiny of its development from both theoretical and 
historical perspectives gives a basis for an accurate analysis of the place that international 
law occupies in contemporary world politics. It also provides an essential insight into legal 
theories and scholars’ perceptions on international law, which wil be further explored in 
the proceeding chapter, which aims to criticaly investigate diferent theoretical 
perspectives that dominated the scholarship of International Relations and their standpoints 
on the role of international law in international affairs. It wil involve looking at 
mainstream theories, which dominated the IR scholarship throughout the twentieth century 
and delivered very different perspectives on both international law and international 
society. The scrutiny of these traditions wil be treated as a foundation for counter-
arguments and formulation of further hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This chapter sets the theoretical foundation of this study. It aims to provide an 
overview of core assumptions of mainstream theories of International Relations and 
contrast them with arguments postulated by theorists afiliated with the English School 
Theory and Constructivism. The comparison wil be conducted by firstly presenting 
some of the key concepts associated with each tradition, which, in turn, wil be 
folowed by their standpoints regarding the notion of international society, the role of 
international law in world politics and the notion of change. 
The chapter begins with an analysis of Realism that contests the very existence 
of international society by emphasising the egoistic, interest-oriented nature of 
international relations. In a similar manner, theorists afiliated with this theory question 
an argument that international law plays any significant role in world politics. This, as 
wil be demonstrated is in sharp contrast with liberal postulates. Scholars associated 
with Liberal Theory of International Relations emphasise an importance of 
international rules and admit their constraining nature at least among states with 
democratic systems of government. Neo-liberals, on the other hand, although agreeing 
with certain basic assumptions of Realists, do not portray the international arena as the 
Hobbesian state of nature and point to the explicit international cooperation which can 
be observed, for example, by looking at the proliferation of international institutions 
and regimes throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Even though Neo-
60 
liberals acknowledge the existence of international society and impact of international 
law on international politics, for them both notions embrace only a utilitarian and 
functional character. 
This thesis wil argue that the most comprehensive understanding of the shift in 
international approach towards the use of force as wel as the status of international law 
can be found in the writings of scholars associated with the English School of 
International Relations1 and Constructivism. The importance of the former can be 
observed in that it conceptualises and contextualises notions of both international law 
and international society. But most importantly it brings about the strongest points of 
the aforementioned theories of IR and by relying on them and exploring them theorists 
afiliated with the ES create a comprehensive and complete portrait of international 
politics. On the other hand, the significance of the later can be observed in that it 
begins by appreciating the independent and influential role of international norms and 
rules in international politics. Their emphasis of the norm-generating aspect of rules 
and law is influential and significantly enriches the study of international law. It wil be 
shown that such a symbiotic approach can deliver an important contribution to study of 
the status of international law. 
Part One: The Realist Traditions of International Relations 
Theorists afiliated with the realist tradition of IR appraise themselves for 
portraying world politics in a realistic, rational way; in essence, they argue that they 
show and see the world as it realy is and separate themselves from idealistic dogmas. 
1 Hereinafter - the ES. 
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The pedigree of this tradition can be traced back to the writings of authors such as 
Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiaveli. In applying their postulates on 
an international level, realist theorists argue that the international arena is characterised 
as the state of war. In the words of Waltz, ‘[a]mong states, the state of nature is a state 
of war’.2 This, however, does not mean that ‘warfare is constant, but only that it is 
always a possibility and that actors understand this’.3 
 
By comparing international and domestic perspectives, they claim that states as 
individuals behave egoisticaly and are guided only by their own interest and 
welbeing.4 According to Morgenthau, ‘it is not only a political necessity but also a 
moral duty for a nation to folow in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, 
one standard of thought, one rule of action: THE NATIONAL INTEREST’.5 Every 
decision is taken rationaly and calculated in terms of gains and costs. According to 
Realists, relations between states should be characterised as ‘conflictual and 
competitive’ in nature.6 This is due to the fact that as the ultimate objective of states is 
power7 and securing their own international position, such conditions create a platform 
for interest clashes as each state pursues and seeks its goals. Although at the domestic 
level individuals behave similarly, the existing law enforcement machinery constrain 
their behaviour in an efective way. On an international level, on the other hand, there 
                            
2 Waltz KN, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hil, 1979), 102. 
3 Jervis R, "Realism and the Study of World Politics," International organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 986. 
4 Alison G Zelikow P, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd edn Harlow: 
Longman, 1999), 32. 
5 Morgenthau HJ, In Defence of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 242 cited in 
Crabb CV Jr Savoy J, " Hans J. Morgenthau’s Version of Realpolitik," The Political Science Reviewer 5 
(1975): 210. 
6 Hay C, Political Analysis. A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 17. See also: Miler 
B, "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behaviour," in Realism: Restatements and 
Renewal, ed. Frankel B (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1996), 318. 
7 In words of Guzzini: ‘international actors are bound to look for power, indeed to maximize their power 
position’ ("The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations," European Journal of 
International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): 537.) 
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is no such machinery and therefore it is up to states to protect and secure their interests. 
Such a condition is characterised as international anarchy and entails that ‘above the 
level of states there is no supreme law-maker or law-enforcer to keep order, as a 
government is supposed to do within states’.8 According to Waltz, ‘the absence of an 
authority above states to prevent and adjust the conflicts inevitably arising from 
particular wils means that war is inevitable’.9 For him and other authors associated 
with Neo-realism such international structure is even more pivotal as they argue that 
the ultimate goal of states in such self-help10 environment is not so much power per se 
but survival and security.11 It is argued that states ‘have to rely on themselves to ensure 
their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher 
authority they can turn to if they are atacked’; and therefore state must ‘put itself in a 
position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted to so’.12 
Accordingly, ‘the conflictual and competitive nature of inter-state relations is the 
product of the pursuit of national interest under the conditions of anarchy’.13 Due to the 
condition of international anarchy, the security of al states at the same time cannot be 
accomplished, as the possibility of recourse to force is constantly present. What 
‘endangers others’ is exactly the fact that states can implement various measures 
necessary for maintenance of their security.14 
                            
8 Booth K, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," International Afairs (Royal 
Institute of International Afairs 1944-) 67, no. 3 (1991): 529. 
9 Waltz KN, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1954), 182. 
10 Self-help from realist perspective is seen as the ‘guiding principle’ of states (Abbot KW, 
"International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal 
Conflicts," American Journal of International Law 93, no. 2 (1999): 364.). 
11 Neo-realists argue that a situation may arose in which ‘a further increase in power ((…) understood as 
mere capabilities) does not imply an increase in security’ (Guzzini (n 7) 539). 
12 Waltz (n 2) 107. 
13 Hay (n 6) 17. Booth further argue that ‘[f]from this perspective, wars occur because there is nothing to 
stop them when a state believes it must defend or further a “vital interest” by force’ (Booth (n 8) 533). 
Waltz goes on and claim that ‘a state wil use force to atain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for 
success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasure of peace’ (Waltz (n 9) 160). 
14 Kocs SA, "Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law as System Structure," 
International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 4 (1994): 536. 
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Theorists of yet another version of Realism, namely Offensive Realism argue 
even further, that the existence of anarchy creates opportunities for states to seek and 
increase power ‘at the expense of rivals, and take advantage of those situations when 
the benefits outweigh the costs’.15 According to Mearsheimer, ‘survival mandates 
aggressive behaviour’ of states and it is the maximization of ‘their odds of survival’ 
rather than wilingness or desire to achieve domination over other states which pushes 
them to act aggressively.16 Moreover, Ofensive Realism also argues that states 
embodied within a self-help environment ‘almost always’ act having in mind their own 
interests; interests, which are not subordinated to ‘the interests of other states, or to the 
interests of the so-caled international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be 
selfish in a self-help world’.17 
 
As the actual state of international relations is characterised as comprising 
conflict and competition one cannot assume the existence of international society. This 
is further supported by the claim that states are not constrained in their conduct by any 
moral legal principles. This is because at the international level there do not exist 
bounds which can be observed in the context of a society therefore any moral or legal 
principles that can be abided within the society do not realy apply at the international 
level. The fact that a state pursues moral or legal goals implies only that these goals are 
to be seen as the goals of that state itself. This, on the other hand, does not mean that 
states cannot enter into agreements with other states but it does imply that these 
agreements can be broken when they are not seen as in the interest of the state.18 
                            
15 Mearsheimer JJ, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 
21. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid 33. 
18 Bul H, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (3rd edn Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmilan, 2002), 23-24. 
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According to Mearsheimer, ‘aliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: 
today’s aliance partner might be tomorow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be 
tomorow’s aliance partner’.19 The entering into agreements or aliances by states with 
other states is seen as a means to achieve states’ aims. In a situation when these 
arangements do not fulfil its role, which is cultivating power20 of their parties, they 
can be dissolved or broken.21 International law is therefore not seen as the real law 
observed nationaly due to the fact that there is no authority above states, which could 
enforce that law. And thus, ‘international law that did not enjoy compliance was not 
law-like’.22 As international law is created by and for states, the same states, when it is 
in their interest, can decide when such law ceases to bind them.   
 
In national societies individuals must abide by the law. Even if the law is 
broken, there is enforcement machinery that enforces obedience or imposes 
repercussions. Such machinery does not exist internationaly as states enter into 
agreements voluntarily. As states can decide whether to abide by legal rules or norms 
or not, it is usualy up to them ‘to impose self-restraint upon themselves’.23 The lack of 
authority above a state entails that “law” in domestic understanding has ‘no place in 
this world. The only relevant laws [are] the “laws of politics”, and politics [is] “a 
struggle for power”.24 
 
                            
19 Mearsheimer (n 15) 33.  
20 Morgenthau HJ, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hil, 
1993), 5. 
21 Bul (n 18) 23-24.  
22 Steinberg RH Zaslof JM, " Power and International Law," American Journal of International Law 
100, no. 1 (2006): 71. 
23 Kocs (n 14) 541. 
24 Slaughter Burley A, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda," 
American Journal of International Law 87, no. 2 (1993): 207. 
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Thus, international law is looked upon by Realists through the angle of power 
relations, i.e. for them ‘international law is considered a tool at the disposal of the most 
powerful’.25 Hence, it is regarded merely as ‘an epiphenomenon of underlying power’26 
and ‘have litle, if any, independent efect on state behaviour’.27 Both Realists and Neo-
realists seldom pay any atention to international law and international institutions28 as 
both of them are not seen as contributing to the maintenance of international order. 
According to them, the international order is best accomplished by the sustainability of 
the balance of power. For Morgenthau, the balance of power is ‘the perennial element 
of international politics’ and ‘the fundamental law of international politics’.29 Waltz, 
even further argues that ‘[i]f there is any distinctively political theory of international 
politics, balance of power theory is it’.30 Indeed, for Neo-realists, the equilibrium, 
accomplished by the balance of power between the superpowers, which existed during 
the Cold War, was the most important factor underling the peacefulness, understood as 
the absence of war between the two blocs, of that period. As wil be explored further in 
the subsequent chapter the international reaction towards the 1982 Israeli intervention 
in Lebanon was influenced greatly by the existing international order based on 
sustainability of the balance of power between the East and the West.   
 
Exploring further the realist position on the role of international law, 
representatives of this tradition go on and argue that even if states comply with 
international law it does not change much in the characteristic of world politics. As it is 
                            
25 Scot SV, "International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics," European Journal of International Relations 5 (1994): 314. See also: Abbot (n 
10) 365. 
26 Steinberg, Zasloff (n 22) 74. 
27 Abbot (n 10) 365 
28 Kocs (n 14) 537. 
29 Morgenthau (n 20). 
30 Waltz (n 2) 117. 
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power that defines international afairs states must prioritise ‘the struggle for relative 
capability’.31 Realists, therefore, stress the importance of diplomacy as it is regarded as 
more useful machinery in resolution of conflictual issues. This is caused by the fact 
‘law is too abstract, too inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the 
unpredictable and the unexpected’.32 
 
Thus, for Realists the conflictual and competitive nature of international 
relations precludes the possibility of the creation of a international society let alone the 
possibility that such a entity already existed. Hence, their answer to the question of 
“‘What is international society’, is ‘nothing’.33 According to representatives of this 
theory, there are no preconditions at the international level as observed at the local one, 
which could give a basis for assuming the existence of society between states. As 
society is created by a social contract, which cannot be observed internationaly, ‘to 
speak of a society of nations is contradictory”.34 Morgenthau explored it further, by 
pointing to the fact that while societies on a national level can identify the main 
principles and norms, such as the notions of justice and equality, which governs the 
relations between their members; a society, which would be integrated to that scope, 
does not exist beyond national societies.35 Another interesting insight of realist theory 
puts into question the notion of morality or ethics in international politics. They 
question the very existence of universal values that other theorists emphasise. For 
instance, Morgenthau argued that the international arena ‘is far from one world in terms 
of the moral values which actualy move men to political action on the international 
                            
31 Kocs (n 14) 541. 
32 Kennan G, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (1951) 95 cited in Slaughter Burley (n 24) 208. 
33 Wight M, "Theory of International Society," in International Theory. The Three Traditions. Martin 
Wight, ed. Wight G Porter B (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), 31. 
34 ibid 31. 
35 Morgenthau HJ, In Defence of the National Interest (1951) cited in Wight (n 33) 31. 
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scene’.36 As maximisation of power and fulfilment of interest are the main objectives 
of a state, Realists negate the possibility of states’ genuine pursuit of the universal 
welbeing of states, let alone the possibility of one state acting in such capacity. 
According to the same author, the ‘moral aspirations of a particular nation’ cannot be 
identified with ‘the moral laws that govern the universe’.37 He supports his claim by 
stressing that various states were ‘tempted (…) to clothe their own particular 
aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe’.38 
 
Realists put emphasis on the continuity in world politics39 and therefore the 
question of change rarely constitutes focus of their enquiries. As was already pointed 
out politics is seen as being a struggle for power and such a struggle is characterised by 
its endlessness i.e. it is ‘perpetual, recurrent, and integral to life itself’.40 Therefore, 
even if change does occur in relation to some aspect of political life at some point, it 
does not have much of an impact on the very nature of international politics in itself. 
Thus, Realists do not accept and recognise a likelihood of any “epochal” change’.41 In 
addition, new developments such as the establishment of the United Nations or the 
general prohibition of the use of force are not seen as possessing any influence on 
international politics in general or on the actions of individual states in particular as 
both international law and international institutions are seen as constituting tools for the 
pursuit of national interests and neither of them is of any real significance. For them, 
‘international rules and institutions have litle, if any, independent effect on state 
behaviour: they are mere (“epiphenomenal”) artifacts of the underlying interest and 
                            
36 Morgenthau HJ ‘A Reassessment of the United States Foreign Policy’ (1958) cited in Crabb, Savoy (n 
5) note 50, 199. 
37 Morgenthau (n 20) 13. 
38 ibid 13. 
39 Jervis (n 3) 984. 
40 Crabb, Savoy (n 5) 190. 
41 Jervis (n 3) 984. 
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power relationships, and wil be changed or disregarded (…) if those relationships 
change’.42 
 
It is plausible to argue that for Realists the fact that, in the light of international 
law since the adoption of the UN Charter, the only lawful situation for individual states 
to use force is in self-defence has not had much impact on international politics. The 
right to self-defence is, thus, seen as yet another possibility for the protection of states’ 
vital interests. Exploring this reasoning further, states wil use this right whenever they 
deem it necessary and the reaction of states towards the implementation of this right 
wil be influenced in a similar manner, i.e. it wil be judged in terms of the relationship 
between the so-caled “victim state” and others and through a neo-realist lens it wil be 
influenced by its possible consequences on international order and the sustainability of 
balance of power. 
 
In the light of the above portrait of international politics from a realist 
perspective, the folowing can be viewed as a plausible realist hypothesis in relation to 
the topic in question. As wil be shown in chapter five the changed approach towards 
the use of force in relation to acts of terorism can be explained by a change in 
international system, i.e. a bipolar system was replaced by an unipolar one. The fact 
that Israeli right to self-defence was not recognised was dictated by the necessity of 
sustaining the balance of power between the East and the West and maintenance of the 
status quo. The fact that the US intervention was recognised, on the other hand, was 
understandable as in the curent international environment it is likely to expect a 
cooperation with hegemon. The fact that, states, especialy Russia and China, joined 
                            
42 Abbot (n 10) 365. 
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other states and expressed their solidarity with the US in the aftermath of 9/11 was 
expected as it was in their interest to do so. Although, as wil be demonstrated, the US 
position as the most powerful state was influential behind the change of international 
approach towards the US intervention in Afghanistan, it cannot explain why the 
aforementioned states recognised the Israeli right to self-defence in relation to the 2006 
Operation Change Direction, especialy taking into consideration the fact that the 1982 
intervention was not accepted as lawful use of force. 
 
Part Two: The Liberal Traditions of International Relations 
 
This section provides an analysis of the writings of scholars associated with the 
Liberal Theory of International Relations. Contrary to Realists, Liberals adopt a 
“botom-up” perspective of politics ‘in which the demands of individuals and societal 
groups are treated as analyticaly prior to politics’43 and therefore the main actors in the 
international arena are individuals and private groups.44 They stress the importance of 
municipal factors such as ‘the type of government and constitutional order that states 
have, as wel as other factors such as domestic politics, civil society, and individual 
beliefs’, which are ‘the primary determinant of state behaviour’.45 They claim that 
states ‘represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state 
oficials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics’.46 Due to the 
fact that internal factors have an influence on the foreign policy of states, ‘states are not 
                            
43 Moravcsik A, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," 
International organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 517. 
44 ibid 516. 
45 Adamson FB Sriram CL, "Perspectives on International Law in International Relations," in 
International Law for International Relations, ed. Çali B (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2010), 30. 
See also: Slaughter A et al., "International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation 
of Interdisciplinary Scholarship," American Journal of International Law 92, no. 3 (1998): 367-397. 
Doyle MW, "Liberalism and World Politics," The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 
1151-1169. 
46 Moravcsik (n 43) 518 (emphasis in original). 
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rational actors but rather a vehicle for preference advancement by domestic 
constituencies’.47 However, although individuals are the fundamental actors in 
international politics, a state, in the view of some Liberals, is ‘the primary agent of 
international action’.48 The folowing paragraphs wil look at three main premises of 
this theory, namely economic interdependence, the promotion of a democratic system 
of government and the peaceful and cooperative relationship between democratic 
states. 
 
Liberals claim that growing communication and cooperation observable on 
various levels inter alia economic, political, and cultural ‘are revolutionizing the 
texture of global politics’.49 The main argument is that states decide to enter into and 
sustain trading relationships with each other because it is highly beneficial for them. 
This in turn leads to a creation of ‘a system of interconnected dependent countries, 
which if based on competitive, free-trade, free-market principles results in maximal 
global output’.50 
 
What Liberals also notice is that such interdependent relationships not only 
profit states’ economies but in fact have a pacifying impact on interstate relations. 
According to Polachek: 
 
                            
47 Armstrong D et al., International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 87. 
48 See, for example: Slaughter Burley (n 24) 227 (emphasis in original). 
49 Barnet MN, "Bringing in the New World Order. Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations," 
World Politics 49 (1997): 534. The author’s writing lies within a long tradition: Deutsch K, The Analysis 
of International Relations (Prentice-Hal, 1968). Kant I, Perpetual Peace (San Diego: Book Tree, 2009). 
Rosecrance R, The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986). -, The Rise of the Virtual State. Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999). Smith A, The Wealth of Nations (Blacksburg: Thrifty Books, 2009). Strafa P, 
ed., The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005). 
50 Polachek SW et al., "Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model," Journal 
of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 406. 
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The logic is simple. If conflict leads to a cessation  or at least a 
diminution  of trade (…) then countries  with the  greatest  gains from 
trade face the highest costs of potentialy lost trade and hence engage in 
the least conflict and the most cooperation.51 
 
What this means is that a system of interdependent relationships mitigates an 
occurence of conflicts due to the fact that states fear to lose ‘the welfare gains 
associated with the trading relationship’.52 In other words, the ‘economic 
interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over 
the alternative of aggression: interdependent states would rather trade than invade’.53 In 
short and in adopting an economic terminology a ‘high interdependence fosters peace 
by making trading more profitable than invading’.54 What should be noted, however, is 
that an 
 
interdependence is seen to  operate as a restraint  on aggressive 
tendencies arising from the  domestic  or individual levels. If 
interdependence becomes low, this restraint is taken away, alowing the 
aggressive tendencies to dominate.55 
 
   Liberals also argue that a system of interdependent relationships should not be 
seen as limited only to the economic sphere. In fact it is argued that it enables an 
                            
51 ibid 405. 
52 Barbieri K Schneider G, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade 
and Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 389. 
53 Copeland DC, "Econommic Interdependence and War. A Theory of Trade Expectations," 
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 5. See also: Mansfield ED Polins BM, ed., Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict. New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
54 Copeland (n 53) 9. 
55 ibid 13. 
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emergence and ‘the development of a “sense of community”, which makes the resort to 
violent forms of conflict increasingly unlikely’.56 Although as wil be shown such a 
sense of community is deeper embedded within a system of democratic states, a 
democracy is not an a priori precondition for a pacifying impact of an economic 
interdependence upon interstate relations. As Oneal et al. argue, ‘expanded trade was 
advocated as a remedy for war before democracy was a realistic possibility in most 
countries’.57 What this means is that interdependency observable when interstate 
relations are looked upon mitigates conflictual situations by itself. Although trade and 
economic interdependence have in themselves independent impact, some Liberals also 
point to the influential role of democratic system of governments. They argue that the 
aforementioned sense of community derived from economic interstate relations is more 
deeply embedded within democratic states. Oneal and Russet agree that ‘[e]conomic 
interdependence and joint democracy are generaly associated with a reduction in 
interstate violence’.58 As the former ‘reinforces constitutional constraints and liberal 
norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than 
conflict’59 innately states with a stronger atachment to and emphasis on the rule of law 
are more likely to respect international rules. 
 
In a liberal view democracies are more reliable and more likely to adhere their 
actions to international rules and principles. Considering the fact that for them ‘the 
global rule of law depends on the domestic rules of law’, states with democratic 
systems of government tend to respect the principle that their actions are constrained by 
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international law and international obligations.60 In short, for Liberals, a domestic 
sphere expresses the ways states behave internationaly.  
 
According to Liberals, democratic states are more likely to comply with 
international law ‘at least among themselves’61 with representatives of this theoretical 
perspective proclaiming that such a system of government is a superior one and thus 
they actively advocate its promotion across the international sphere. They argue that 
‘the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain 
international cooperation, especialy when these practices are enshrined in international 
institutions’.62 The on-going cooperation between democracies has been evident since 
the Second World War and is linked to the establishment of international institutions, 
which created ‘a framework for order that helps to establish credible commitments’.63 
In addition, ‘[n]egotiation, compromise, and consensus-building came naturaly to 
statesmen stepped in the uses of such practices at home’.64 The aforementioned 
international order existing among democratic states, which is defined ‘thick and 
robust’, is based 
 
on identity, institutions and interdependence. Identity  means common 
Western support for the  values  of  political and civil liberties, and a 
liberal market economy. Institutions mean that cooperative relationships 
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are  heavily institutionalised.  And interdependence  means social and 
economic interaction that is seen to be for mutual benefit.65 
 
Such a liberal international order is said to provide a platform for very close 
cooperation based on the idea that democracies share the same vision of international 
afairs based on combined ‘values and colective identities’66 and that there exist 
‘political bonds of liberal rights and interests’, which in turn indicate that ‘[a]separate 
peace exists among liberal states’.67 
 
This idea of “separate peace” is crucial when considering the problématique of 
this thesis. In addition, there is a common agreement among liberal scholars that 
democratic states ‘are far less likely to go to war with one another than they are to go to 
war with non-liberal States’. 68 This does not, however, mean that liberal states are 
more peaceful but rather that ‘a variety of factors converge to reduce the likelihood of 
military conflict between them’.69 Although a general absence of war between liberal 
states is noticeable, the folowing case studies, namely the1982 Operation Peace for 
Galilee as wel as the 2006 Operation Change Direction wil demonstrate that such a 
war remains a possibility. 
 
The aforementioned superiority of a democratic system of government is further 
supported by developments of the last decade of the twentieth century, namely the 
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colapse of communism and the democratisation of ex-communist states. Such an 
argument is presented by various liberal theorists, most particularly Francis Fukuyama. 
For him, the end of the Cold War should be portrayed as a triumph of economic and 
political Liberalism, which is evident in ‘the total exhaustion of viable systematic 
alternatives’.70 According to this scholar, ‘[w]hat we may be witnessing is not just the 
end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the 
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government’.71 
 
For Liberals, the colapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have also 
given the US a predominant position as wel as created a special role reserved for the 
sole superpower. In addition, when the US emerged from the Cold War as the most 
powerful state Liberals appreciated this moment as not only a triumph of Liberalism 
but also as the initiation of the new world order based on liberal values and peaceful 
relations between states. The US, as the champion of the premises of Liberalism and 
the most active advocate of its values and norms was seen as the state ‘bound to 
lead’.72 Such reliance on Liberalism has made the US hegemony more benevolent 
through its ‘unusual capacities to make commitments and restrain power’ and thus 
should be regarded by other states as less threatening or intimidating.73 
                            
70 Fukuyama F, "The End of History? (1989), " The National Interest in htp:/wesjones.com/eoh.htm 
[accesed 1 December 2012]. 
71 ibid. See also: Fukuyama F, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," PS: Political Science and 
Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 659-664. 
72 Nye JS, Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power (New York Basic Books, 1990), 
110. See also: Nye JS, The Paradox of American Power. Why the World’s Only Superpower Cant’s Go It 
Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a discussion about Nye’s book see Cohen WI, 
America’s Failing Empire. Us Foreign Relations since the Cold War (Oxford: Blackwel Publishing Ltd, 
2005). 
73 Ikenberry GJ, "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy," Review of International 
Studies 27 (2007): 194. 
 76 
Moreover, even though the US is the most powerful state its actions are stil 
constrained by ‘the preferences’ of other states.74 According to Liberals, the actions of 
the US are further restricted by the democratic system of conducting foreign policy 
based on liberal values as wel as international institutions.75 And therefore, ‘[t]he 
result has been the most stable and prosperous international system in world history’.76 
Thus, contrary to a realist perspective, the US should not be perceived as pursuing only 
its own interests and objectives but, in fact, as ‘a producer of world order’.77 
 
In the light of the above discussion it is possible to draw the folowing 
hypothesis from the liberal perspective. As wil be demonstrated in chapter five, three 
main aspects need to be taken into account when explaining the change in the reaction 
of international society towards the use of force in relation to acts of terorism. First of 
al, the growing interdependence and interconnectedness in the contemporary world 
politics. Secondly, the embedded cooperation among liberal states. And lastly, the 
notion of democracy promotion. In relation to the first point, the reason behind a 
diferent approach towards the Israeli and the US interventions can be found in that 
states such as China and Russia became more liberal in outlook than they used to be 
during the Cold War. Thus, the recognition of the US right to self-defence was 
understandable as the end of the Cold War created a much more favourable foundation 
for international cooperation. As for the second point, the response of other liberal 
states was indeed to be expected due to the fact that the cooperation between liberal 
states is more deeply embedded within international spectrum. This cooperation is 
argued to be so embedded that in fact these states do not fight each other. The last 
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aspect derives from the liberal emphasis on the protection of human rights and the 
superiority of democratic over the other systems of government. This thesis wil 
chalenge this hypothesis in the folowing way. Although the end of the Cold War has 
created a more suitable platform for international cooperation, the growing 
interdependence cannot explain in depth why states, such as China and Russia, 
supported the US in the aftermath of 9/11 but condemned Israel in relation to its two 
interventions in Lebanon during the 1990s. As wil be demonstrated, the notion of the 
greater cooperation between liberal states can also be chalenged. Firstly, it does not 
explain why the US, despite their close relationship, as wel as other liberal states did 
not recognise Israeli right to self-defence in 1982. Secondly, as both Lebanon and 
Israel have been considered as democracies the claim that democracies do not fight 
each other can also be discredited as the 1982 and the 2006 operations demonstrate. 
The last point, namely the democracy promotion, although influential in relation to the 
2001 Operation Enduring Freedom cannot, however, be viewed as the basis underlying 
the comparison as the government of Lebanon, as opposed to the Taliban, was 
internationaly recognised as democratic and legitimate. 
 
Part Three: The Neo-liberal Traditions of International Relations 
 
One ofshoot of the Liberal Theory of International Relations that can highly 
contribute to this study is Neo-liberalism also refered to as Liberal or Neo-liberal 
Institutionalism. Although, as wil be demonstrated, it treats the notion of international 
law through its reference to international regimes it stil constitutes an important insight 
into world politics. This theoretical approach grew out of regime theory and based its 
analysis on the merits of game theory. By incorporating economic methods of analysis 
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they try to show the possibility and conditionality of international cooperation and the 
place of international institutions in the process of forming such cooperation.78 In fact 
they focus their analysis on explaining why states create international institutions in 
first place.79 Indeed their concentration and emphasis on the role of international 
institutions in world politics has generated the perception of Neo-liberalism as ‘the 
mainstream approach to analysing international institutions’.80 
 
Neo-liberals begin by accepting and admiting coherence of certain basic neo-
realist assumptions. In addition, like Realists they see states as key international actors. 
In a similar manner, they portray states as rational actors oriented at the maximisation 
of their own interests. Although they admit that states are self-interested and utility-
seekers, as oppose to Neo-realists, they claim that states seek absolute rather than 
relative gains.81 Neo-liberals further admit that international anarchy has important 
consequences on the relations between states.82 However, the creation of various 
international institutions mitigates the conflictual nature of international relations and 
stimulates international cooperation.83 Moreover, unlike Realists, Neo-liberals point 
out that international anarchy is not an active cause of war. For them, the fact that states 
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are more likely to seek absolute rather than relative gains which can be achieved 
through international cooperation under the umbrela of international regime, can limit 
an occurrence of wars.  
 
The similarity between Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism can be further observed 
by looking at the treatment of international cooperation by the later. It is, indeed, seen 
by Neo-liberals in pure calculative and rationalist terms. In addition, while international 
cooperation is perceived as facilitator needed in order to obtain states interests, 
international institutions are portrayed as tools essential in meeting these goals. 
According to one of the leading theorists afiliated with this theoretical approach, 
Keohane: 
 
[i]nternational cooperation  does  not  necessarily  depend  on altruism, 
idealism,  personal  honor, common  purposes, internalized  norms,  or 
shared belief in a set of values embedded in a culture (…) cooperation 
can be understood without reference to any of them.84 
 
Neo-liberals analyse international cooperation by refering to game theory, most 
commonly to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This game is indeed useful in analysing the 
origins and benefits of cooperation between players. In addition, if the game is played 
only once players shows a high incentive to cheat because of the likelihood that another 
player may choose deception as wel. However, if the game involves more than one 
iteration then such an incentive may be minimalized and players may cooperate. This 
way of reasoning has been incorporated by Neo-liberals in their analysis of 
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international cooperation through international institutions and regimes.85 By adopting 
the game theory reasoning they argue that it alows seeing how the incentive to cheat 
can be minimalized and cooperation even between ‘resolutely self-interested’ states can 
be possible. Similar point can be made in relation to war: although at the first instance 
the use of force might be profitable, in the long term this might not be the case 
especialy taking into consideration the likelihood of the future cooperation. Thus from 
a neo-liberal standpoint it is always more profitable to look at the particular case or 
conflictual issue from the angle of the future. According to Setear, ‘[i]nternational 
“institutions’ or “regimes” may increase the likelihood or depth of (…) cooperation 
[among states] by lowering “information costs” or “transactions costs”’.86 
 
Before proceeding to the presentation of Neo-liberals’ arguments supporting 
their claim on the role of international regimes, institutions and organisations it is 
important to define these concepts, as they are not straightforward and disagreements 
regarding their definitions and scope exists even among neo-liberal scholarship. The 
most famous definition of international regime was delivered by Krasner. According to 
him, international regime should be understood as ‘sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.87 In a similar manner, 
Haas defines regimes as ‘norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate 
an issue-area. Norms tel us why states colaborate; rules tel us what, (…), the 
colaboration is about; procedures answer the question of how the colaboration is to be 
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caried out’.88 International regimes are seen as a ‘special case of international 
institutions’89 or ‘specific institutions’.90 According to Levy et al., they are 
 
social institutions that influence the  behaviour  of states and their 
subjects (…)  The term is explicitly  broad and captures the  unwriten 
understandings and relationships, as wel as the formal legal agreements, 
that influence  how states and individuals  behave in any  given issue-
area.91 
 
Most critics of the neo-liberal approach point out that the term “international 
regime” is yet another way of labeling “international organization”. According to Neo-
liberals, however, the terms “international regime” and “international organization” 
should not be seen as analogous, although some of regimes possess organizational 
structures. According to Keohane, the term “international institution” should be 
identified as ‘related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’92 
and be seen more as ‘sets of practices and expectations rather than in terms of formal 
organizations with imposing headquarters buildings’.93 Hesenclever et al., goes further 
and argues that 
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regimes –being sets of principles, norms, rules, and procedures- do not 
possess the capacity to act. By the same token, the sphere of activity of 
an  organization  need  not  be restricted to any  one issue-area  of 
international politics, as exemplified by the United Nations.94 
 
The importance of international regimes, according to Neo-liberals, can be 
observed in their wide-ranging proliferation since the Second World War.95 Numerous 
studies treating the notion of international regimes have been conducted in areas such 
as international trade and finance, national security, energy, human rights and 
international environment.96 
 
As already mentioned, international regimes are portrayed as tools available to 
egoist states in order to enable international cooperation in the condition of 
international anarchy.97 The rationale behind the establishment of an international 
regime can be seen in that ‘actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements 
they wil be able to make mutualy beneficial agreements that would otherwise be 
dificult or impossible to atain’.98 Therefore states anticipate joining a particular 
regime when it is in their self-interest, i.e. ‘they expect the benefits of membership to 
outweigh the costs’.99 In sum, as Keohane famously argued, ‘institutions can help 
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states work together’.100 He bases his argument on an assumption that ‘concern about 
the future helps to promote cooperation’ and the role of international institutions is 
significant ‘since institutions embody, and affect actors expectations’.101 Neo-liberals 
further argue that international regimes have an impact on the behaviour of states 
because by joining a particular regime a state itself accepts certain constraints on its 
behaviour. Moreover, they maintain that this constraining aspect of international 
regimes is crucial as it alows ‘states to restrain themselves and others from pursuing 
short-term interests at the expense of shared long-term goals’,102 where the later rather 
than the former is seen as more desired and valued by states. In sum, the influential role 
of international institutions is seen in ‘encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring 
compliance and sanctioning defectors’. 103 Furthermore, international regimes ‘enhance 
trust, continuity and stability in a world of ungoverned anarchy’.104 
 
The utilitarian and functional nature of international regimes can be observed 
when one atempts to look at the origins of their establishment. According to Neo-
liberals, international regimes usualy develop when the most powerful state in the 
international arena, for instance the US in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
endeavour to adjust the international order to its own interests. From this it can be 
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deduced that if a particular regime encompasses the goals and interests of the 
hegemonic power within an international system then such a regime is likely to be 
stable and successful. Although the role of the hegemonic state in the regimes’ creation 
is unquestioned by Neo-liberals, they argue that once the regimes are embedded within 
the system, they ‘acquire their own dynamic’ and subsequently ‘express only 
incompletely the interests and purposes of the hegemonic state’.105 The significance 
and influential role of international regimes can be further observed in that even if the 
decline of the hegemonic power occurs, international regimes ‘are strong enough to 
make sustained cooperation possible, though not inevitable’.106 
 
Neo-liberals position international law ‘under the banner of regime theory’.107 
Reus-Smit argues that the reason for that may be found in the fact that they were 
oriented more at ‘economic theory rather than law’ and because in ‘the Realist-
dominated field of cold war international relations it was less provocative to speak the 
language of international regimes and institutions than that of international law’.108 
Despite the diference in language being used the subject of the discussion in essence 
remains the same. Indeed, as discussed earlier, many international regimes are created 
out of formal international agreements,109 embodying certain rules and principles, 
which can be seen as the common characteristic of international law. Even though 
international regimes might be viewed as encompassing a broader institutionalisation 
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than international law110 for the purpose of this study the scholarship treating the 
former wil be used as the neo-liberal standpoint on the role of international law. 
 
Neo-liberals ‘recognize that legal rules do, in fact, foster compliance with 
regime norms by providing channels for dispute-setlement, signaling and triggering 
retaliatory actions, and requiring states to furnish information regarding compliance’.111 
And thus from a neo-liberal perspective, international law does mater. Therefore, it 
can contribute to international cooperation in a significant way. As states are seen as 
rational actors oriented more at long-term objectives, compliance with international law 
seems to be rational and reasonable. However, as states are utility-seekers having in 
mind their absolute gains, international law should be seen as a tool helping to reach 
these objectives. In other words, the role of international law is seen through the lenses 
of functionality and usefulness. 
    
The functional character of international law as argued by Neo-liberals can be 
observed also in that it enabled a cooperation between states, even those who belong to 
diferent cultures or differing domestic political systems so clearly exemplified during 
the Cold War.112 Although Neo-liberals are greatly commited to the study of 
international cooperation, they do not focus much on the understanding of the notion of 
international society. Nevertheless, certain neo-liberal assumptions on the idea of 
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international society can be deduced from their treatment of the notion of cooperation 
between states. Firstly, unlike Realists they do not question the very existence of 
international society. Secondly, Neo-liberals would not doubt liberal arguments that 
closer and deeply rooted relationships could be found between liberal democracies. 
However, they would also appreciate the fact that an international society can be 
comprised of states with various domestic systems of government. Thirdly, their 
understanding of international society entails that it possess a functional rather 
normative character. And its role is to facilitate and provide grounds for cooperation 
among international actors. Therefore, it is very likely that they would agree with the 
folowing argument that the possibility of the existence of international society despite 
ethnical or cultural diversities and observable differences in terms of ‘goals and values’ 
between the members of international society is substantiated by the recognition that 
states are nonetheless ‘bound by a common code of co-existence’.113 And the role of 
international institutions was not intended ‘to provide a stable and universal peace, but 
only to mitigate the inevitable conflicts that arise from the existence of a multiplicity of 
sovereignties’.114 
 
In the final part of the analysis of the merits of Neo-liberalism it is important for 
this thesis to include a neo-liberal perspective on the notion of change. In opposition to 
realist and neo-realist scepticism in relation to the possibility of change in world 
politics, one of the first main assumptions made by Neo-liberals is that the second half 
of the twentieth century marked a significant rise in the proliferation of international 
regimes and other international institutions not comparable with any other moment in 
                            
113 Wheeler NJ Dunne T, "Hedley Bul’s Pluralism of the Intelect and Solidarism of the Wil," 
International Afairs 72, no. 1 (1996): 95. 
114 Alderson K Hurrel A, ed., Hedley Bul on International Society (Basingstoke and London: 
Macmilan Press Ltd, 2000), 8. 
 87 
world history, which marks a significant change in the international system. They also 
recognise that although states remain the primary international actors, the significant 
impact on international relations that saw a rise in the number and roles of other actors 
such as international organisations and non-state actors is unquestionable.115 Therefore 
they accept the possibility of changes in ‘the characteristics of the international 
system’116 and although they do not treat directly the concept of international law, their 
assumptions on the notion of change in refering to an international regime can be 
treated as adaptable in relation to international law. In addition, the aforementioned 
changes in the characteristics of an international system can have an impact on an 
international regime as wel as influence in its successfulness.117 Moreover, a change of 
international regime itself can occur when the principles or norms of such regimes 
change. If such a change takes place then ‘a new regime emerges’.118 Another 
possibility of change in relation to international regimes is when rules and decision-
making procedures change, i.e. a change takes place within the regime itself.119  
 
In the light of the main arguments and assumptions presented above, the 
possible neo-liberal hypothesis regarding the variation of the response of international 
society towards the interventions in question can be viewed in the folowing way. 
Firstly, the prospect of a change, even in relation to the regime governing the use of 
force and therefore relating to the notion of national interest and security, is possible. 
Thus, it might be argued that the way in which international society responded towards 
9/11 and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan indicates an altered approach 
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towards the use of force in response to acts of terorism. Secondly, such a possibility, 
as wil be demonstrated, was conditioned by the fact that it was the US – that is the 
hegemon - who made an instigation of such a change achievable. In a neo-liberal view 
such situation was to be expected as the role of the hegemon in creation of international 
regimes is not novel. Thirdly, it wil be argued that because it is in states’ own interest, 
a change within the existing regime governing the use of force wil be consolidated. 
Thus, the fact that international society also recognised the Israeli right to self-defence 
in relation to the 2006 Operation Change Direction should be as evidence of such a 
consolidation. 
 
The folowing section presents the main assumptions of the theoretical approach 
chosen to explain the topic in question. The synthesis of the English School and 
Constructivism with its emphasis on the role of international society and their distinct 
account of norms and a complex understanding of the notion of interest deliver the 
most comprehensive explanation of the changed international approach towards the use 
of force in self-defence evident since 9/11. 
 
Part Four: The Symbiotic Approach of the English School of International 
Relations and Constructivism 
 
As mentioned, the synthesis of the English School and Constructivism delivers 
an important contribution to the study of the status of international law. The folowing 
case studies wil demonstrate that such a symbiotic approach alows for a 
comprehensive analysis of the shift in international approach towards the use of force 
observable since the 9/11 atacks. This part of the chapter commences in a similar way 
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to the preceding parts in that it introduces the reader to the fundamental assumptions 
and arguments advocated by leading representatives of both the ES and Constructivism. 
 
The English School of International Relations begins by not questioning certain 
crucial points made by the representatives of both (Neo)realism and Neo-liberalism. 
The ES theorists agree that states are primary international actors, who pursue national 
interests and seek their own security. Moreover they do not negate the argument that 
international anarchy constitutes an important feature of international politics. What 
they, however, advocate is that international anarchy does not impose conflictual 
relations among states to the extent comparable with the Hobbesian state of nature. And 
that in fact various international institutions, including inter alia international law, 
impose certain constraints and limitations on states’ actions. 
 
Constructivists, in opposition to Realists, argue that the international structure is 
in fact socialy constructed, i.e. ‘[a]narchy is what states make of it’.120 It is usualy 
held that a structure is ‘a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behaviour of 
states’.121 From a realist perspective, such constraints are embodied within the notions 
such as self-help and the pursuit of power. As already mentioned, the anarchical 
structure of the international environment constrains cooperation among states, as it 
forces states to seek power and further their own national interests. Wendt, however, 
claims that ‘self-help and power politics do not folow either logicaly or causaly from 
anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, 
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not structure’.122 He bases his argument on the assumption that ‘structure has no 
existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of anarchy’. 123 
 
In addition, relations between states may be as peaceful as they can be 
conflictual but such a condition does not derive from the international anarchy, which 
is seen as ‘an empty vessel with no inherent logic’, but from the culturaly or 
historicaly created understandings of what the absence of world government in fact 
means.124 Such description brings Constructivism closer to the ES understanding of 
international anarchy. In fact, Wendt agrees with Bul’s distinction of three diferent 
types of anarchy, namely a ‘Hobbesian’, a ‘Lockean’ or a ‘Kantian’.125 And as such, 
international structure might change miroring the diferent times in history. 
 
 Continuing their deliberation on the notion of international structures 
Constructivists claim that they are not ‘reified objects that actors can do nothing about, 
but to which they must respond’ but ‘[r]ather structures exist only through the 
reciprocal interaction of actors’.126 What this suggests is that these structures have 
social rather than only material aspects and that they shape not only the behaviour of 
states but also their identities and interests.127 For instance, taking both the Cold War 
and the post-Cold War environments into consideration, it can be argued, from a 
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constructivist point of view, that the understanding of what the notion of international 
anarchy means was perceived diferently. The conflictual nature of bipolarity, which 
emerged after the Second World War, shaped and was shaped by the identity of the two 
superpowers. The colapse of the Soviet Union relaxed the tensions and constraints and 
the identity of both the US and Russia altered and was redefined. As wil be 
demonstrated, a similar assumption can be made about the nature of international 
society. It wil be demonstrated, that the contemporary international society no longer 
fits the minimalistic, pluralist conception, based on the notion of mere co-existence. It 
wil be shown that, in fact, it embodies certain characteristics of the solidarist 
conception of international society. 
 
a) The Concept of International Law 
 
The English School of International Relations dedicates a special place for 
international law. As was already mentioned international law is seen as an institution 
of international society, defined as ‘a body of rules governing the mutual interaction 
not only of states but of other agents in international politics (..) which is considered to 
have the status of law’.128 However, it should not be considered as coresponding to the 
rule of law observed within the municipal sphere. Whereas in modern states 
government can be seen as an authority responsible for sustaining order and 
compliance with law, in the international system there is no such authority which could 
enforce compliance with international law.129 What folows is that international law is 
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not ‘a necessary or essential condition of international order’ and ‘is not itself suficient 
to bring about international order’.130 
 
It is argued that the existence of international law is ‘the most essential proof of 
the very existence of an international society’ and therefore ‘those who deny the 
existence of international society begin by denying the reality of international law’.131 
What folows is that international law cannot identify the idea of international society 
as the supreme normative principle unless an international society in some measure 
already exists, and is receptive to the treatment of this principle as the supreme one. 
Bul in his analysis of the meaning of international law was in contradiction with the 
instrumental treatment of international law, so explicit in the writings of both Neo-
realists and Neo-liberals.132 In his own words: ‘the importance of international law 
does not rest on the wilingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of 
their interests, but in fact that they so often judge it in their interest to conform to it’.133 
Exploring this idea, Wheeler and Dunne argue that ‘this narow argument about the 
motives of states in conforming to international law is projected on to the broader 
canvas of international society as a whole’ and therefore ‘the case for international 
society against realpolitik is that states wil adhere to the rules and norms of the society 
of states even when these conflict with their non-vital interests’.134 Both authors are of 
the opinion that the writings of Bul indicate implicitly that he agreed that states’ 
actions should be intended to strengthen established normative principles and 
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international society itself.135 At the same time, however, Bul points out that it is a 
mistake to think as if  
 
international law were to be assessed only in relation to the function it 
has of binding states together, and not also in relation to its function as 
an instrument of state interest and as a vehicle of transnational purposes; 
as if atempts to maintain a balance of power were to be interpreted only 
as endeavours to  preserve the system  of states, and  not also as 
manoeuvres  on the  part  of  particular  powers to  gain ascendancy; as if 
great  powers  were to  be  viewed  only as “great responsibles”  or “great 
indispensables”, and  not also as  great  predators; as if  wars  were 
constructed only as atempts to violate the law or to uphold it, and not 
also simply as atempts to advance the interest of particular states or of 
transnational groups.136 
 
This lengthy quotation is crucial in understanding the complexity of 
international politics. Although notions such as values, principles, norms, rules and 
international institutions constitute an important and ireplaceable feature of world 
politics, the international arena is not free from power politics, conflicts, and the pursuit 
of varying interests or egoism.137 As wil be shown throughout the thesis, the role of 
the most powerful states, in particular the US, in international politics is extensive. As 
has already been introduced and wil be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, 
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international law embodies and is influenced by interests and values held by dominant 
states. Moreover most of the changes that occur in international law usualy originate 
from these dominant powers. However, the fact that a particular state occupies the 
status of great power does not mean that such a state is in a position of imposing or 
forcing certain rules or behaviour unquestionably and without any protest or objection. 
The aforementioned institution of sovereignty is not just a lip service or an archaic 
term. It gives states a choice. As the second case study wil demonstrate for a change to 
occur within the international approach towards the use of force in relation to terorism, 
the other members of international society – and not only the US - had to accept such a 
new development. Although the most dominant and powerful member of such a society 
may have a power to instigate a changed approach, for such a change to actualy be 
embedded within the system, other members of international society need to accept and 
recognise it. This is in agreement with a constructivist view that states’ interests are 
shaped further by ‘commonly held principles (…) behaviour norms, or shared terms of 
discourse’.138 Although they do not disagree with the IR mainstream theories, which 
claim that norms and institutions are created by states in pursuit of their own interests 
and values, they claim that these norms and institutions redefine these ‘interests and 
values, perhaps even the identities of the actors themselves’.139 In fact, norms in a 
constructivist perspective play a crucial role in international politics. For them, the 
importance of norms is not seen only in their role of regulating states’ behaviour as 
emphasised by Neo-liberals but their significance lies also in the fact that they 
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‘constitute actor identities and interests’.140 Thus, ‘interests cannot be determined in 
isolation from ideas and norms’.141 
 
Here it is important to elaborate the meaning of an international norm as 
understood by Constructivists. Norms are defined as ‘a set of intersubjective 
understandings and colective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of states and 
other actors in a given context or identity’.142 They can have either a constitutive 
character, i.e. they define actors’ identity, or a regulative character, in that they 
prescribe the proper and expected behaviour.143 What distinguishes norms from other 
types of rules is the embedded ‘quality of “oughtness’, which describes what behaviour 
is an appropriate one and the appropriateness of behaviour is known through the 
‘judgement of a community or a society’.144 What folows is that a state’s decision to 
act in a particular way is driven by other states’ possible reaction to or perception of 
such action.145 For instance, if a state adheres to norms governing a particular group, 
the likelihood is that other members of such a group wil perceive the state as 
trustworthy and ‘strongly atracted to the group’.146 Therefore many Constructivists 
emphasise the impact that reputation can have on states’ behaviour.147 
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They oppose the neo-liberal argument that norms possess only a functional 
character, enabling states to pursue national interests. For them, norms embody 
explanatory power, which is ‘independent of structural and situational constraints’, 
which means that they influence states’ behaviour in their own ways.148 They 
emphasise the fact that norms can shape states’ interests even ‘in ways that contradict 
the strategic imperative of the international environment (…) or the functional need to 
cooperate’. 149 As an example they bring the notion of humanitarian intervention, in 
which states may decide to get militarily involved in a situation that does not provide 
them with any obvious economic or strategic benefit.150 Thus, by referring to the 
question of values in international politics, Constructivists emphasise the normative 
character of norms and international law, which can also lead states to redefine their 
interests. They argue, for example, that the norm of racial equality influenced states’ 
condemnation of Apartheid even though ‘they had material incentives not to do so’.151 
As wil be shown in the proceeding chapter, the embedded norm of non-intervention 
had great influence on the response of international society towards the Israeli military 
operation within the teritory of Lebanon. 
    
The analysis of the notion of international norms, as wel as the question of 
their emergence and their roles leads directly to the notion of change. In analysing the 
question of change it is useful to refer back to the norm of racial equality. As 
mentioned, the development of this norm led international society to condemn the 
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government of South Africa for its policy of Apartheid.152 Although many powerful 
members of international society used to be the colonial powers, once colonialism was 
over and the norm of racial equality emerged and was recognised the racist policies of 
South Africa were no longer accepted or even tolerated. Constructivists claim that the 
violation of certain norms is not disregarded and even states, which may have interests 
in keeping good relations with the norm-breaking state wil nevertheless stand by other 
members of international society. Therefore ‘international law and its associated 
institutions’ create and disperse ‘beliefs and standards of appropriate behaviour that 
have a powerful socializing efect on international relations’.153 Hence, both interests 
and identities of states can be altered in a process of engaging with international law. In 
addition, ‘[t]he process of negotiation, mutual education, and principled argument 
related to the creation of and compliance with international law has a feedback effect 
on how national actors see themselves and their interests’.154 
 
Although from the above passage it seems that the possibility of change is not a 
subject of dispute among Constructivists in that they question ‘the inevitability of the 
social status quo’,155 in fact they argue that it is not so straightforward. The fact that 
agency and structure can in fact shape each other means that change can be both 
‘possible and dificult’.156 However, they also claim that change can in fact occur as a 
result of just one precedent.157 They emphasise what they refer to as the focal points of 
history, which can trigger change that not only brings about an emergence of a new 
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norm but also an alteration in the understanding of what is meant by interest and 
appropriate behaviour. For instance, the atrocities commited in Rwanda and later in 
Kosovo triggered an international consensus that international society cannot remain 
passive to human sufering and prompted an international action.158 At the same time, 
however, the enforcement of this norm is limited by the existence of another norm – 
that of states’ sovereignty, which proscribes an internal authority within specified 
teritory. 
 
    This subsection of the chapter has outlined basic and fundamental assumptions 
and concepts of both the ES and Constructivism. Based on the merits of these 
assumptions these IR perspectives have been chosen as a theoretical background for 
this thesis. In the view of the present author a synthesis of the ES and Constructivism 
alows for the most thorough understanding of the status of international law in the 
wake of 9/11. As already mentioned and what wil be further elaborated throughout the 
thesis, the scope of international law cannot be limited only to its utilitarian character. 
Its normative aspect, i.e. what should be seen as an appropriate behaviour cannot be 
undermined. International law provides a guidance for appropriate behaviours and 
states recognise that certain principles, which do not clearly reflect their national 
interests, need to be upheld and should not be broken. Thus, states in adopting their 
decisions are guided not only by their national interest but also by the aforementioned 
notion of “oughtness”. For example, as the first case wil be shown, the US – a 
traditional Israeli aly – criticised the government of this state for its intervention in 
Lebanon despite incentives not to do so. Moreover, as wil be further demonstrated, 
international law not only constrains states’ actions but also reflects the identity of 
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international society. As identity of the later changes, so does the role and scope of the 
former. It wil be argued that the identity of international society and thus the 
understanding of international law in the wake of 9/11 difer from the ones existing 
during the Cold War. 
 
b) The Concept of International Society 
 
The English School of International Relations can efectively be classified as 
the theory of international society. A timeless definition of international society is 
delivered by Bul in a classic text on the subject, namely: the Anarchical Society. 
International society is defined here as ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values’, which ‘form[s] a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common institutions’.159 A few implications can be 
deduced from the aforementioned definition. Firstly, the membership of such society is 
reserved for states and the membership does not necessarily have to be universal. 
Indeed it would be dificult to claim that prior to the twentieth century international 
society was comprised of the majority of states. Secondly, members of this society not 
only share interests and values but they recognise the constraining power of 
international law. What folows is that states in relations with other states acknowledge 
that they are bound by certain rules such as respect for others’ claims to independence, 
honouring agreements and limitation in exercising force against other states. Last, but 
not least, states acknowledge the importance of international institutions, which 
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includes ‘the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and 
general international organisations, and customs and conventions of war’.160 
 
 This distinguishes international society from the notion of international system 
understood more in a traditional and realist manner, ‘which contends that states belong 
to an international system in which there is seldom relief from competition and 
conflict’.161 Accordingly, international system is brought into being ‘when two or more 
states have sufficient contact between them, and have suficient impact on one 
another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a 
whole’.162 When can the relations between states be viewed as reflecting and 
encompassing elements of international society instead of merely that of international 
system? In a view of Bartelson, ‘an international system becomes an international 
society when the logic of anarchy governing interaction in the system presses forward a 
notion of shared identity that comes to constitute the foundation of international 
society’. 163 There is a need for states not only to ‘recognise each other as being the 
same kind of entity’, but also to acknowledge and accept ‘sovereign equality’ of al 
members of internationals society.164 
 
According to the ES, there are six goals of international society. The first 
objective is ‘the preservation of the system and society itself’; the second aim refers to 
‘the maintenance of the independence or eternal sovereignty of individual states’; the 
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third and fourth treats the question of the use of force. 165 While the former’s objective 
refers to the creation of peace understood as the ‘absence of war among members of 
international society’, the later establishes the more achievable goal especialy when 
international society has become universal - namely the ‘limitation of inter-state 
violence’. 166 The fifth goal aims at the respect and adherence to international 
agreements. 167 The last objective refers to the respect and stability of the rights, which 
derive from the institution of sovereignty.168 Bul points out, however, that these goals 
are not exhaustive and might be subject to change. As the history of relations between 
states evolves, so does the nature of international society. At diferent times, diferent 
goals are prioritised. What should be emphasised, nevertheless, is that al of these goals 
contribute to the international order.169  
 
One of the most important contributions of theorists addressing the notion of 
international society is their emphasis that such a society can exist despite cultural, 
linguistic or religious differences.170 As international society became universal, which 
can be observed by looking at the membership of the United Nations, ‘the doctrine that 
this society rests upon a specific culture of civilisation is generaly rejected’.171 The 
main features of the contemporary international society are as folows: the equality in 
terms of rights and obligations; international agreements are based on the notion of 
reciprocity; rules and institutions derive from states’ consent.172 
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As the constructivist view is that international politics is socialy constructed, 
theorists associated with this theory claim that the role that international society itself 
plays in the international arena is significant. They argue that international society 
indeed shapes the very identity of states by ‘virtue of recognizing their legitimacy and 
admiting them to international organizations whose membership is often restricted 
only to states’ and thus in fact statehood ‘depends partly on the position [of a state] in 
the international society of states’.173 What is particularly important is that in the 
Constructivists’ view the very sustainability of international society is perceived as 
constituting states’ long-term interests. Hence, international society is seen as a force in 
itself, influencing states’ decisions.174 
 
Such a perspective on international society as wel as the Constructivists’ 
emphasis on the constitutive values of norms and the processes of norm-generation 
brings Constructivism close to the English School of International Relations. As 
Jepperson has argued ‘it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a 
condition of participation in a society to argument that states are constructed, partly or 
substantialy, by these norms’.175 
 
    A constructivist emphasis on the role of ideas, norms and identities in 
international politics enriches the discussion about the nature and role of international 
society as wel as international law. In addition, Constructivists argue that certain 
notions, such as national interest, sovereignty or even the state, are not given but 
instead are socialy constructed, i.e. the understandings and ideas that actors have about 
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them are inter-subjective and can change.176 They base their argument on the 
assumption that international actors ‘operate within a social context of shared 
subjective understandings and norms’ and due to that the aforementioned notions ‘are 
not objectively true, but subjective; their meaning is not fixed, but contingent’.177 
 
To what extent can we talk about the existence of international society in the 
contemporary world? Do states form an international entity based on the idea of shared 
identity? Do they conceive themselves as being bound by an established and recognised 
set of rules and norms? This thesis argues that al these questions can be answered 
afirmatively. The existence of international society can be observed in that states 
created and have been upholding various norms, rules and principles with the aim of 
not only securing their interests but also ensuring a more peaceful co-existence. 
According to Reus-Smit, ‘[t]he warp and weft of international society are the 
“authoritative practices” that enable states with different goals, values and objectives to 
coexist and co-operate, such as diplomacy and international law’.178 It is submited that 
states ‘have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the 
conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these 
arangements’.179 In fact Bul argues that: 
 
[t]he element  of international society  has always  been  present (…) 
because at  no stage can it  be said that the conception  of the common 
interests  of states,  of common rules accepted and common institutions 
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worked  by them,  has ceased to exert an influence.  Most states at  most 
times pay some respect to the basic rules of coexistence in international 
society, such as mutual respect for sovereignty, the rule that agreements 
should be kept, and rules limiting resort to violence.180 
 
Such an understanding of the modern international relations distinguishes itself from 
the Hobbesian tradition, which emphasises the conflictual nature of inter-state relations. 
One of the most important aspects of international society is that states recognise that 
they are bound by these existing rules and norms. According to Bul, rules ‘must be 
obeyed to some degree, and must be reckoned as a factor in the calculations of those to 
whom it applies, even those who elect to violate it’.181 Moreover, rules 
 
need to be legitimised in the eyes of the persons or groups to which they 
apply.  Rules are legitimised to the extent that  members  of the society 
accept them as valid, or embrace the values implied or presupposed by 
the rules. To the extent that the rules are legitimised they do not depend 
for their efectiveness on sanctions or enforcement.182 
 
This is in agreement with Dunne, who argues that ‘the identity of being a member of 
international society generates an obligation to folow the rules’.183 This can be 
exemplified by the international situation throughout the Cold War. Accordingly, even 
during the most turbulent moments of that period the US and the Soviet Union did not 
‘break of diplomatic relations, withdraw recognition of one another’s sovereignty, 
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repudiate the idea of a common international law or cause the break-up of the United 
Nations into rival organisations’.184 Yet, the existence of international society does not 
guarantee peaceful and harmonious relations between states. In a view of Bul, ‘[t]he 
element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war and of 
transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, and to reify the first element, or to 
speak as if it annuled the second and third, in an ilusion’.185 States sometimes break 
the established rules but non-compliance with such rules does not mean that 
international society ceases to exist. According to the same author: 
 
 [w]hen accepted norms are broken, the offending state tries to justify its 
actions with reference to another norm or gives reasons why the actions 
constitutes a legal exception. If there were no such thing as international 
society, there  would  be  no  need to account for  one’s actions in this 
way.186 
 
This wil be exemplified very clearly in the proceeding chapters, where it wil be 
demonstrated that both countries in question, i.e. the US and Israel, delivered 
justifications for their actions, in which they relied upon specific international legal 
provisions. International society would be endangered if noncompliance with the 
established institutions, rules and norms of international behaviour became a notorious 
feature of international relations and it would no longer be viewed as an exception. 
 
International society is not a static concept and is a subject of development and 
change. Frameworks of international relations undergo diverse transformations, which 
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impact international society in a variety of ways. At the same time, any postulate 
suggesting an emergence of a change or transformation of/within international society 
needs to be vigorously investigated. The folowing paragraphs provide, thus, an 
overview of a number of issues and developments, which might be perceived as 
signaling what some caled a process of ‘reinvention’ of international society.187 
 
The first argument is delivered by those who question a state-centric approach 
to international society. When we look at the contemporary world, it is, indeed, 
impossible not to take into account various and numerous voices other than those of 
states. When discussing the problématique of the use of force as a response towards 
terorist atacks, one cannot help but notice the role of actors other than states. The fact 
that al three interventions discussed throughout this thesis occured as results of 
atacks instigated by non-state actors might be viewed as chalenging the state-centric 
approach to international relations. Indeed, the widespread process of globalisation 
visible at various platforms enabled a proliferation of numerous interactions involving 
a variety of international actors. Such account may even suggest that it is more 
adequate to refer to a world society rather than an international society. According to 
Wiliams, ‘whilst the institutions of international society have generaly treated 
individuals as, for example, objects rather than subjects of international law, world 
society’s reconceptualisation of the nature of political space chalenges the need to 
work through the state to achieve political significance’.188 The idea of world society is 
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associated  with a  political system in  which states are  not the 
predominant actors, although this does not mean they disappear; where 
political activity is  principaly focused  upon individuals, rather than 
institutionalised colectives; and where normative progress is understood 
in universal terms.189 
 
According to Buzan, while international society composes of states and treats them as 
dominant actors, the world society composes of various actors and emphasises the role 
and importance of transnational actors and individuals.190 World society encompasses 
many elements and features of the solidarist conception of international society. First 
and foremost both emphasise the development, protection and enforcement of human 
rights, the right to self-determination, democracy and a possibility of humanitarian 
intervention. According to Neumann, ‘the discourse surounding human rights was one 
key to the making of world society’.191 Indeed it is viewed from this perspective that 
‘some cosmopolitanism, and concern for the rights of individuals, is necessary for 
international society’.192 As such, solidarism ‘focuses on the possibility of shared moral 
norms underpinning a more expansive, and almost inevitably more interventionist, 
understanding of international order’.193 This is in a stark contrast to pluralism, which 
is ‘about the preservation and/or cultivation of the political and cultural diference and 
distinctness’.194 Such characterisation makes the scope of international society rather 
limited and ‘restricted to shared concerns about the degree of international order under 
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anarchy necessary for coexistence’.195 While the pluralist conception of international 
society is state-centric, the solidarist one ‘ties together state and non-state actors, and 
draws on cosmopolitan notions of individual rights and a community of humankind’ 
and because of that ‘it cannot help but blur the boundary between international and 
world society’.196 
 
    Even though the various developments of the last decades point towards a 
greater relevance and importance of non-state actors the role of states has not been 
diminished. According to Friedrichs, ‘[t]he nation-state is the only authority which is 
entitled to convey popular legitimacy to colective decisions at the international 
level’.197 In a slightly diferent manner, Armstrong observes: 
 
Globalisation and  other forces  may  wel  have created a structure  of 
economic, social, political and cultural interactions that cannot fuly be 
understood  within a framework  defined solely  by the state and the 
relations among states, but they have not replaced that framework.198 
 
International society, encompassing either pluralist or solidarist characteristics, 
stil remains a society of sovereign states. This is in an agreement with Brown, who 
states that ‘state-centricity is a defining feature of a “society of states” approach and 
cannot simply be abandoned’.199 Even though interactions at the global stage are 
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conducted via various channels and include a variety of actors and thus are not limited 
only to states, special and distinctive rights and duties are awarded only to states. As 
Bul observes, ‘states have been united in the belief that they are the principal actors in 
world politics and the chief bearers of rights and duties within it’.200 International law 
‘remains the law of states associated in a society of states, not of people who are 
members of some larger community’. 201 
 
In the light of international law only states can lawfuly use force while 
implementing their rights to self-defence. This right, embodied within the article 51 of 
the UN Charter, is restricted to states and states only. This right is recognised both in 
international customary law and international case law and its application has never 
been questioned. Furthermore, ‘[i]t is sovereign states which command most of the 
armed forces in the world, which are the objects of the most powerful human loyalties 
and whose conflict and co-operation determine the political structure of the world’.202 
In addition, ‘[n]ot only has globalisation been drive by state policies but state retreat is 
reversible and the power resources available are stil critical and distinctive – Microsoft 
maters but so, too, do the marines.’203 According to Jackson, ‘any claim that a “global 
civil society”, consisting of such actors and networks, is displacing global international 
society based on sovereign states seriously misconstrues the character of international 
society’.204 A similar view is held by Reus-Smit, who argues that ‘non-state actors do 
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not fundamentaly alter the basic principles and dynamics of the society of sovereign 
states’.205 
 
In conclusion, the intention of the present author is not to negate the impact of 
the proliferation and the role of various international non-state actors. Nevertheless the 
above analysis aimed to demonstrate that state-centric approach of international society 
is the most adequate in contributing to the explanation of questions posed in this study. 
Although the role of various actors in international politics can no longer be 
questioned, the complexity surounding the notion of legitimacy of the use of force in 
relation to acts of terorism can be explained most adequately and effectively by 
adopting this very approach. International law is created, interpreted and even 
reinvented by states. Only states can lawfuly use force while implementing their rights 
to self-defence. As the right to self-defence remains states’ domain such approach is 
both logical and efective. Moreover, the scope of this study does not alow for a 
thorough investigation of whether the curent international society should be identified 
in fact as the world society. Such an investigation would require posing diferent 
questions. Lastly, as Dunne observes: ‘the question whether one proceeds with an 
expansive understanding of international society – which includes a multiplicity of 
actors al enmeshed in international order – or a more restrictive one (simply the inter-
state domain) is an analytical choice’.206 
 
A role of and a growth in number of non-state actors are not the only 
developments suggesting a transformation or a reinvention of international society. 
This thesis argues that the contemporary international society no longer fits a 
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minimalist pluralist conception of international society but in fact embodies certain 
characteristics of a solidarist conception of international society. The former resided 
within the broad understanding of the notion of co-existence and thus limited itself to 
the emphasis of notions such as respect for states’ sovereignty and non-intervention 
within domestic afairs. The later, on the other hand, through its emphasis of the more 
deeply embedded cooperation between states embodies the notion of interest 
colectively understood. This suggests that it should not only be understood in terms of 
self-interest but also as in the colective interest of society. Although mainstream 
theories of IR might question such an understanding as in their discussions about 
states’ interests they emphasise the material benefits residing within the thin conception 
of the self-interest, the case studies presented in this thesis wil show that such a 
perception is no longer accurate. 
 
As the identity of states, their roles and interests might change; the same applies 
to the international society. This thesis argues that the conception of international 
society during the Cold War difered from the one observed since the 1990s. Although 
a more in-depth analysis of this transformation of international society wil be provided 
in chapter five and seven, certain basic reflections need to be addressed at this stage. As 
mentioned, the international society of the second half of the twentieth century can be 
identified as a pluralist society based on the notions of self-preservation, equality and 
sovereignty and a limited international engagement. Such a limited approach was based 
on the international situation of the time and the priority of sustainability of the 
international order and status quo. The current international society can no longer be 
viewed as resembling such characteristics. Although certain principles, for example the 
principle of sovereignty, have been sustained, states’ understanding of their scope has 
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altered. For instance, it has become accepted that sovereignty is not absolute and, in 
fact, is conditional. What it means is that this principle implies not only rights but also 
obligations. The diference between the curent international society and the one of the 
Cold War period can be viewed in that its members adopted a more active approach, 
evident for example in their approach towards the enforcement of international law. As 
wil be shown in chapter five, the bipolarity and a continuing hostility between the East 
and the West alowed the international society to embrace only a limited role. The 
demise of these constraints in 1990s, however, created a foundation for an emergence 
of an international society that no longer resembled a limited pluralist conception. 
 
c) The UN Security Council as a Proxy of International Society 
 
This thesis analyses the ways in which international society reacted towards Israeli 
and the US military interventions as responses towards terrorist atacks. To this end it 
relies to a great extent upon meetings and statements delivered at the UN Security 
Council. In fact this thesis argues that the UN Security Council can efectively be used 
as a proxy of international society. Thus this part of the chapter provides reasoning 
behind such classification. 
 
Firstly, the UN Security Council is the most important organ of the only 
universal international organisation, which is regarded as ‘a symbol of a sense of 
common interests and values’.207 The fact that its responsibilities encompass a 
management of situations threatening international peace and security including the 
instances of the use of force between states makes a consultation of its involvement 
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both logical and necessary. Due to the fact that its main responsibility is to maintain 
international order, its involvement in events surounding Israeli interventions in 
Lebanon as wel as the US intervention in Afghanistan was explicitly noticeable, 
consistent and continuous. As the folowing chapter wil demonstrate the UN Security 
Council hold numerous meetings in the aftermath of each interventions, during which 
its members presented their statements, discussed the issue in question and adopted 
relevant resolutions. 
 
 Secondly, this thesis focuses on the legitimacy of the use of force in relation to 
terorism. As the UN Security possesses legal and recognised authority in regards to the 
use of force it is both logical and crucial to consult it and to treat it as a continuous 
point of reference. Moreover, it is the only body that not only can make decisions 
which binds states but also can impose a sanction or (in instances threatening 
international peace and security) can direct a military operation. Article 25 of the UN 
Charter states that ‘[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and cary out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’.208 This 
provision means that decisions adopted at the UNSC forum are binding on al members 
of the United Nations. Moreover, the UNSC resolutions dealing with question of 
international peace and security under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are considered as 
‘the most important category of binding resolutions’.209 According to Krisch, ‘the fact 
that Council decisions are legaly binding might explain a general inclination to folow 
them, especialy since most states have an interest in maintaining international legal 
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order in general’.210 This is in a striking contrast to the UN General Assembly 
resolutions, which are described as being ‘at best only soft law’.211 Even though the 
UN General Assembly is a broader forum where opinions of al member states can be 
heard, its decisions or statements delivered by states’ representatives do not cary the 
same weight as those of the UN Security Council.  
 
Thirdly, despite the fact that its work or decisions in some cases meet with 
criticism, in that they are selective, the UNSC is seen as an authoritative and a 
respected organ of the UN. As the debates surounding for example interventions in 
Kosovo and Iraq has demonstrated the question of the UNSC authorisation ‘was very 
much at the centre of atention, and without it, public opinion was far more reluctant to 
endorse military action’.212 
 
Fourthly, the permanent membership of the UN Security is reserved to states, 
which can efectively be described as Great Powers traditionaly understood. It is not 
surprising that the special status, privileges as wel as responsibilities were bestowed 
upon the victorious powers of the World War I. This is in an agreement with Bul who 
argues that  
 
great  powers are  powers recognised  by  others to  have (…) certain 
special rights and  duties’ (…)  The idea  of a  great  power, (…) 
presupposes and implies the idea of international society as opposed to 
an international system, a  body  of independent  political communities 
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linked  by common rules and institutions as  wel as  by contact and 
interaction.213 
 
Jackson points out that ‘[t]he special international procedural responsibilities of the 
great powers since 1945 have been defined by chapter VI of the UN charter which 
applies to members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent (great power) 
members: USA, China, Russia, Britain, France’.214 Yet, what needs to be emphasised 
upfront is the fact that Great Powers can realise their roles in international society as 
long as these roles ‘are accepted clearly enough by a large enough proportion of the 
society of states to command legitimacy’.215 A rise in power of states such as Japan, 
India, Brazil ‘might result in a widening gap between actual Great Power “status” and 
formal privilege’, however the permanent membership of the UNSC stil ‘confirms the 
Great Power status of the curent holders of privilege’.216 
 
An establishment of such a privileged status is not a post-1945 invention and it is 
not an exceptional one. A role of great powers in a creation and maintenance of 
international order was noticeable in other periods of history, for instance: after the 
victory over Napoleon in the nineteenth century or in the aftermath of the World War I 
in the twentieth century. In relation to the former, a composition of a new international 
order occured at the Congress of Vienna between 1814 and 1815. This order ‘shaped 
relations between European state for years to come’.217 Eventualy the victorious 
powers set up the Concert of Europe reflecting ‘a more formal directorate’, which 
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would alow them to ‘hold periodic conferences whenever international developments 
caled for Great-Power action or threatened to destabilise the continent’.218 The future 
relations were to be based upon multilateralism, which meant that victorious powers 
‘were to be consulted on every issue that arose and joint decisions, reflecting the 
common “European” interest, were to be arived at’.219 It is argued that the 
establishment of such a new order instigated ‘a fundamental change (…) in the 
governing rules, norms and practices of international politics’ by bringing about 
‘political equilibrium’.220 Such privileged states ‘undermined the formal equality that 
has prevailed in the previous century and enabled [the Great Powers] to set norms and 
lay down rules for international society as a whole’.221 
 
 Coresponding situation occured in the aftermath of the World War I, when the 
victorious powers of the time ‘convened at the Palace of Versailes to construct a new, 
more peaceful international order’.222 The Covenant of the League of Nations 
expectedly reserved a special position for the victorious states and reflected a 
distribution of power of the day. In a similar manner in years to come, the creation of 
the United Nations and the UN Charter rested upon an agreement and a reflection of 
the interests of the victorious states. As Krisch observes: ‘the Covenant of the League 
of Nations embodied privileges for the Great Powers, even though it often led to an 
uneasy balance with aspirations of formal equality. In the negotiations of the UN 
Charter, the Great Powers exploited this precedent in their favour’.223 
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Lastly, the present author’s intention is not to suggest that the UNSC is the 
international society. However, the UN Security Council can efectively be seen as a 
proxy of international society as it plays a central role in the maintenance of 
international order and has a power to make decisions, which are binding on al 
member states. As the curent membership is virtualy almost universal it is not an 
exaggeration to claim that decisions reached at the UNSC forum have an impact upon 
the whole world. This far-reaching power and privileged status of the UNSC led 
Jackson to suggest that it might be viewed even as constituting ‘a sort of government of 
international society’.224 Although such classification might appear to be contrived it 
stil points toward the influential and central role of the UNSC, and the permanent 
members in particular. As Jackson argues ‘the UN is not a universitas. The Political 
world is stil a societas of sovereign states. The UN Security Council exists to uphold 
the societas of states’.225 
 
In light of the above discussion, it is possible to draw the folowing hypothesis. 
Firstly, the changed international approach towards the use of force in relation to acts 
of terorism evident since 9/11 reflects the identity of the contemporary international 
society. The fact that the right to self-defence was, for the first time in relation to 
terorism, recognised and states expressed an overwhelming solidarity with the US 
delivers evidence that the international society of the post-Cold War era no longer can 
be positioned within the pluralist conception but in fact embodies certain 
characteristics of the solidarist conception. Secondly, the changed approach towards 
the use of force was however conditioned by the fact that it was the US who was 
atacked on September 11, 2001. Thus, in a manner similar to realist and neo-liberal 
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theories, the symbiotic perspective of the ES and Constructivism emphasise the role of 
the hegemon. Its understanding of the term difers, however, in that it stresses the 
importance of notions such as authority, recognition and legitimacy. Moreover, it 
argues that hegemony is more deeply embedded within the notion of international 
society to the extent that it actualy might be viewed as its institution. Thirdly, as 
opposed to mainstream theories of IR, states recognised the US right to self-defence not 
only because it was in their own self-interest but also because it was in the interest of 
international society itself. As the identity of international society changed since the 
end of the Cold War so did its interests. Lastly, the 2006 Operation Change Direction, 
which constitutes the third case study presented in this thesis, delivers further evidence 
of the changed identity of international society as it shows that international reaction 
towards 9/11 was not an example of “the double standard”. 
 
The compatibility of the assumption of the ES with Constructivism can be also 
found in their approach towards international law. Even though the ES theorists agree 
with Neo-liberals and recognise that international law possesses a functional character, 
at the same time they point out a limitation of such portrait of the nature of 
international law. Both the ES theorists and Constructivists share the view that 
international politics cannot be brought down merely to its material and egoist nature 
and that international norms play both influential and independent roles in world 
politics. 
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Part Five: Research Methods 
 
This thesis can be placed neatly within qualitative research methods. The 
qualitative methods alow for a thorough scrutiny of international law in general and of 
trends visible in state practice in relation to the notion of the use of force. Indeed most 
of legal discourses employ qualitative methodology. Moreover, an in-depth qualitative 
data is indispensable for a comprehensive and coherent research in a field of 
International Relations. Thus, this thesis relies upon an extensive colection of 
international legal documents, such as international treaties, judgements delivered by 
international courts, resolutions adopted by UN Security Council and UN General 
Assembly, states’ statements as wel as secondary sources of international law. This 
thesis depends also upon a widespread International Relations scholarship. A 
consultation and engagement with various traditions of International Relations, such as 
Realism, Liberalism, Neo-liberalism, the English School of International Relations and 
Constructivism, is central for a formulation of hypothesis and ‘structured or codified 
ways to test theories’. 226 
 
This thesis tests the hypotheses formulated in the preceding parts of this 
chapter. This is conducted via a comparative study of three case studies, namely the 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom and the 2006 
Operation Change Direction. Comparison is said to be 
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a fundamental tool of analysis. It sharpens our power of description and 
plays a central role in concept-formation  by  bringing into focus 
suggestive similarities and contrast among cases.  Comparison is 
routinely  used in testing  hypotheses, and it can contribute to the 
inductive discovery of new hypotheses and to theory-building.227 
 
Its advantage can be observed in that it alows for ‘hypothesis testing and 
development’ and in that it ‘has the potential to improve the classifications we use to 
impose some sort of order on the diversity of the political world’.228 According to 
Lijphart, ‘case studies can make an important contribution to the establishment of 
general propositions and thus to theory-building in political science’.229 As the 
preceding parts of this chapter presented this thesis wil analyse and explain the 
dichotomy in ways in which international society reacted towards three military 
interventions in response to terorist atacks, which are treated as separate case studies. 
To this end this thesis wil test and falsify various theories of International Relations in 
order to deliver the most comprehensive and convincing explanation of such a change. 
As Van Evera observes, ‘case studies can supply quite decisive evidence for or against 
political theories’.230 Bennet points out that: 
 
[t]he comparative advantage  of case study  method includes identifying 
new  or  omited  variables and  hypotheses, examining intervening 
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variables in individual cases to  make inferences  on  which causal 
mechanisms may have been at work, developing historical explanations 
of particular cases, ataining high levels of construct validity, and using 
contingent generalisations to model complex relationships.231 
 
A case is defined as ‘an instance of a class of events of interest to the 
investigator’.232 Therefore a case study is ‘a wel-defined aspect of a historical 
happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical happening 
itself’.233 Folowing this definition the scrutiny of case studies wil be limited only to 
the notion of the right to self-defence. This wil involve analyses of both Israel’s and 
the US justifications for military interventions in question based on the premises of this 
principle and the subsequent international reaction towards these instances of the use of 
force. As wil be shown, the sole focus of this study is reserved to the legal discourse 
surounding the instigation of these operations rather than their execution. Thus the 
criteria of jus ad belum rather than jus in belo wil be consulted and analysed. 
 
There are, however, certain limitations of the comparative method. For 
example, Lijphart argues that ‘[t]he principal problems facing the comparative method 
can be succinctly states as: many variables, smal number of cases’. 234 Van Evera 
emphasises that the results of case study ‘cannot be generalised to other cases’.235 At 
the same time, however, the author points out that this consequence is applicable only 
to ‘single-case studies’.236 Reliance upon three case studies might be viewed as a 
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limited approach, especialy considering the extent to which the findings can be 
applicable or generalised to other cases. A possible inclusion of a greater number of 
case studies could potentialy strengthen an overal discussion. However, such an 
inclusion does not necessarily lead to a more coherent and comprehensive study. As 
Colier observes: 
 
the application  of a concept to a  broader range  of cases can lead to 
conceptual “stretching”, as some  of the  meanings associated  with the 
concept fail to fit the  new cases.  The concepts that can  most easily  be 
applied to a broad range of cases are  often so  general that they do not 
bring into focus the similarities and contrasts among cases that are 
essential blocks in worthwhile comparative analysis.237 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that ‘the most interesting studies wil often be those that focus 
on a smaler number of cases’.238 This is the view which is apparently shared with 
Lijphart, who suggests that ‘the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be 
more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases’.239 In light of 
the above, the folowing paragraphs explain the merits behind choosing only three case 
studies. 
 
Firstly, the scope of the study imposes certain limitations and in order to deliver 
a comprehensive analysis and coherent conclusions the topic needs to be approached 
from a practical way. Secondly, although this thesis relies upon three case studies, the 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee can efectively be viewed as a representative of other 
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interventions instigated by Israel within the territory of Lebanon during the second half 
of the twentieth century. As the proceeding chapter wil demonstrate, Israel conducted 
various military operations in Lebanon since 1968.240 These interventions were 
instigated as responses to terorist atacks and were based on the same justification. As 
such, Israel claimed that its actions were justified in the light of international law in 
general and the Article 51 in particular. They also met with the same international 
reaction in that they were viewed as unlawful actions. Given these points, Operation 
Peace for Galilee and the subsequent international response towards this intervention 
can in effect be regarded as representing a general international approach towards the 
use of force prior to 9/11. 
Thirdly, such a method alows for a thorough and extensive scrutiny of the 
cases at hand as it enables placing a particular case study within a historical and 
political context. A rigorous scrutiny of these three case studies enables a thorough 
account of a change in international approach towards the use of force in response to 
terorist atacks. As such it alows for a more comprehensive explanation as to why 
such a change has occurred and what does it say about the nature of international law. 
Placing an analysis within a broader discourse on international society facilitates 
appreciation of contextual, political as wel as historical underpinnings and 
developments, which not only prompted such a change but also can be viewed as 
suggesting a certain level of consolidation. This certain level of consolidation can be 
observed through an analysis of the 2006 Operation Change Direction. What is evident 
firstly is the fact that Israeli right to self-defence was recognised for the first time. This 
recognition is in a striking contrast to the international reaction folowing the 1982 
240 The 1968 Beirut Raid, the 1978 Operation Litani, the 1993 Operation Accountability, and the 1996 
Operation Grapes of Wrath. 
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Operation Peace for Galilee, where Israeli actions met with a widespread criticism and 
condemnation. Considering the fact that other military intervention instigated by Israel 
within the teritory of Lebanon throughout the second half of the twentieth century also 
met with similar international criticism and/or condemnation, the recognition of the 
right to self-defence in 2006 can be viewed as a prominent event delivering indeed 
evidence of a changed approach towards the use of force in relation to terrorism.  
 
Lastly, a difficulty of whether to include a wide or narow range of case studies 
can be resolved by an appropriate understanding of what constitutes comparable cases. 
Accordingly, Lijphart defines “comparable” as 
 
similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which 
one wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variable are 
concerned  with  one  wants to relate to each  other. If such comparable 
cases can  be found, they  offer  particularly  good  opportunities for the 
application  of the comparative  method  because they alow the 
establishment of relationships among a few variables while many other 
variables are controled.241 
 
In the light of this characteristic, the case studies selected for the purpose of this study 
are “comparable” for a number of reasons. Firstly, both Israel and the US in their 
justification relied upon the notion of the inherent right to self-defence. Secondly, al 
three interventions were instigated as responses to terorist atacks and directed against 
the teritory of hosting states. Although, it might be argued that 9/11 cannot be 
                            
241 Lijphart (n 229) 687. 
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comparable with the assassination atempt triggering Operation Peace for Galilee in 
1982, this thesis wil demonstrate that a diference in scopes does not mean that these 
cases an incomparable. Firstly, such argument cannot explain the reasoning behind a 
decision of international society to recognise Israeli right to self-defence in 2006. This 
is due to the fact that the scale of the atacks triggering Operation Change Direction 
could in no way be viewed as comparable with 9/11. Secondly, as the second case 
study wil demonstrate, the extent to which 9/11 can be viewed as amounting to an 
armed atack triggering an implementation of the right to self-defence remains 
debatable. Thirdly, both victim states in their justifications made references to previous 
atacks launched by relevant non-state actors. This suggests that although one event 
was a trigger, the whole military campaign can in fact be viewed as a response towards 
a series of atacks conducted over a period of time. Lastly, each intervention 
constituted a subject of an extensive debate at the UNSC forum. 
 
a) The Customary International Law and the Notion of Change  
 
    This subsection looks at customary international law and analyses the notion of 
change. The reasoning behind an inclusion of this subsection is twofold. Firstly, it 
establishes a foundation for the folowing analysis of the right to self-defence. This 
thesis argues that there has been a noticeable shift towards the broadening scope of the 
right to self-defence in relation to terorism. Although, as the folowing case studies 
wil show such a shift has not yet been acknowledged by international case law, the 
validity of such a claim can be found in the recent state practice. Therefore a scrutiny 
of rules governing the international customary law regarding the possibility of change 
is pivotal and central to the discussion in question. 
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International customary law is defined as the law ‘which has evolved from the 
practice or customs of states’, which consists, for example, of an ‘actual activity, 
statements made in respect to concrete situations or disputes, statements of legal 
principle made in the abstract, national legislation and the practice of international 
organisations’.242 Notions such as time (i.e. how long a norm has been in use) and 
repetition (i.e. has the state practice been consistent with such as a norm) are viewed 
here as crucial as they deliver evidence that a particular norm has been recognised and 
accepted by states as a valid one. The necessity of time and repetition requirements 
makes a crystalisation of a particular norm into a part of customary international law a 
long and gradual process. Tunkin observers that ‘[t]he creation of a customary norm of 
international law is an historical process; the elements of the norm of law evolve 
gradualy’.243 
 
Customary international law is not, however, static and changes in state practice 
are eventualy reflected in law. Indeed, this thesis argues that the case studies in 
question demonstrate that there has been a shift in states’ approach towards the use of 
force in relation to terorist atacks suggesting a growing acceptance of a broader scope 
of the right to self-defence. Tunkin in his discussion on the customary norms of 
international law asks an important question, that is: ‘[i]n what measure does [the] 
“old” rule answer present-day requirements?’.244 It is true that the aforementioned time 
                            
242 Dixon M, Texbook on International Law (7th edn Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32. On 
customary international law in general, see, for example: Kunz JL, "The Nature of Customary 
International Law," American Journal of International Law 47, no. 4 (1953): 662-669. Shaw MN, 
International Law (5th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 68-88. Thirlway H, The 
Sources of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Jennings R Wats A, 
Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (9th edn London and New York: Longman, 1996), 25-31. Wolfke 
K, "Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary International Law," Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 24 (1993): 1-16. 
243 Tunkin GI, "Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law," California 
Law Review 49, no. 3 (1961): 424. 
244 Ibid, 420. 
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factor gives a particular norm an established status and because of that changes occur 
relatively rarely. At the same, however, a particular change might be necessary to 
reflect the present international environment. 
 
And even though these factors of time and repetition play again an important 
role in a process of consolidation rapid changes are not excluded. According to Tunkin, 
‘the element of time does not in itself create a resumption in favour of the existence of 
a customary norm of international law’ and that ‘[i]t is conceivable (.) for the element 
of repetition in some cases not to occur and for the rule of conduct to appear as a result 
of one precedent only’.245 Such an approach is also reflected in writings of various 
scholars. For instance, Cassese argues that ‘international law does not necessarily 
require that there should be a consistent repetition over time of the acts or conduct for a 
new rule to take shape. There may be case where a single episode of some magnitude, 
combined with the reaction of other states, may sufice to bring about the formation of 
a rule’.246 It might be suggested that especialy in the contemporary world with an ever-
expanding globalisation and interconnectedness such instant changes are to be 
expected. This is in conformity with O’Brien, who states that ‘in the modern world 
with the faster tempo of life it is unrealistic to wait for extensive evidence of prolonged 
practice’.247 A similar view is presented by Shaw, who states that ‘[i]n a society 
constantly faced with new situations because of the dynamics of progress, there is a 
                            
245 Ibid, 419. 
246 Cassese A, "A Folow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis," 
European Journal of International Law 10, no. 4 (1999): 796. See also: Akehurst M, "Custom as a 
Source of International Law (1976)," in Sources of International Law, ed. Koskenniemi M (Hants: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000), 248-303. 
247 O'Brien J, International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2001), 78. 
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clear need for a reasonably speedy method of responding to such changes by a system 
of prompt rule-formation’.248 
 
In instances when a change appears rapidly a crucial factor resides within the 
degree of international acceptance and recognition. Accordingly: 
 
 [s]uch recognition  or acceptance represents a tacit  proposal to  other 
states to regard this rule as a  norm  of international law. If such a tacit 
proposition is accepted  by  other states, i.e., if  other states  demonstrate 
by their actions that they recognise the  given customary rule as 
juridicaly  binding, it  may  be taken that a customary  norm  of 
international law has appeared.249 
 
What is also emphasised is that ‘[t]he number of States taking part in a practice 
is much more important than the number of separate acts of which the practice is 
composed, or the time over which it is spread; a single act involving fifty States 
provides stronger proof that a custom is accepted by the international community than 
ten separate acts involving ten separate pairs of States’.250 This, as the chapter four wil 
demonstrate, can be viewed as pivotal evidence of the international acceptance of the 
changing scope of the right to self-defence observable since 9/11. The international 
reaction to the 9/11 atacks was uniform on an unprecedented scale. The solidarity with 
the US and recognition of the right to self-defence was forthcoming even from usualy 
unexpected forums, such the League of Arab States. In a view of Sadat, ‘[i]t is true that 
the lack of any real objection to the military campaign initiated on October 7, 2001 
                            
248 Shaw (n 242) 74. 
249 Tunkin (n 243) 423. 
250 Akehurst (n 246) 264. 
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suggests that the world community viewed the United States’ actions in Afghanistan as 
legitimate acts of self-defence’.251 
In writings of international legal scholars a substantial degree of atention is 
paid to the role of the Great Powers in formulation of norms of international customary 
law. In the words of Tunkin, ‘[n]o doubt the position of the majority of states, the Great 
Powers in the first place, is of decisive significance in the creation of generaly 
accepted norm of international law’.252 This is in agreement with Shaw, who points out 
that ‘it is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than others and 
that their activities should be regarded as of greater significance’.253 
Both scholars and the International Court of Justice emphasise the role of states, 
which are most likely to be afected by the emergence of a particular norm. The ICJ in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases stated that  
[a]lthough the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, 
or  of itself, a  bar to the formation  of a  new rule  of customary 
international law (…) an indispensable requirement would be that within 
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including 
that  of  States  whose interests are specialy afected, should  have  been 
both extensive and  virtualy  uniform in the sense  of the  provision 
invoked.254 
251 Sadat LN, "Terrorism and the Rule of Law," Washington University Global Studies Law Review 3, 
no. 1 (2004): 143. 
252 Tunkin (n 243) 427. 
253 Shaw (n 242) 75. 
254 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep, section 74, 43. See also: Dixon (n 238). 
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According to Dixon, the emphasis of the special role of these “afected” states does not 
necessarily mean that they are ‘more “important” or more powerful than others; it is, 
rather, that some states wil be directly afected by certain rules and thus their practice 
is more significant’.255 
Conclusion 
This chapter sets out the theoretical foundations of this study. It provides an 
analysis of four theories, two of which are indispensable for the discussion on the status 
of international law in world politics. Firstly, it introduced the reader to the basic 
arguments and assumptions of the mainstream traditions of International Relations. 
This was, in turn, folowed by their perspectives on the notion of international society 
and the role that international law play in international politics. The analysis also 
presented their views on the possibility of change. The subsequent part of the chapter 
compared the aforementioned theoretical approaches with the English School of 
International Relations and Constructivism, which constitute the theoretical framework 
of this thesis. In a similar manner, these theoretical perspectives were approached by 
looking at their pivotal assumptions, their treatment of both international society and 
international law as wel as the possibility of change. As argued an adoption of such a 
symbiotic approach alows for a more comprehensive understanding of the status of 
international law in the aftermath of 9/11. This chapter also delivers reasoning behind 
choosing the UN Security Council as a proxy of international society. The final part of 
this chapter provides an overview of the research methods chosen for this research. It 
delivers an explanation behind a choice of qualitative methods as the most appropriate 
255 Dixon (n 242) 34. 
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methodology, a selection of three case studies and the notion of change in international 
customary law. The indispensability of this chapter can be observed in that it 
constitutes the points of departure for further analysis and discussion. The folowing 
chapter comprises of the first case study, namely the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee 
and wil not only rely on the information provided here but it wil further explore it. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE 1982 OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the first case study of this research, namely the 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, which was instigated by Israeli military forces in 
Lebanon on June 4, 1982. This operation is symptomatic of the international approach 
towards the use of force in self-defence in relation to a terorist atack prior to 2001. In 
pursuit of this argument, this chapter is organised as folows: it begins by introducing the 
reader to the background and origins of the operation. The first, main part of the chapter is 
divided into two sections, both of which investigate the legality of the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee in light of international law. The first section provides scrutiny of the 
justification delivered by the representative of the Israeli government to the United 
Nations. The next section comprises of an investigation into whether or not the Israeli 
justification was in accordance with international law. This, in turn, involves looking at the 
internationaly accepted legal provisions treating the use of force in self-defence. The 
second main part of this chapter provides a presentation and analysis of the ways in which 
international society responded to this operation. This is undertaken by looking at various 
statements delivered by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council as wel as 
resolutions adopted subsequently. 
The rationale behind the focus on Operation Peace for Galilee is as folows. Firstly, 
the choice of this operation was dictated by its scope; in fact, it constituted the biggest 
military intervention when compared with other military operations launched by Israeli 
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armed forces in Lebanon. Although this operation comprises the main focus of this study, 
this chapter is not only limited to it as other interventions, which were instigated between 
1968 and 1996, are also looked at and form additional evidence supporting the argument.1 
Thus they are treated as background for the main focus of this chapter, namely the 1982 
Operation Peace for Galilee. Though the military organisations responsible for atacks and 
subsequently comprising the target of Israeli strikes difered over time, both the Israeli 
justification and the international response remained similar. Secondly, the 1978 Operation 
Litani and the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee are of great importance because one of 
their results was the establishment of the Israeli “security zone” in Southern Lebanon. 
Although these interventions were instigated as a response to the atack undertaken by the 
PLO, the creation of the “security zone” led to an increase of atacks against Israel by 
another faction, namely Hezbolah. 
 
There was a clear patern in the response of international society towards these 
operations. Al military interventions conducted by Israeli forces within the teritory of 
Lebanon met either condemnation or disapproval. In neither occasion was the right of self-
defence recognised thus suggesting an international agreement with regard to these 
operations as constituting unlawful and unjustified uses of force. For these reasons, the 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee is treated in this study as representing al Israeli 
                            
1 For general information about other Israel’s interventions in Lebanon see, for example: Amnesty 
International, Israel/Lebanon. Unlawful Kilings During Operation “Grapes of Wrath”,1996 (AI Index: 
MDE 15/42/96). Anonymous, "Why?," Economist 1996. Blum YZ, "The Beirut Raid and the International 
Double Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A. Falk " American Journal of International Law 64, no. 1 
(1970): 73-105. Falk RA, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," American Journal of 
International Law 63, no. 3 (1969): 415-443. Fedarko K Beyer L, "Operation Grapes of Wrath," Time 147, 
no. 17 (1996). Morris N Shahin M, "Bombs of Wrath," Maclean’s 109, no. 18 (1996). Najem TP, 
"Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and South Lebanon," Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 46 (2000): 4006-
4009. Nelan BW Beyer L, "What’s Peace Got to Do with It," Time 142, no. 6 (1993). Peterson S, "'Grapes of 
Wrath' Blitz Sil Bites Back at Israel," Christian Science Monitor 89, no. 224 (1997). Phares W, "Liberating 
Lebanon," Middle East Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1996). Sirriyeh H, "Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict," Adelphi 
Paper 243 (1989). Steele S Silver E, "A War of Wils," Maclean’s 106, no. 32 (1993). Zisser E, "The 
Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: Early Contacts," Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 4 (1995): 889-
918. Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 22 (1968). Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 32 (1978). 
Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 47 (1993). Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 50 (1996). 
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interventions in Lebanon caried out since 1968 until 1996 as al of these operations were 
based on the same reasoning, directed against non-state actors and international society 
treated them in a particular way. 
 
Background and Origins 
 
Operation Peace for Galilee began on June 4, 1982 when Israeli forces launched an 
atack against the Lebanese teritory.2 In the Israeli justification, which wil be analysed 
subsequently, the initial reason for the military operation was the assassination atempt 
upon the Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, on June 3. The organisation that 
was held accountable for the atack was the PLO, an organisation which had been 
responsible for previous atacks against Israel. The growth in power of this organisation in 
Lebanon could be observed since the early 1970s, when a massive influx of Palestinian 
refugees occured in Lebanon.3 This wave of migration was a result of what became 
known as the Black September initiated by King Hussein of Jordan, as a response to PLO 
atacks against Israel, who announced he would not tolerate the PLO hostile activities. 
Eventualy the policy of the King and the on-going fights between the PLO and Jordanian 
authorities forced Palestinians to leave Jordan and seek refuge in the other place. Lebanon, 
with its multicultural society and unstable situation resulting from the eruption of the civil 
war, seemed the perfect platform for a continuation of the PLO’s fight against Israel. 
Southern Lebanon became a territory dominated by Palestinians where refugee camps 
provided an excelent opportunity for the PLO to recruit Palestinians for their military 
                            
2 Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 36 (1982), 428 (hereinafter UNYB). See: Appendix 1. 
3 On Palestinian refugees in general see, for example: Masalha N, Catastrophe Remembered. Palestine, 
Israel and the Internal Refugees (London: 2005). Morris B, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
Revisited (Cambridge: 2004). Perretz D, "The Arab-Israeli War. Israel’s Administration and Arab Refugees," 
Foreign afairs 66, no. 5 (1988): 336-346. 
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operations.4 From that moment as the Lebanese government was unable to prevent and 
stop the PLO actions against Israel, ‘Lebanon became the centre of organised Palestinian 
operations against Israel, and, indeed, was the only Arab state along the Israeli border that 
aforded them an opportunity to launch military strikes on Israeli targets’.5 
 
Although some argue that the invasion had been planed long before its de facto 
initiation and there were diferent reasons behind the decision to launch the operation, the 
purpose of this study is limited to the oficial justification. It suffices, however, to point out 
that the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee was indeed controversial.6 In short, the 
controversy arose as to the question of who was responsible for the assassination atempt 
as the PLO had not admit to the commission of that act.7 Secondly, there was an 
accusation that the ultimate aim of Israel was to get access to the Litani River, the main 
water source in the area8 and thirdly Israel was accused of trying to establish a more 
favourable government in Lebanon.9  
 
The cease-fire agreement was reached on November 25, 1983 in Damascus 
according to which the PLO militia and Israeli forces were to withdraw from Lebanon. 
Although Israeli forces withdrew from most of the Lebanese teritory, they took under 
                            
4 See, for example: Ignatius D, " How to Rebuild Lebanon," Foreign afairs 61, no. 5 (1983): 1145. Murden 
S, "Understanding Israel’s Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security 
During the Peace Process," British Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 1 (2000): 29. See: Appendix 2. 
5 Najem (n 1) 4006. 
6 Welens KC, ed., Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946-1992). A 
Thematic Guide (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 743. 
7 Chomsky N, "Israel’s Invasion and the Disarmament Movement," MRIP Reports 108/109 (1982): 37. 
8 See, for example: Beschorner N, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," Adelphi Paper 273 
(1992/1993): 3-26. Cooley JK, " The War over Water," Foreign Policy 54 (1984): 3-26. Frey F Naf T, 
"Water: An Emerging Issue in the Middle East," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 482, no. 1 (1985): 65-84. Kilgore AI, "For Israel, Southern Lebanon Means the Litani River," 
Washington Report on Middle East Afairs 25, no. 7 (2006): 21-21. Medzini A Wolf AT, "Towards a Middle 
East at Peace: Hidden Issues in Arab-Israeli Hydropolitics " Water Resources Development 20, no. 2 (2004): 
193-204. Zeitoun M, "The Conflict Vs. Cooperation Paradox: Fighting over or Sharing of Palestinian-Israeli 
Groundwater?," Water International 32, no. 1 (2007): 105-120. See: Appendix 3. 
9 Chomsky (n 7) 37. 
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their control a 10-15 km stripe of Lebanese teritory in the South, which subsequently was 
caled a “security zone”. In reality, it meant that the population of one hundred thousand 
living in hundred fifty towns and vilages came under the authority of Israel.10 The 
establishment of the “security zone” can be regarded as both the consequence of the 1978 
and 1983 interventions and the initial reason and rationale for the future atacks against 
Israel undertaken from the Lebanese territory. Although a substantial part of the PLO 
troops withdrew from Lebanon, some groups of Palestinians stil remained there, oriented 
at the continuation of their fight against Israel. However, with the pacification and limited 
‘actual influence of the PLO, many of the atacks against teritory of Israel [were] 
undertaken by newly established Hezbolah’.11 As was pointed out earlier, one of the main 
aims of this organisation was to force Israel to withdraw from the “security zone”.12 
Hezbolah concentrated its militia in the north of the Israeli “security zone”. Their atacks 
mainly involved firing rockets against the setlements in northern Israel and ‘sometimes 
infiltrating the zone itself’.13 Such actions provoked subsequent Israeli interventions in 
1993 and 1996, directed mainly against the Hezbolah militia.14 
 
Part One: Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli Justification and (Non)compliance with 
International Law 
 
The justification for launching Operation Peace for Galilee was delivered by Israel 
on June 4, 1982, the very same day the operation was instigated. Israel claimed that it was 
acting in self-defence and in order ‘to stop the atacks across its northern border from PLO 
                            
10 Murden (n 4) 34. See also Phares (n 1). 
11 For more detailed information about Hezbolah, see chapter six, part one, subsection a. 
12 Najem (n 1) 4007. 
13 Osmańczyk EJ, Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 1180. 
14 ibid. 
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bases in southern Lebanon, to deter continued terorism against its citizens and to ensure 
their safety’.15 The reasoning given by Israel that it had the right to use force in self-
defence within the teritory of Lebanon was based on three grounds. Firstly, in a leter to 
the UN Security Council, the Israeli representative pointed to the assassination atempt 
upon the Ambassador, which he referred to as the ‘heinous terorist outrage perpetrated in 
London’.16 Secondly, the atention was also drawn to the policy of the PLO, which the 
Israeli government held responsible for the atack upon the Israeli Ambassador as wel as 
previous atacks. In the words of the Israeli oficial: 
 
such teror atacks constitute a central objective in the deliberate and vicious 
strategy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to cause maximum 
loss of life and limb among Israelis and Jews everywhere, whether oficials 
or civilian, including men, women and children. 17 
 
He continued by stating that Israel wil ‘take the measures necessary to protect lives 
and ensure the safety of its citizens’.18 The third reason corelated with an international 
principle, namely the duty of states to exercise due diligence.19 Although the Lebanese 
government was not accused of commissioning the PLO to initiate the atack, it was, 
however, accused of being indirectly responsible because it did not put an end to terorist 
activities that originated from within its own teritory.  
 
                            
15 UNYB (n 2) 435. 
16 UN Chronicle, vol. XIX nr. 8 (September 1982) 14. The Israeli Ambassador Argov was atacked by on 3 
June 1982 by HG Said, M al-Banna and N al-Rosan, members of Abu Nidal’s organisation. The Ambassador 
was shot in the head but survived despite the severe injuries.  
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 The term refers to the duty of a state to take al necessary steps to prevent an occurrence of the offence 
(Curzon LB Richards PH, The Longman Dictionary of Law (7th edn Harlow: Pearson Longman), 207.) See 
also: Shaw MN, International Law (5th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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According to Israel: 
 
if Lebanon was unwiling or unable to prevent the harbouring, training and 
financing of PLO terorists openly operating from Lebanese territory with a 
view to harassing Israel, Israelis and Jews world-wide, it must be prepared 
to face the risk  of Israeli countermeasures.  Since July  1981, about  150 
terorist acts had been instigated by PLO against Israelis and Jews in Israel 
and elsewhere,  most recently the  wounding  of the Israeli  Ambassador in 
London (on  3 June).  PLO  deliberately established  bases in civilian 
neighbourhoods and thus  bore responsibility for losses  of civilian lives in 
such places.20 
 
Opposite this, the Lebanese representative to the UN claimed that the military 
intervention on such a scale launched by the Israeli armed forces was in no way justified.21 
He pointed to the fact that the assassination atempt ‘was caried out by non-Lebanese and 
(…) unidentified persons’. 22 And, ‘[w]hile there is unanimous condemnation of this 
atempt, in no way can Lebanon be held accountable, and no principles of international law 
can justify Israel’s violent aggression’.23  
 
Dividing the above Israeli justification into three separate, although connected, 
reasons is very useful for the analysis of whether the Operation Peace for Galilee was in 
accordance with international law. Therefore, in a similar manner, these three reasons wil 
                            
20 UNYB (n 2) 435. 
21 Israel’s forced atacked Southern Lebanon and eventualy reached Beirut. It is estimated that between five 
thousands and 8 thousands civilians were kiled as a result (Anonymous, Twenty Century Atlas – Death Tols 
and Casualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorship and Genocides in htp:/necrometrics.com/20c300k.htm 
[accessed 1 December 2012]). 
22 UN Chronicle (n 16) 14. 
23 ibid. 
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be treated from the angle of international provisions governing the use of force. As was 
already mentioned in chapter one, a state in order to use force in self-defence lawfuly 
must show that it has been a victim of an armed atack.24 This requirement was further 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, where it was stated, 
that ‘the exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an 
armed atack’.25  
 
Although the term an “armed atack” is the subject of many debates and 
commentaries26 as it is not explained clearly in either example of the treaty law, both state 
practice and international case law since the adoption of the UN Charter seem to support 
the view that usualy an armed atack refers to an atack undertaken by a state.27 Thus, if a 
state was under an on-going atack launched by the armed forces of another state, a 
rationale behind a decision of a victim state to defend its teritory militarily would rarely 
have been questioned. The more complicated and less straightforward situation arises 
when a state has been a victim of a terorist atack. In such a situation, a victim state needs 
to show that a terorist atack was, in fact, an armed atack. Often the atacks launched by 
non-state actors might have been characterised more likely as aggressions and not as armed 
atacks. It is, therefore, useful to analyse the dichotomy between the two. The reason for 
choosing the term an “armed atack” is explained by Fawcet, who indicates that 
 
                            
24 See chapter one, part two, subsection a. 
25 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep. section 195, 103. 
26 For a discussion, see, for example: Feder NM, "Reading the UN Charter Connotatively: Toward a New 
Definition of Armed Atack, " New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 19 (1987): 
395-432. 
27 The explanation of ‘an armed atack’ is not provided in the Article 51 of the UN Charter, which governs 
the right of self-defence. The Article reads: ‘[n]othing in the present Charter shal impair the inherent right 
of individual or colective self-defence if an armed atack occurs against a Member of the United Nations 
(…)’ (Charter of the United Nations (adopted on 26 June 1945, entered into force on 24 October 1945) 892 
UNTS 119 (hereinafter: UN Charter)). For a discussion, see, for example: Feder (n 26).  
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there is some evidence that the drafters of the Charter used the precise and 
restrictive notion of “armed atack” in preference to “aggression” or “threat 
to the  peace”,  precisely  because they  wished to avoid  giving too  much 
latitude within the Charter system to the recognised right of self-defence.28 
 
This is further explored by Dinstein, according to whom, ‘[t]he choice of words in 
Article 51 is deliberately confined to a response to an armed atack’.29 Thus, a ‘[r]ecourse 
to self-defence under the Article is not vindicated by any violation of international law 
other than an armed atack’.30 
 
What folows is that it is generaly accepted that an armed atack indicates some 
level of gravity, which may not be the case when it comes to an aggression. Thus, every 
armed atack can be seen as an aggression; however, not every aggression may be 
recognised as constituting an armed atack. Nevertheless, neither of the terms is wel 
defined in the UN Charter. Although the word aggression appears in the UN Charter, its 
meaning is not clearly explained.31 One of the atempts of international society to provide 
some level of clarity was the adoption of the Definition of Aggression by the UN General 
Assembly.32 The importance and precision of this definition can be observed not only in 
that it has been widely accepted by member states but also through the ICJ reference to it, 
which in turn suggests that it has the status of customary law.33 In its judgment, the Court 
stated, that ‘an armed atack must be understood as including not merely action by regular 
                            
28 Fawcet JES, “Intervention in International Law: A Study of Some of Recent Cases” Recueil des Cours 
103 (1961): 361 cited in Maogoto JN, "War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism," 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 4 (2003). 
29 Dinstein Y, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
185. 
30 ibid 186. 
31 Maogoto (n 28). 
32 Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974). 
33 Dinstein (n 29) 127. 
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armed forces across an international border’.34 In accordance with Article 3(g) of the 
aforementioned Definition, the ICJ agreed, that ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, iregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed forces 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ an atack undertaken by regular 
forces ‘or its substantial involvement therein’35 may be treated as an armed atack. 
However, the Court highlighted as wel that it is ‘necessary to distinguish the most grave 
forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed atack) from other less grave 
forms’.36 
 
The aforementioned gravity requirement is further explained by Dinstein, 
according to whom for an aggression to constitute an armed atack there must be 
“suficient gravity”, which can be observed in ‘serious consequences, epitomized by 
teritorial intrusions, human casualties or considerable destruction of property’.37 If that is 
missing then the action undertaken in response to such aggression cannot be seen in 
accordance with the Article 51 of the UN Charter. What folows is that if such an atack 
was on a scale comparable to that commited by regular forces than a victim state could 
have convincingly postulated rationale for launching a military campaign. 
 
As the next section of this chapter focusing on the response of international society 
towards Operation Peace for Galilee wil demonstrate, an assassination atempt upon the 
Israeli ambassador in London was not seen as meeting the above criteria necessary for a 
state to implement its right of self-defence. Here, it is important to bring to atention the 
fact that Israel in its justification refered to previous and continuous atacks launched by 
                            
34 Nicaragua Case (n 25) section 195, 103. 
35 Definition of Aggression (n 32) Art 3(g) and Nicaragua Case (n 25) section 195, 103. These acts may 
include: invasion, bombardment, blockade, etc. 
36 Nicaragua Case (n 25) section 191, 101. 
37 Dinstein (n 29) 193. 
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non-state actors operating from within Lebanese teritory. Israel, in delivering such 
rationale behind the instigation of the military operation relied upon the merits of the 
Nadelstichtaktik theory,38 also known as the “accumulation of events” theory, which 
implies, that a state can respond militarily to the atacks of militia when they occur 
repeatedly for the certain period of time. According Feder: 
 
each specific act  of terorism,  needle  prick,  may  not  qualify as an armed 
atack that entitles the victim state to respond legitimately with armed force. 
But the totality of the incidents may demonstrate a systematic campaign of 
minor terorist activities that  does rise to the intolerable level  of armed 
atack.39 
 
In addition, while one atack may not be seen as constituting enough threat and 
damage, the series of atacks and their consequences when treated accumulatively may, 
nevertheless, be regarded as meeting the “gravity” requirement for an atack to constitute 
an armed atack.40 As wil be shown, however, international society did not discuss at the 
UNSC forum the adequacy and accuracy of this theory. Although the merits of this theory 
were not the subject of the deliberation, it may, nevertheless, be assumed that during the 
Cold War in general and in relation to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, in particular, 
the validity of this theory was not internationaly recognised.41 
                            
38 Nadelstichtaktik is German concept and means “tactics of the needle prick”. It was described by German 
international lawyers (Blum YZ, "State Response to Acts of Terorism," German Yearbook of International 
Law 19 (1976): 233.) 
39 Feder (n 26) 415. 
40 See also: Bowet DW, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force," American Journal of International 
Law 66, no. 1 (1972): 1-36. Falk (n 1). Katan V, "The Use and Abuse of Self-Defence in International Law: 
The Israel-Hezbolah Conflict as a Case Study," Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2007): 31-
50. Dinstein (n 29) 202.  
41 See, however, Feder who argues that ‘[n]umerous incursions and atacks by PLO personnel on Israel’s 
nationals and property individualy satisfy conceptions of armed atack that would warrant a proportionate 
response to each distinct event’ ((n 26) 411). 
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Assuming, arguendo, that an assassination atack or previous atacks treated 
cumulatively amounted to an armed atack, for the government of Lebanon to be held 
responsible for the atacks, Israel, in order to exercise lawfuly its right of self-defence, 
would have had to prove that there had been a close relationship between Lebanon and the 
PLO. From this, it is submited, that for a victim state to implement its right of self-
defence, not only an atack launched by non-state actors needs to be amounting to an 
armed atack but also the relationship between these non-state actors and another state and 
its involvement in the atack need to be proved. What this means is that it needs to be 
investigated whether actions undertaken by non-state actors can be ‘atributable to the 
state’ which in turn may give a legal justification for a victim state to exercise its right of 
self-defence.42 The same view was expressed by the ICJ in the Tehran case, where it was 
decided the conduct of the militants 
 
might be considered as itself directly imputable to the (…) State only if it 
were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted 
on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the 
(…) State to carry out a specific operation.43 
 
From this, it could be further argued by analogy, that in a situation when non-state 
actors launch an atack from the State A against State B, the State A can be in breach of its 
international obligations but not necessarily held responsible for the actions of non-state 
actors. 
 
 
                            
42 Gray C, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 97. 
43 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staf in Tehran (United States of America v. 
Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep, section 58, 29. 
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Although some argued that 
 
a state that is the target  of  persistent teror  has  virtualy  no effective 
response, in the event that the foreign government is unable or unwiling to 
suppress the teroristic tactics of a liberation movement, other than recourse 
to what is traditionaly regarded as “aggressive” war,44 
 
the ICJ continued to support the narow notion of the right of self-defence, when it decided 
that for a state to be responsible for actions of non-state actors ‘it would in principle have 
to be proved that State [has] efective control of the military or paramilitary operations in 
the course of which the aleged violations were commited’.45 While elaborating on this, 
Gray further added, that it would be dificult to conclude from the judgment that ‘a lesser 
degree of state involvement, such as acquiescence or even inability to control armed bands 
operating on its teritory, could ever be enough to constitute an armed atack, but it seems 
implicit in its judgment that armed atack is narrower than this’.46 
 
Israel in its justification did not claim that the government of Lebanon had a direct 
involvement in atacks launched by the PLO or had a control over the activities of this 
organisation. What Israel, however, relied upon further in its justification was the duty of 
states to exercise due diligence. Israel, throughout the conflict with Lebanon, claimed that 
                            
44 Falk (n 1) 427. Wedwood, for example further argues that ‘[i]f a host country permits the use of its 
territory as a staging area for terrorist atacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses requests 
to take action, the host government cannot expect to insulate its territory against measures of self-defence’ 
("Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against Bin Laden," Yale Journal of International Afairs 24 (1999): 
565.) Blum points out, that there has been an increase in acceptance that ‘the encouragement by a state of 
guerrila organisations planning to operate on foreign territory, or even the toleration of such organisations on 
a state’s territory’ can be treated as an act of aggression (Blum (n 1) 80). 
45 Nicaragua Case (n 25) section 115, 64. ‘The requirement of international law for the atribution to States 
of acts performed by private individuals is that the State exercises control over the individual. The degree of 
control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case’ (Tadić Case (Judgment) 
ICTY-94-I-A (15 July 1999) section 117, 48). 
46 Gray (n 42) 99. 
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the later was responsible for failure in preventing the atacks by the iregular forces to be 
launched in the first place, and because of that, Israel had the right to implement its 
inherent right of self-defence. In addition, ‘failure to prevent, or mere acquiescence in, the 
activity of armed bands was claimed not only to cause state responsibility but also to 
justify self-defence’.47 As was already briefly described in chapter one of this thesis, a 
state, which alows ‘knowingly its teritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States’48 may be accused of breaching its international obligations towards another 
state. This duty to exercise due diligence, which impose on a state a duty to ‘prevent its 
own subjects, and such foreign subjects as live within its teritory, from commiting 
injurious acts against other states’ was referred to by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case and 
has acquired international recognition.49 From this, it can be assumed that the teritory of 
State A cannot be used as a base for non-state actors from which an atack against State B 
may be caried out. What folows is that ‘it is irefutable that the toleration by a State of 
activities by terorists or armed bands, directed against another country, is unlawful’.50 A 
similar view was expressed by the ICJ in the Tehran case, where the Court decided that the 
state can be ‘in breach of its international obligations’ when it fails to prevent atacks 
undertaken within its teritory against premises belonging to foreign states. What needs to 
be noted, however, is that such a state would not be held responsible for the atacks.51 
 
The ICJ, in the Corfu Channel case, stressed further that ‘it cannot be concluded 
from the mere fact of the control exercise by a State over its teritory and waters that State 
                            
47 ibid 100. 
48 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep, 22. 
49 Jennings R Wats A, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (9th edn London and New York: Longman, 
1996), 549. 
50 Dinstein (n 29) 206. 
51 Jennings, Wats (n 49) 552. The same view was expressed by Kelsen who argued that ‘the states are 
obliged by general international law to prevent certain acts injurious to other states from being commited on 
their territories and if prevention is not possible, to punish the delinquents and force them to repair the 
damage caused by the delict’ (Kelsen H, Principles of International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston inc., 1966), 205-206.) See also: Dinstein (n 29) 244. 
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necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein’.52 
Moreover, even if it is proved that a state knew about unlawful activities taking place 
within its border, not fulfiling the duty to exercise due diligence does not automaticaly 
give a victim state a right to use force in self-defence. Generaly in a situation when a state 
shows negligence in exercising its duty it may be held ‘responsible and (..) liable to pay 
damages’53 but not become a target of a state exercising a right of self-defence.  
 
    Although Israel claimed that Lebanon did not fulfil its duty to prevent hostile 
activity against Israel organised within its teritory, it can be persuasively argued that the 
government of Lebanon could not put an end to the aforementioned atacks as the teritory 
from which the atacks were launched, that is South Lebanon, was de facto under the 
control of the PLO and not the state of Lebanon. An important factor relates to the internal 
situation in Lebanon: a state, which witnesses many dificulties within diferent parts of its 
teritory and is unable to stabilise and create an internal order, cannot be held responsible 
for hostile actions that originate from yet one part and are not, in fact, actions directed by 
such a state. It can be argued that the eruption of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 had given 
the PLO an opportunity to establish ‘a considerable level of autonomy in South 
Lebanon’.54 In addition, Lebanon with its multicultural society and unstable situation 
seemed to be a perfect place for a continuation of the PLO’s fight against Israel. Southern 
Lebanon became Palestinian land, where refugee camps provided an excelent opportunity 
for the PLO to recruit Palestinians for their military operations.55 
 
                            
52 Corfu Channel Case (n 48) 18. 
53 Jennings, Wats (n 49) 549. 
54 Najem (n 1) 4006. 
55 Murden (n 4) 29. Ignatius (n 4) 1145. 
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Therefore, the internal unstable situation in Lebanon taken together with the level 
of autonomy enjoyed by the PLO in South Lebanon can be seen as evidence that the 
government of Lebanon could not regain control over its teritory and did not have the 
power to prevent cross-border strikes launched from the teritory which was not de facto 
under its own control. Moreover, in the situation when a state does not have enough power 
to suppress the militia activities undertaken against other states ‘[t]he obligation not to 
tolerate may in part be fulfiled by colaboration with an international authority or other 
States to avert the danger resulting from terorist activities or to inform other States or 
international bodies of the situation’.56 This was fulfiled by the government of Lebanon 
already in 1978 when it protested against Israeli invasion57 on the UNSC forum. The UN 
Security Council subsequently decided to establish UNIFIL.58 One of the main purposes of 
this peacekeeping force was to assist ‘the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of 
its efective authority in the area’.59 By doing so, the UNSC acknowledged that the 
government of Lebanon did not control South Lebanon in an effective way. Therefore, 
taking into consideration the fact that the government of Lebanon on various occasions 
brought atention of the UNSC to the situation in the southern part of its teritory and 
subsequently asked for extending the mandate of the UNIFIL60 it can be concluded, that 
the Government of Lebanon could not be held responsible in any way for the hostile 
actions against Israel commited by the PLO.61 
                            
56 Sucharitkul S, "Terorism as an International Crime: Questions of Responsibility and Complicity," Israel 
Yearbook on Human Rights 19 (1989): 257. 
57 Referring to the Operation Litani launched on the night of 14/15 March 1978. 
58 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. 
59 UNSC Res 425 (19 March 1978) UN Doc S/RES/425. 
60 For more information see: htp:/www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml [accessed 
1 December 2012]. 
61 Although some authors already in 1970 suggested that had been an increase in acceptance that ‘the 
encouragement by a state of guerrila organisations planning to operate on foreign territory, or even the 
toleration of such organisations on a state’s territory’ can be treated as an act of aggression, such an approach 
and especialy the second part did not reach a recognition either in the case law or in states practice (Blum (n 
1) 80).  
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Part Two: The 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee and the Response of International 
Society 
 
As the Israeli justification for using the force within Lebanese teritory remained 
the same in relation to various interventions launched since 1968, the response of 
international society towards these operations, in a similar manner, did not difer and set a 
particular patern. In addition, corespondingly to al interventions, Operation Peace for 
Galilee was not recognised as constituting the lawful exercise of the right to self-defence. 
The fact that neither an assassination atempt upon the Israeli Ambassador in London nor 
previous and continuous atacks launched by the PLO treated accumulatively were 
internationaly recognised as justifying military intervention within Lebanon suggests, that 
prior to 2001 it had been very dificult for a victim state to convince the international 
society that the resort to force was an adequate and reasonable response to a terorist 
atack. Such an approach was reflected in statements of the Permanent Members of the 
UNSC during the meetings devoted to the situation in Lebanon. 
 
In addition, in relation to Operation Peace for Galilee, the President of the UNSC 
acting on behalf of the UNSC made ‘an urgent appeal to al the parties to adhere strictly to 
the cease-fire that had been in efect since 24 July 1981 and to refrain immediately from 
any hostile act likely to provoke an aggravation of the situation’.62 On June 5, the UNSC 
unanimously adopted Resolution 508 in which it caled ‘upon al parties to cease 
immediately and simultaneously al military activities within Lebanon and across the 
Lebanese-Israeli border’.63 In the same resolution, the UNSC brought atention to its grave 
concern ‘at the violation of the teritorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of 
                            
62 UNYB (n 2) 433. 
63 UNSC Res 508 (5 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/508. 
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Lebanon’.64 During the next day meeting, the UNSC adopted a subsequent resolution, in 
which it demanded ‘that Israel withdraw al its military forces forthwith and 
unconditionaly to the internationaly recognised boundaries of Lebanon’.65 The growing 
international concern over the gravity of the situation in Lebanon can be observed in that 
over the period of two months the UNSC adopted ten resolutions.66  
 
Subsequently to the initiation of Operation Peace for Galilee, the Permanent 
Members of the UNSC expressed their opinions in various forms. While some in their 
statements expressed their disapproval of the techniques and scope of the force used by 
Israel, others delivered a stronger response and, in fact, condemned the Israeli actions. In 
addition, the representative of the United Kingdom argued that the assassination atempt 
against the Israeli Ambassador ‘did not justify the massive Israel atacks on Lebanese cities 
and towns, and caled for a halt to the conflict and restoration of the cease-fire’.67 Although 
the US did not deliver an explicit condemnation of the Israeli intervention, the 
representative of the US to the UNSC caled for a simultaneous implementation of the ‘two 
interelated objectives’ of an adopted resolution, namely the ‘cessation of hostilities by al 
parties and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon’.68 
 
                            
64 ibid. 
65 UNSC Res 509 (6 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/509. 
66 UNSC Res 508 (n 63). UNSC Res 509 (n 63). UNSC Res 511 (18 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/511. UNSC 
Res 512 (19 June 1982) UN Doc S/RES/512. UNSC Res 513 (4 July 1982) UN Doc S/RES/513. UNSC Res 
515 (29 July 1982) UN Doc S/RES/515. UNSC Res 516 (1 August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/516. UNSC Res 
517 (4 August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/517. UNSC Res 518 (12 August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/518. UNSC Res 
519 (17 August 1982) UN Doc S/RES/519. Moreover, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution on 26 
June 1982, in which it referred to Israeli actions as ‘acts of aggression against the sovereignty of Lebanon’ 
and condemned Israel for its non-compliance with previous resolutions and demanded its compliance 
(UNGA Res (26 June 1982) UN Doc A/RES/ES-7/12). Although the UNGA resolutions are not binding and 
therefore their powers are limited, they nevertheless provide an ilustration of general states’ opinion and can 
be useful for geting a broader view on the Operation Peace for Galilee. 
67 UNYB (n 2) 434. 
68 ibid 435-436. 
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France, on the other hand, condemned ‘Israeli air raids’, and pointed out that ‘force 
would not guarantee Israel’s right to live within secure and recognised boundaries’.69 The 
representative of the Soviet Union presented a stronger view and, in refering to the UNSC 
resolution, claimed that it ‘did not reflect clearly enough the condemnation Israel deserved 
and the Council should use al means available in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter to halt Israeli aggression’.70 In a similar manner, China opted for an adoption of ‘a 
resolution which explicitly condemned Israeli aggression’.71 
 
As has been shown, none of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council 
accepted Israeli justification and rationale behind the instigation of Operation Peace for 
Galilee. In a similar manner, Israeli right of self-defence was not recognised. The 
empirical evidence presented throughout this chapter demonstrates that not only were the 
assassination atempt and previous atacks launched by the PLO not of sufficient gravity to 
amount to an armed atack but also that Lebanon did not bear responsibility for these 
atacks. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide insights into a certain dichotomy surounding 
the possibility of the use of force in self-defence in relation to a terorist atack during the 
Cold War. As has been demonstrated, for a state to exercise its right of self-defence in 
relation to a terorist atack it was imperative to prove firstly that such an atack was of a 
scale comparable to an atack instigated by regular armed forces and secondly, that there 
existed a certain close relationship between the non-state actors responsible for such an 
                            
69 ibid 434. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid 435. 
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atack and a state. The empirical evidence suggests that international society, during the 
Cold War, favoured a narrow and rigid understanding of the right to self-defence. 
Operation Peace for Galilee, which constitutes the main Israeli intervention in 
Lebanon thereby justifying its choice as the focus of this chapter confirms the above 
argument, as it was either condemned or criticised by the Permanent Members of the UN 
Security Council for being an excessive response towards the assassination atempt upon 
the Israeli Ambassador and was perceived, in general, as unlawful. Despite Israeli atempts 
to persuade an international opinion that, in fact, its military response was instigated not 
only as a response towards the aforementioned atack but also towards the previous and 
continuous atacks launched by the PLO, the Israeli rationale was not accepted 
internationaly. Although Israel relied upon the same justification and reasoning in relation 
to each intervention it instigated over the period of three decades within the teritory of 
Lebanon, neither one of them was recognised by the international society as being in 
accordance with international law. 
This chapter constitutes an important part of this thesis. Its contribution can be observed 
not only in that it provides an example of the international approach towards the use of 
force during the Cold War but also in that it sets the grounds for the comparison of this 
approach with the one observed since September 2001. Thus, the evidence presented in the 
folowing chapter is set against the evidence gathered in here and thoroughly compared. 
The folowing chapter is structured in a similar way, which alows for the diferences of 
international approach to be seen in a clear and structured fashion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE 2001 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom, which 
was instigated by the US and the coalition forces within the teritory of Afghanistan on 
October 7, 2001 as a response towards the terorist atacks upon the US caried out by the 
al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001.1 The significance of this operation for the study of 
international law relating to the use of force is indeed crucial as for the first time in history 
the right of self-defence in relation to a terorist atack was oficialy recognised by 
international society. The scrutiny of this operation wil be conducted by comparing it with 
the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, which constituted the first case study of this thesis. 
As wil be shown, although the rationale for instigating both operations was based on very 
similar justifications, the response of international society differed substantialy in that 
while the 1982 operation in Lebanon was seen as an unlawful use of force, the 2001 
operation in Afghanistan was treated as constituting a lawful exercise of the right to self-
defence. This chapter, thus, looks at Operation Enduring Freedom from the angle of the 
1982 intervention in Lebanon. The rationale behind comparing these two operations is 
based on four main reasons. Firstly, both operations were instigated as responses to acts of 
terorism commited by non-state actors. Secondly, both countries justified their military 
actions on the basis of their rights to self-defence. Thirdly, both victim states made 
reference to previous and continuing atacks launched by these non-state actors. Lastly, 
1 See: Appendix 4. 
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both interventions were conducted within the teritory of hosting states, which could not be 
seen as directly responsible for the atacks. 
 
As wil be demonstrated, the fact that the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan was 
recognised as a lawful and justified use of force, has had a significant impact on an 
international perception of the use of force in relation to terorist atacks: for the first time 
since the adoption of the UN Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force, a state’s 
right to self-defence was recognised – legitimising, in turn, the use of force. This 
recognition of the right to self-defence has chalenged certain existing rules governing the 
use of force. It wil also be shown, that this has expanded the notion of an armed atack and 
has granted some validity to the claim for accepting the “accumulation of events” theory. 
Moreover, it has also chalenged the very notion of the right of self-defence, in that its 
scope has been widened, which, in turn, questions further application of international rules 
governing the use of force during the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
Such a changed international approach towards the use of force in relation to a 
terorist atack was noticed by international legal scholarship. As wil be demonstrated 
there have been two noticeable and distinct approaches towards the new developments. 
The first one refers to the on-going insistence upon the adequacy of the narrow scope of 
the right to self-defence evident in the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which according to both the ICJ and some 
international lawyers have obtained the status of international customary law.2 The 
                            
2
 For the debate on the notion of self-defence prior to 9/11, see in general: Feder NM, Reading the UN 
Charter Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Atack, " New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 19 (1987): 395-432. Gray C, International Law and the Use of Force  
McCormack TLH, Self-Defence in International Law. The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. 
Schachter O, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," Michigan Law Review 82, no. 5/6 (1984): 1620-
1646. - "Self-Defence and the Rule of Law," American Journal of International Law 83, no. 2 (1989): 259-
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representatives of the second approach, however, emphasise the priority of the state 
practice, which seems to support the growing acceptance of the wider scope of the right of 
self-defence.3 
 
This chapter consists of two main parts. Part One begins with introducing the 
reader with the background information on the 9/11 atacks and a short history of al-Qaeda 
and its activity prior to the atacks in question. This, in turn, is folowed by an analysis of 
the justification delivered by the US at the UN Security Council forum. The US 
justification is compared with Israel’s justification relating to the 1982 Operation Peace for 
Galilee and treated from the angle of new developments, especialy in relation to scholars’ 
opinion regarding the use of force that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. Part 
Two comprises an analysis of ways in which international society responded towards the 
9/11 atacks and subsequent military intervention in Afghanistan.  
 
Part One: The 9/11 Atacks and the Case Against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
 
a) Background 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom, instigated on October 7, 2001, was a military response 
towards the September 11 atacks upon the United States, which resulted in the deaths of 
3,000 people, a complete destruction of the World Trade Center and a partial destruction of 
                                                                                    
277. Wetberg G, The International Legality of Self-Defence against Non-State Actors (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2007). For those advocating narrow right of self-defence, see for example: Brownlie I, International 
Law and the Use of Force by States  Charney JI, "The Use of Force against Terrorism and International 
Law," American Journal of International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 835-839. Maogoto JN, "Walking an 
International Tightrope: Use of Military Force to Counter Terrorism," 1-58. Tams CJ, "The Use of Force 
against Terrorists," European Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (2009): 359-397. 
3 For those supporting wider scope of self-defence, see, for example: Bowet DW, Self-Defence in 
International Law (New York: Praeger, 1958). Maogoto (n 2). S Schwebel, "Aggression, Intervention and 
Self-defence in Modern International Law, " 136 RCADI (1972-II) in 
htp:/mefacts.org/cached.asp?x_id=10943 [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
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the Pentagon. Soon after the atacks, the US administration pointed out the terorist 
organisation al-Qaeda4 with Osama bin Laden as its leader as being responsible for the 
aforementioned atacks. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organisation, created in 1988, whose aim 
was to undertake jihad (“the holy war”) against the US and ‘the Western “occupation” of 
Islamic land’.5 In an oficial document, the UK government confirmed that ‘Osama bin 
Laden and al-Qa’ida (..) planned and caried out the atrocities on 11 September’.6 The 
information was supported by the inteligence sources establishing that ‘not long before 
[the 9/11 atacks] bin Laden had indicated he was about to launch a major atack on 
America’.7 This led the UK Prime Minister at the time; Blair to state that there was 
‘absolutely no doubt that bin Laden and his network are responsible’.8 The UK 
government furthered its argument by pointing to the possession of information outlining 
‘that bin Laden himself asserted shortly before 11 September that he was preparing a major 
atack on America’.9 The accusation was further supported by NATO oficials who said 
that the US had presented ‘clear and compeling proof’ that al-Qaeda was responsible for 
the atacks.10 The leader of al-Qaeda, nevertheless ‘did not publicly and expressly claim 
responsibility for the atacks’.11 
 
 
                            
4 The roots of the word al-Qaeda comers from the Arabic word qaf-ayn-dal, which can be understood as ‘a 
base, as in camp or a home, a foundation, such is what beneath a house or a pedestal that supports a column’ 
(…) it can also mean a precept, rule, principle, maxim, formula, method, model or patern’ (Burke J, Al 
Qaeda. The True Story of Radical Islam (3rd edn London: Granta Books, 2004), 1.) See also: Ruthven M, A 
Fury for God. The Islamist Atack on America (London: Granta Books, 2002). 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Atacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report. Final 
Report. (New York and London: WW. Norton& Company, Inc., 2004), 55-56. See also: Johnston D Risen J, 
"After the Atacks: The Investigation; Bin Laden Tie Cited," New York Times 13 September 2001. 
6 Office of Prime Minister, Oficial Document: Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 
11 September 2001 (October 4 2001). 
7 ibid. 
8 Murphy SD, "Contemporary Practice of the United States. Legal Regulation of Use of Force. Terrorist 
Atacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon," American Journal of International Law 96, no. 1 (2002): 241. 
9 Office of Prime Minister (n 6). 
10 See, for example: Daley S, "The Evidence; NATO Says US Has Proof against Bin Laden Group," New 
York Times (3 October 2001). 
11 Murphy (n 8) 241. 
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b) The US Justification 
 
Looking at the US justification for instigating Operation Enduring Freedom, there 
were three explicit grounds upon which the case against both the al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
was built. As wil be demonstrated, the rationale behind the initiation of Operation 
Enduring Freedom resembled the one delivered by Israel in relation to the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee discussed in chapter three. 
 
Firstly, similarly to the 1982 intervention, a terorist organisation was held responsible 
for the atack. Indeed, in the US opinion, there was no doubt that al-Qaeda was responsible 
for the 9/11 atacks. Although the atack upon American soil constituted the ultimate 
rationale for launching the military campaign, the US government delivered two other 
reasons in furthering its case. Secondly, George W Bush, the President in office at the 
time, declared in various statements folowing the atacks that not only was al-Qaeda 
responsible for the atacks but also that it presented a continuing threat to the US and other 
western countries. On November 6, the President stressed that al-Qaeda ‘operates in more 
than 60 nations (…) [t]hese terorist groups seek to destabilise entire nations and regions 
(…) Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventualy, to 
civilization itself’.12 Similarly to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, the US 
administration referred also to previous atacks instigated by al-Qaeda,13 such as the 1993 
atacks on World Trade Center, 1996 atacks on US military housing complex in Saudi 
                            
12 Bush GW, "President Bush: “No Nation Ban Be Neutral in This Conflict”. Remarks by the President to the 
Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism,"(6 November 2001) in htp:/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
13 Bush GW: ‘The evidence we have gathered al points to a colection of loosely affiliated terrorist 
organisations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole’ (Bush GW, "Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress and the American People," (20 September 2001) in htp:/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
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Arabia, the 1998 atacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the 2000 atack on 
USS Cole in Yemen.14 In relation to the 1998 atacks, bin Laden was interviewed by Time 
magazine and admited that he was responsible. He declared that ‘[t]he US knows that I 
have atacked it, by the grace of God, for more than ten years now’.15 The US and the UK 
also brought atention to various statements and declared objectives of al-Qaeda’s 
organisation. Most notably, the main aims of that organisation were to ‘oust pro-Western 
governments in the Middle East, to remove US military forces from the region, and to 
prevent an Arab-Israeli peace setlement’.16 Moreover, days after the 9/11 atacks the plot 
against the US embassy in Paris was discovered and thwarted.17 Al these al-Qaeda’s 
activities were treated as a reason to think that the US and its alies were under an ongoing 
threat from bin Laden’s organisation.  
 
The third reason delivered by the US administration constituted the basis for the 
military operation within the teritory of Afghanistan and was related to the aleged 
relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Similarly to the 1982 intervention, the 
notion of due diligence was inexplicitly brought out as the Taliban regime was accused of 
alowing its teritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. What 
distinguished the US’s from Israel’s justification, however, was the fact that the former 
pointed to the close and dependant relationship between al-Qaeda and the Afghanistan’s de 
facto government, which had not been the case in relation to the 1982 Operation Peace for 
                            
14 Murphy (n 8) 239. See also Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities (n 5). In one of his speeches, the 
President stated that ‘[t]he evidence we have gathered al points to a colection of loosely affiliated terrorist 
organisation know as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole’ (Bush (n 13)). 
15 Office of Prime Minister (n 6). 
16 Murphy (n 8) 239. 
17 See for example: Hedges C, "Police Work; the Inner Workings of a Plot to Blow up the US Embassy in 
Paris," New York Times (28 October 2001). 
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Galilee and the relationship between the PLO and the state of Lebanon. According to 
Cohan: 
 
the Taliban appears to have been both directly and indirectly supportive of 
terorists  within its  borders  by consistently  permiting, failing to suppress, 
and tolerating international terorists in their use of Afghanistan as a center 
for training camps, supply, and staging  operations, and in refusing to 
cooperate in the capture of Osama bin Laden.18 
 
However, as wil be demonstrated even though the relationship between Taliban and 
al-Qaeda was indisputably close it was not, in fact, on a scale which would trigger the 
implementation of the right to self-defence in accordance with international law as 
understood throughout the twentieth century. 
 
Nevertheless, elaborating on its rationale, the US claimed that the leadership and 
training bases of al-Qaeda were ‘under the protection of the Taliban rulers of 
Afghanistan’.19 In the view of the UK’s government, ‘bin Laden and the [Taliban] regime 
[had] a close aliance on which both depend for their continued existence’.20 Accordingly, 
such a dependent or symbiotic relationship had been evident, firstly, in bin Laden’s 
provision of troops, arms, and money to the Taliban in order to support their fight against 
the Northern Aliance; secondly, in bin Laden’s ‘representatives in the [Taliban] military 
command structure’; and thirdly, in the Taliban’s provision of ‘a safe haven’ and 
permission to establish terorist training camps; and fourthly in the joint exploitation of the 
                            
18 Cohen JA, "Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism," Pace 
International Law Review 14, no. 1 (2002): 93. 
19 US Department of State, "Paterns of Global Terrorism 2001," (2002): 161. 
20 Office of Prime Minister (n 6). 
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Afghan drug trade. The close association between the two was also emphasised by a 
former Afghan government oficial, who described the relationship in a folowing way: the 
Taliban and bin Laden are ‘two sides of the same coin: Osama cannot exist in Afghanistan 
without the [Taliban] and the [Taliban] cannot exist without Osama’.21 Furthermore, the 
then NATO’s Secretary General, speaking on the basis of classified material stated that 
‘the facts are clear and compeling’ and that ‘[w]e know that the individuals who caried 
out these atacks were part of the worldwide terorist network of Al Qaeda, headed by 
Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants and protected by the Taliban’.22 
 
c) The 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom in the Light of International Law 
 
This part of the chapter is oriented at scrutinising the aforementioned justification from 
the angle of international law. The structure of it is commenced in a similar fashion to the 
one in the preceding chapter that focused on the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, which 
in turn alows for an explicit comparison between the two military interventions. In 
addition, the notion of an armed atack and the changes in the general understanding of it 
wil be analysed initialy. This analysis wil be conducted by investigating whether the 
9/11 atacks met the gravity requirement needed for an act of terorism to amount to an 
armed atack. This, in turn, is folowed by a discussion about the nature of the relationship 
between the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda. As already stressed, such analysis of the 
relationship between a hosting state and non-state actors is crucial as it comprises the 
second requirement needed for the victim state to implement its right to self-defence.  
 
 
                            
21 ibid. 
22 Lord Robertson cited in Daley (n 10). 
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i) A new meaning of “an armed atack”? 
 
As was already mentioned in the preceding chapters, although the term an “armed 
atack” usualy refered to an atack instigated by a state,23 international law did not negate 
the possibility of an atack launched by non-state actors to be treated as amounting to an 
armed atack.24 For instance, the Appeals Chamber in the Boškoski and Tarčulovski case 
recaled the Trial Chamber judgement that ‘[a]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State’.25 The 
Court thus recognised the possibility of the existence of an armed conflict between a state 
and a non-state actor. Although the UN Charter does not provide a definition of an armed 
atack, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case pointed out that, for the actions of non-state actors to 
constitute an armed atack, they must be commited by the group of armed irregulars ‘of 
such gravity as to amount to an actual armed atack by regular forces’.26 As wil be 
demonstrated 9/11 has prompted a debate surounding the question whether the atacks 
could in fact be regarded as an armed atack traditionaly understood. The folowing 
paragraphs wil introduce the reader to the main arguments underlying this debate. What 
needs to be emphasised upfront however is the fact that the UN Security Council 
recognised the US right to self-defence. This suggests that 9/11 could be seen as either 
amounting to an armed atack traditionaly understood or creating a precedent where a 
terorist atack can prompt a defensive military response.   
                            
23 See, for example: Verhoeven S, "Atacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence," 289-320. 
24 See for example: Schmit MN, "Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law ": 25. 
According to Murphy, ‘Article 51 is silent on who or what might commit an armed atack justifying self-
defence’ ("Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Atack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter, " Harvard 
International Law Journal 43, no.1 (2002): 50). 
25 Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski. The Appeals Chamber (Judgement 19 May 2010) IT-
04-82-A, section 21, 8-9 
26 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep, section 195, 103. 
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When the number of victims is considered, the 9/11 atack could be seen as an atack 
resembling the one by armed forces as it resulted in the death of 3,000 people. This, in 
itself contrasts the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, launched by Israel in Lebanon and 
which was initialy instigated as a response to the assassination atempt upon the Israeli 
Ambassador in London. Although the diference at first seems indeed to be striking, the 
comparison is problematic as the ambassador is the representative of the state and the later 
itself may be seen as the target of the atack.27 Further, taking especialy into account the 
contemporary picture of wartime with advanced technology oriented at the limitation of 
the casualties, the 9/11 with its devastating consequences could have amounted to an 
armed atack. Moreover, the atackers targeted two significant symbols of the United 
States, namely the World Trade Center, which could be seen as the headquarters of world 
finance and the Pentagon, the symbol of American power and government. However when 
looked at from a different angle it is dificult to place 9/11 within the narrow scope of 
Article 51 as wel as other sources of international law treating the concept of an armed 
atack.  
 
Taking into consideration the traditional hesitancy and controversy surounding the 
subject it was of no surprise that some authors argued that the group of people who 
kidnapped planes on 9/11 might not meet the criteria established by the aforementioned 
Nicaragua case. This is because the group of nineteen kidnappers can be described rather 
as a smal group, which was armed with an unconventional weapon (i.e., “box cuters”) 
that would not usualy be regarded as a weapon used for example by armed forces. 
Moreover, the kidnappers ‘did not in any sense operate as normal military or paramilitary 
                            
27 For a discussion on the notion of scale and gravity of the atack, see chapter one, part two and chapter 
three, part one. 
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units, and [who] were engaged in isolated incidents’.28 What folows is that such actions 
according to these scholars should be treated as ‘a use of force or intervention below the 
threshold of armed atack’29 and, therefore, considered a criminal act rather than an armed 
atack.30 Moreover, such reasoning can be further supported by the response of the UN 
General Assembly, which did not treat 9/11 as an armed atack but as ‘heinous acts of 
terorism’.31 
 
By contrast, the supporters of the claim that 9/11 was an armed atack argue that the 
gravity of the atack was similar to that of a conventional military atack – even that of 
Pearl Harbour, which occured in 1941.32 This is further supported by the number of 
victims of the atack that took place on a single day, and was regarded as the worst atack 
since the American Civil War.33 Secondly, the gravity and the seriousness of the atack 
could be observed not only in its lethality but also by the fact that the atack was not 
initiated by a state but was organised and launched by a terorist organisation. The fact that 
a non-state actor could undertake an atack on such a scale within the teritory of a state 
signifies and magnifies the actual threat and access to resources available to such 
organisations. It seems plausible to argue that in the past only states could have access to 
such resources. Indeed, usualy non-state actors used to rely upon the sponsor state to a 
great extent in order to instigate their military campaigns. Moreover, although terrorist 
atacks had not been uncommon prior to 9/11, the gravity of these atacks and the 
consequences were argued to be on an unprecedented scale. According to one author: 
                            
28 Murphy (n 24) 45. 
29 ibid 45-46. 
30 According to Schmit: ‘actions by non-State actors (..) might be criminal in nature and/or represent threats 
to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, but not be of a scale sufficient to implicate the 
international law right of self-defence’ in Schmit (n 24) 18-19. See, also: Tams (n 2). 
31 UNGA Res 56/1 (2001) A/RES/56/1. 
32 It is said that ‘the death tol from the incidents was worse that Pearl Harbor’ (Murphy (n 24) 47). 
33 Murphy (n 8) 237. 
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 the teritorial integrity of the US was violated and the psychological efect, 
the feeling  of  outmost  vulnerability and insecurity  of the  population as a 
whole, was comparable to that generated from a military atack by a state.34 
 
By this, the gravity of the atack ‘went beyond terrorism as it was known’ and 
‘statements from various capitals around the world pointed to a need to develop new 
strategies to confront a new reality’.35 Here, it would seem that the ‘scale and efects’ 
requirements36 set up in the Nicaragua Case were also fulfiled. According to these 
premises, ‘the “scale and efects” of the act that are determinative in assessing whether an 
armed atack is taking place such that a right to respond in self-defence vests. By the 
Court’s standard, acts of a “significant scale” suffice’.37 
 
Thirdly, as was already mentioned, the majority of countries across the globe 
agreed with the US as to the treatment of the events as constituting an armed atack. 
Although neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council of the United Nations in 
their resolutions caled the events of 9/11 an armed atack, they recognised the inherent 
right of individual and colective self-defence and the need ‘to combat by al means [the] 
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’.38 The response of 
international society wil be further scrutinised in the next part of this chapter.  
 
                            
34 Müler AC, "Legal Issues Arising from the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan," Non-State Actors and 
International Law 4 (2004): 250-251. 
35 Maogoto JN, "War on the Enemy: Self-Defence and State-Sponsored Terrorism." 
36 ‘[T]he prohibition of armed atacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of 
another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed 
atack’ Nicaragua Case (n 26) section 195, 103. 
37 Schmit (n 24) 18. 
38 UNSC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1368, UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN 
Doc S/RES/1373. 
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Furthermore and as was already mentioned, the Bush administration in various 
statements folowing the 9/11 atacks refered to previous atacks instigated by al-Qaeda, 
such as the 1993 atacks on World Trade Center, 1996 atacks on US military housing 
complex in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 atacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and 
the 2000 atack on USS Cole in Yemen,39 which in its view was evidence that the US was 
undergoing a sustained threat from al-Qaeda. Such an approach to treat the atacks 
cumulatively was supported by some scholars. According to Schmit, 
 
it  would  make litle sense to evaluate each terorist atack individualy in 
every case (..) in many situations it may be reasonable to conclude that an 
armed atack  was  merely the  opening shot in an  overal campaign that in 
itself constitutes a single ongoing armed atack.40 
 
The fact that this reasoning was not questioned by other members of international 
society and, in fact, accepted by some international legal scholars gives certain validity to 
the claim that the “accumulation of events” theory has acquired international recognition. 
It can, however, also mean that the reliance on the premises of this theory was not 
necessary as 9/11 in itself amounted to an armed atack and thus gave the basis for 
implementation of the right to self-defence. Or it could be argued that the reliance on the 
Nadelstichtaktik theory in relation to previous atacks launched by al-Qaeda was treated 
barely as an additional support for the case rather than the main part of justification as had 
been the case in relation to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. 
 
                            
39 Murphy (n 8) 239. See also: Office of Prime Minister (n 6). 
40 Schmit (n 24) 31. 
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Al of the aforementioned arguments were believed to deliver a coherent, yet for 
some controversial, reasoning supporting the view that 9/11 constituted, in fact, an armed 
atack in accordance with the UN Charter. Those scholars, who questioned this view, 
suggest that the 9/11 atacks could have been dealt under domestic criminal law and 
adequate international law treating the terrorist acts.41 Others suggest the possibility of 
organising a short police action, which would involve apprehending terorists from a 
particular state.42 Yet another possibility brought up was that a victim state could have 
organised a short incursion into the teritory of a harbouring state in which they only atack 
terorist bases. 
 
Authors who were, however, sceptical in relation to the lawfulness of the US 
military response, questioned the time during which Operation Enduring Freedom actualy 
commenced. According to the reading of Article 51, for a state to exercise the right of self-
defence the armed atack should not end but be ongoing.43 In other words, ‘[i]f an atack 
has ceased and there is no danger of future atack, the right of self-defence itself ceases’.44 
What folows is that if the response comes long after the atack and there is no real danger 
of possible future atack, such a response should be treated as an unlawful reprisal.45 In 
addition, the atack against Afghanistan occured a few weeks after the 9/11 atacks on 
October 8,46 and for some such a response was too late to be lawful. The supporters of the 
US intervention in Afghanistan counter-argued that such a late response was 
                            
41 Rogers APV, "Terrorism and the Laws of War: September 11 and Its Aftermath" in 
www.crimesofwar.irg/expert/atack-apv.html [accessed 1 December 2012]. See also: Schroeder PW, "The 
Risk of Victory. An Historian's Provocation," The National Interest (2001/02): 22-36. 
42 O’Connel ME, Jurist Forum: Lawful Responses to Terrorism (2001) in 
www.jurist.law.pit.edu/forum/forumnew30.htm [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
43 Schmalenbah  K, "The Right of Self-Defence and the “War on Terrorism” One Year after September 11," 
German Law Journal 3 (2002) in www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=189 [accessed 1 December 
2012]. See also: Charney (n 2). 
44 ibid. 
45 O’Connel (n 42). 
46 Müler (n 34) 239. 
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understandable and necessary in order to ascertain proof of al-Qaeda’s responsibility. 
Moreover, 
 
[b]earing in  mind that  hasty self-defence  would  undermine the aims  of 
Article  2(4)  of the  UN  Charter, such a  delay  was  understandable and 
perhaps even justifiable.  The terorist atacks  were  not folowed 
immediately by other terrorist atacks, but several threats were made by Al 
Qaeda  members,  which could justify the  perception  of the threat as 
enduring.47 
 
Although the controversies surounding 9/11 remain present in the writings of 
various scholars, one of the consequences of the 9/11 atacks is that international society 
recognised the US right to self-defence, which, in turn, suggests that a terorist atack can 
constitute an armed atack and states can exercise their right to self-defence against 
terorist organisations within the teritory of other states once the threat of future atacks is 
established.48 However this in itself is not the only requirement needed to exercise the right 
to self-defence. As was already mentioned, the atacks needed to be atributed to a state, in 
this case to Afghanistan. If no link between the non-state actors and the supporting states is 
established then a state, which has been atacked, should look for an ‘alternative response 
to armed force’.49 What is interesting and worth mentioning here is that although according 
to some authors there were other legal bases for the use of force,50 the US chose to justify 
its action as an exercise of the right to self-defence. Byers, for instance, points to three 
                            
47 ibid 252. 
48 Schmalenbah (n 43). 
49 O’Connel (n 42). 
50 Such as Chapter VII of the UN Charter, intervention by invitation, humanitarian intervention, see, for 
example: Byers M, "Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September," International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2002): 401. 
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other possible legal justifications that could have been used, that is: Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter (intervention under the UN’s emblem), intervention by invitation and humanitarian 
intervention.51 
 
i) Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
 
This part of the chapter seeks to investigate the relationship between the Taliban 
regime and al-Qaeda and whether the nature of this relationship was suficient enough to 
establish the Taliban’s responsibility and in turn legitimise the intervention in accordance 
with international law. As mentioned earlier,52 a state, which openly supports non-state 
actors, might be held responsible for the actions of such an entity. This principle, as the 
first case of this thesis has demonstrated, proves to be controversial as in some cases the 
relationship between the two actors is dificult to be established. Moreover, the cases 
involving wilful or unwilful harbouring of non-state actors prove to be debateable and 
controversial. Although international law of treaties is silent in this mater and does not 
provide any legal guidance regarding the responsibility of states for the actions conducted 
by non-state actors the workings of international courts and tribunals53 as wel as the 
writing of various international lawyers and scholars54 put some insight into the 
understanding of the mater in question.  
                            
51 ibid 401. 
52 See chapter one, part two and chapter three, part one. 
53 For example, the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep, Nicaragua 
case (n 26), Tadić Case (Judgment) ICTY-94-I-A (15 July 1999). 
54 See, for example: Blum YZ, "State Response to Acts of Terrorism." Brownlie I, "International Law and 
the Activities of Armed Bands." Brown Weiss E, "Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First 
Century," American Journal of International Law 96, no. 4 (2002): 798-816. Cassese A, "The Nicaragua and 
Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgement in Bosnia, " European Journal of International Law 18, 
no. 4 (2007): 649-668. Griebel J Plücken M, "New Developments Regarding the Rules of Atribution? The 
International Court of Justice’s Decision in Bosnia V. Serbia," Leiden Journal of International Law 21, no. 3 
(2008): 601-622. Milanović M, "State Responsibility for Acts of Non-State Actors: A Comment on Griebel 
and Plücken," Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009): 307-324. Talmon S, "The Responsibility of 
Outside Powers for Acs of Secessionist Entities," International & Comparative Law Quarterly 58 (2009): 
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In addition, if a close relationship is established, a victim state, which has sufered 
from the terorist actions, can ask for reparation of the wrong.55 With regard to 9/11, 
however, the US implied that it had a right to atack Afghanistan in order to exercise its 
inherent right to self-defence, which, in turn, implied that the Taliban’s regime was 
indirectly responsible for 9/11. The point of departure is the investigation of the proof. In 
other words, it needs to be established whether the US and its alies provided evidence 
proving the atribution of al-Qaeda atacks to Taliban regime and whether such evidence 
was, indeed, satisfactory. Throughout the history of the US advocating its case for the use 
of force, most Administrations refered to the provision of “convincing” or “compeling” 
evidence.56 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case stressed the importance of  “suficient proof”.57 
Scholars refer to “suficiently convincing”, “convincing evidence”58 or “stringent 
evidence”.59 Thus the question to be asked is: has the US provided such compeling, 
suficient or convincing evidence? 
 
The US in its justification claimed that leadership and training bases of al-Qaeda 
were ‘under the protection of the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan’.60 As was already 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the relationship between the Taliban and al-
Qaeda was seen as dependable and close. Despite this accusation, the US decided to 
provide the Taliban with a series of demands, which, in turn, could halt the possibility of 
the US intervention in Afghanistan. This, in turn, suggests that the US before engaging in a 
military operation sought to resolve the conflict by peaceful means in accordance with the 
                                                                                    
493-517. Tams CJ, "Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible State?," 
European Journal of International Law 13, no. 5 (2002): 1161-1180. 
55 Shaw MN, International Law (5th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 694. See also: 
Jennings R Wats A, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1(9th edn London and New York: Longman, 
1996), Chapter IV. 
56 O'Connel ME, "Evidence of Teror," Journal of Conflict ad Security Law 7, no. 1 (2002): 21. 
57 Nicaragua case (n 26) section 101, 59. 
58 Greenwood cited in O’Connel (n 56) 25. 
59 Lobel cited in O’Connel (n 56) 25. 
60 US Department of State (n 19) 161. 
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principles of international law. Moreover, although the US did not recognise the Taliban as 
the de jure government of Afghanistan, it accepted the fact that the regime is, in fact, the 
de facto government of the state,61 as it controled ninety per cent of the Afghan teritory62 
and therefore the Bush administration decided to engage in a discussion with them through 
Pakistan’s oficials.63 In addition, three demands are of special interest for this case study. 
Firstly, President Bush insisted on the delivery ‘to United States authorities al the leaders 
of al Qaeda who [hid] in [Taliban’s] land’. 64 Secondly, the Taliban were required to 
‘[c]lose immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan’. 65 And 
finally, to ‘give the United States ful access to terrorist training camps, so [the US] can 
make sure [that] they are no longer operating’. 66 Moreover, the President also stressed that 
‘[t]hese demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act 
immediately. They wil hand over the terorists, or they wil share in their fate’. 67 
Although the Taliban leadership at first instance condemned the 9/11 atacks, it claimed 
that bin Laden was not responsible,68 and demanded that proof of bin Laden’s guilt be 
delivered. Although at the beginning, due to the lack of evidence, the Taliban decided not 
to extradite bin Laden69 their position changed and the Taliban suggested that they may be 
                            
61 The exact translation of the words de jure: ‘by rights; by lawful title’ (Curzon LB Richard PH, The 
Longman Dictionary of Law (7th edn Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007)). In international law, the term refers 
to the theory of states’ recognition. According to Shaw, ‘[r]ecognition de jure usualy folows where the 
recognizing state accepts that the effective control displayed by the government is permanent and firmly 
rooted and that there are no legal reasons detracting from this’ ((n 55) 382). In other words, the government 
of a particular state is recognized by other states as lawful government. Recognition de facto, on the other 
hand, ‘implies that there is some doubt as to the long-term viability of the government in question’ and by 
this it ‘involves a hesitant assessment of the situation, an atitude of wait and see’ (ibid 382). 
62 Schmalenbah (n 43). 
63 Murphy (n 8) 244. 
64 Bush (n 13). 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 Bearak B, "Condemning Atacks, Taliban Says Bin Laden Not Involved," New York Times. 12 September 
2001. 
69 Burns JF, "Hunt for Bin Laden Begins on a Trail Gone as Cold as the Afghan Landscape," New York Times 
23 September 2001. 
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wiling to ‘turn [bin Laden] to a third country’.70 The US responded that the demands were 
not negotiable. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the scholars’ opinions, in relation to the US’ strikes 
against Afghanistan, were divided. Some authors claimed that the US intervention was 
lawful. According to one of them, ‘defensive action in the teritory of the host state is 
necessary if this host does not protect the defending state from further atacks emanating 
from its teritory’.71 Therefore, ‘in the case of the Taliban, the de facto government did not 
suficiently protect the US, so that self-defence could be considered necessary’.72 Others 
argued that the military actions should have been directed against al-Qaeda only and that 
the 9/11 atacks could not have been atributed to the Taliban.73 It was also suggested that 
launching an atack against training camps and weapons arsenals and not the host state 
itself would be a legitimate response.74 
 
Although scholars’ opinions on the legality of the US military intervention in 
Afghanistan were divided, the controversy surounding this case has prompted an 
academic debate on the notion of the right to self-defence. While throughout the most of 
the twentieth century, at least since the adoption of the UN Charter, the majority of 
scholars tended to support the narow right of self-defence, a number of those supporting 
the wider scope of the right of self-defence has increased since 2001.75 When this is 
coupled with the growing support explicit in various statements of the members of 
                            
70 Frantz D, "Taliban Say They Want to Negotiate with the US over Bin Laden, " New York Times 3 October 
2001. 
71 Krajewski cited in Müler (n 34) 256. 
72 ibid. See also: Franck TM, "Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence," American Journal of International 
Law 95, no. 4 (2001): 840-841. -"When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force without Prior Security 
Council Authorization?," Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 5 (2001): 51-68. 
73 Schmit (n 24) 51, 53. See also: O’Connel (n 56) 30. 
74 Müler (n 34) 254, 257. 
75 See note 2 and 3. 
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international society, it is apparent that, firstly, it is much more likely now for a terrorist 
atack to be seen as constituting an armed atack; and secondly international society, as wil 
be demonstrated, has become less reluctant towards the use of force directed against non-
state actors and harbouring states. This suggests the growing acceptance of the wider scope 
of the right of self-defence which, in turn, gives more freedom for a victim state to engage 
its armed forces in a military action outside its borders. 
 
Part Two: The Response of International Society Towards the 2001 Operation 
Enduring Freedom 
 
As wil be demonstrated the manner of the way in which international society 
responded towards the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom suggests that there has been 
change in states’ approaches firstly towards terrorist atacks and secondly towards those 
states, that wilingly or unwilingly alow their territories to be used as operational bases 
for non-state actors. This shift can be observed clearly when both the 1982 Operation 
Peace For Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom and the subsequent 
responses of international society towards the operations in question are compared. 
 
a) Terrorist Atack as an Armed Atack 
 
The fundamental change, which has had consequences on the legal system, can be 
observed in that the right to self-defence was, for the first time since the adoption of the 
UN Charter, recognised in relation to a terorist atack. Writing in relation to 9/11 Cassese 
noted that ‘in a mater of a few days, practicaly al states (..) have come to assimilate a 
terorist atack by a terrorist organisation to an armed aggression by a state, entitling the 
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victim state to resort to individual self-defence’.76 This in turn may indicate that ‘the 
response of the international community in the aftermath of 9/11 has given rise to a new 
principle of customary international law that permits the use of force in self-defence in 
response to “armed atacks” commited by non-state terorist organisation’.77 
 
The fact that neither an assassination atempt nor previous atacks launched by the 
PLO were recognised by international society as justifying military intervention within 
Lebanon suggests that prior to 2001 it had been very difficult for a victim state to convince 
international society that the resort to force was an adequate and reasonable response to a 
terorist atack. As has been demonstrated, the recognition of the right to self-defence 
might have been caused by the gravity of the atacks, which occured on September 11 and 
resulted in the deaths of 3,000 people. However, as the third case study wil demonstrate 
international society changed its approach towards the use of force in relation to terorism 
in general rather than only in relation to terorist atacks, which could in its gravity amount 
to an armed atack, traditionaly understood. The folowing case study wil show that even 
in a situation when the atack launched by non-state actors did not meet the gravity 
requirement, international society nevertheless recognised a state’s right to self-defence.  
 
Regarding the international approach towards 9/11, the international support, 
signaling the shift in approach towards terorism, was further strengthened by the adoption 
of two resolutions by the UN Security Council.78 The significance of these resolutions can 
be observed in that not only the 9/11 atacks were condemned but also were treated as 
constituting a threat to international peace and security. In addition, Resolution 1368 states 
                            
76 Cassese A, "Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law," American 
Journal of International Law 12, no. 5 (2001): 996-997. (emphasis in original). 
77 Garwood-Gowers A, "Self-Defence against Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World," Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 4, no. 2 (2004): 11. 
78 UNSC Res 1368; UNSC Res 1373 (n 38). 
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that the UNSC ‘[u]nequivocaly condemns in the strongest terms the horifying terrorist 
atacks, which took place on 11 September 2001 (…) and regards such acts (…) as a threat 
to international peace and security’.79 Moreover and indeed more importantly, the Security 
Council also recognised ‘the inherent right of individual or colective self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter’.80  
 
However, the very fact that the 9/11 atacks were treated as constituting a threat to 
international peace and security as wel as giving a basis for the implementation of the 
right to self-defence brought about an academic dispute over the meaning of these 
resolutions: the controversy over the adoption of these resolutions surounded the question 
of whether 9/11 should be treated as an armed atack thus giving the basis for the right of 
self-defence81 or as a threat to international peace and security and thus be dealt with under 
the provision of Article 39 of the UN Charter.82 In addition, according to some, the 
aforementioned resolutions indicated that 9/11 should be seen as constituting a threat to 
peace and therefore the situation ‘should be dealt with not under the rubric of unilateral or 
multilateral self-defence, but under the colective security provisions of the UN Charter’.83 
In addition, both resolutions were adopted before an instigation of the military campaign 
on October 7. Thus, the US government could have asked the UNSC to undertake the 
enforcement measures in compliance with Article 39 of the UN Charter,84 especialy since 
                            
79 UNSC Res 1368 (n 38) (emphasis in original) the reaffirmation of this statement was delivered in UNSC 
Res 1373 (n 38). 
80 UNSC Res 1368; UNSC Res 1373 (n 38). 
81 See, for example: Byers (n 50) 401-414. Gray C, "The US National Security Strategy and the New "Bush 
Doctrine" on Preemptive Self-Defence," Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 2 (2002), pp. 437-447. 
White ND Myjer EPJ, "The Twin Towers Atack: An Unlimited Right to Self-Defence?," Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 7, no. 1 (2002): 5-17. 
82 See, for example: Bothe M, "Terorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force," European Journal of 
International Law 14, no. 2 (2003): 227-240. White, Myier (n 80). 
83 White, Myier (n 81) 11. 
84 Article 39 reads: The Security Council shal determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shal make recommendations, or decide what measures shal be taken in 
accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security (Charter of the 
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the Security Council had already recognized acts of international terorism as a threat to 
peace and security. The US in launching operation Enduring Freedom, however, relied 
upon the merits of Article 51 and thus its right to self-defence and not the UNSC 
authorisation.85 
 
Nonetheless it should be noted that although 9/11 or ‘any act of international 
terorism’ was recognized as constituting a threat to international peace and security, this 
does not necessarily imply the recognition of the right to use of force. What this implied, 
however, is the possibility of the use of force in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 or the 
usage of other legal measures, discussed earlier, and not necessarily Article 51, which 
treats the right to self-defence.86 It is enough to bring atention to acts of terorism that 
occured in the past, such as those commited either by the PLO or Hezbolah discussed in 
the preceding chapter, and the subsequent response of states, to realize that not every act of 
international terorism would subsequently lead to the implementation or international 
recognition of the right of self-defence. As wil be demonstrated subsequently this very 
shift, i.e. that the right of self-defence was recognised, created a certain dichotomy or 
controversy in relation not only to the meaning of the aforementioned resolutions but also 
to the role of the UNSC in a situation relating to the implementation of the right to self-
defence.  
 
 
                                                                                    
United Nations (adopted on 26 June 1945, entered into force on 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119 
(hereinafter: UN Charter)). 
85 Ruys, Verhoeven (n 23). 
86 While Article 41 treats an employment of measures not involving the use of force, Article 42 envisages the 
possibility of an armed intervention under the emblem of the United Nations. 
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b) The Recognition of the Right of Self-defence in Relation to a Terrorist Atack and 
the Question of the UNSC Authorisation 
 
As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter discussing the Israeli interventions in 
Lebanon, although the justification delivered by the Israeli government was indeed similar 
to that of the US government in relation to 9/11, the Israeli right to self-defence was not 
recognised. Thus state practice prior to 2001 had given evidence suggesting that it was 
indeed very difficult for a victim state to convince international society that the use of 
force was, in fact, legitimate and in accordance with international law. As wil be 
demonstrated the way in which international society reacted to 9/11 has shone a new light 
onto the legitimacy of the use of force in relation to a terorist atack.  
 
In addition, the UNSC, in resolutions 1368 and 1373 adopted on September 12 and 
28 respectively, recognized and reafirmed ‘the inherent right of individual or colective 
self-defence in accordance with the Charter’.87 This recognition was not free from 
controversy not only regarding the aforementioned recognition of 9/11 as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security but also in relation to the role of the UNSC in the 
implementation of the right to self-defence. In addition, although some authors argue that 
this wording is proof that 9/11 was “an armed atack”88 and thus the UNSC ‘was 
acknowledging for the first time that States may unilateraly use military force against 
terorists who have commited an armed atack’,89 for some the resolutions were not that 
straightforward. Various scholars, for example, argued that although the right to self-
defence was recognised, the US prior to the instigation of the military campaign in 
                            
87 UNSC Res 1368, UNSC Res 1373 (n 38). 
88 Wal AE, "International Law and the Bush Doctrine," Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 34 (2004): 202. 
See also, for example: Schmitt (n 24) 26-27. 
89 Wal (n 88) 202. 
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Afghanistan should have obtained formal authorisation from the UNSC.90 This argument, 
though, raises certain questions: firstly, is the authorisation actualy required? And, 
secondly, in a case when such authorisation is missing, is the instigation of the military 
campaign unlawful? According to Murphy, the UNSC did not authorise explicitly the use 
of force.91 Delbrϋck, on the other hand, argued that although the UNSC did not expressly 
authorize the use of force, 
 
it appears that the requirements  of the applicability  of  Art.  51 (…) are 
fulfiled with the proviso, though, that the measures of self-defence have to 
stay within the bounds set by the principle of proportionality and the rules 
of international humanitarian law92 
 
and therefore it is ‘a clear indication of the consensus’.93 Yet another criticism is delivered 
by Bowring, according to whom, ‘the Security Council neither endorsed nor authorized the 
military action, it merely noted that it is taking place, with a justification of self-
defence’. 94 For him, ‘[t]he Security Council, and, in efect, the whole Charter and 
                            
90 See for example: Charney (n 2). Lietzau WK, "Old Laws, New Wars: Jus Ad Belum in an Age of 
Terorism," 383-455. Stahn C, "International Law at a Crossroads? The Impact of September 11," 
MaxPlanck Institut (2002): 183-255. 
91 Murphy (n 8) 244. 
92 Delbrϋck J, "The Fight against Global Terrorism: Self-Defence or Colective Security as International 
Police Action? Some Comments on the International Legal Implications of the ‘War against Terrorism’," 
German Yearbook of International Law 44 (2001): 16. 
93 ibid 20. 
94 Bowring B, "The Degradation of International Law?," in Law after Ground Zero, ed. Strawson J (London: 
The GlassHouse Press, 2002), 14-15. The Resolution 1368 reads: ‘The Security Council, 
Reafirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations (…) Recognising the inherent 
right of individual or colective self-defence in accordance with the Charter, 
Unequivocaly condemns (…) and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to 
international peace and security (…) Expresses its readiness to take al necessary steps to respond to the 
terrorist atacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat al forms of terrorism, in accordance with its 
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations’ (n 38). 
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customary law on the use of force and self-defence, [had] been jetisoned in the name of 
the war against terorism’.95 
 
Franck, crucialy, argues that there is no need for states to obtain ‘the blessing of 
the Security Council before responding to an armed atack according to international law.96 
This argument seems to be the most convincing. In addition, the UN Charter imposes a 
requirement to report defensive actions to the UNSC97 and this was fulfiled by the US on 
October 7, 2001.98 Indeed, Article 51 of the UN Charter reads that a state can act in self-
defence after an armed atack and until the UNSC takes the appropriate action.99 No 
authorization requirement is, in fact, mentioned in this article. Moreover, both resolutions 
(i.e. 1368 and 1373) did, in fact, recognize the inherent right of self-defence and did not 
impose any further steps for the US to fulfil before such a right could be endorsed. It is 
very probable that the drafters of these resolutions took into consideration the likelihood of 
the use of force. If they did include authorization of the use of force than in the future such 
resolutions could be used to justify any military action undertaken to fight international 
terorism. This seems to be coresponding to Byers’ opinion in that the point 
 
 is not that the resolution (…) should be read as authorizing the use of force 
– indeed, in my view it does not – but that it could provide the US with an 
at-least-tenable argument  whenever and  wherever it  decides, for  political 
                            
95 Bowring (n 94) 14-15. Koh, argues, however, ‘a narrow, legalistic focus should not obscure the bigger 
picture: September 11 was an atack, not just on innocent civilians, but on the very spirit of international law’ 
("The Spirit of the Laws," Harvard International Law Journal 43, no. 1 (2002): 25.) 
96 Franck (n 72) 843. 
97 Schmit (n 24) 12. 
98 Leter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (7 October 2001) UN Doc S/2001/946. 
99 For a discussion, see: Shah NA, "Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence and Pre-Emption: International 
Law’s Response to Terorism," Journal of Conflict and Security Law 12, no. 1 (2007): 95–126. 
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reasons, that force is  necessary to “prevent the commission  of terorist 
acts”.100 
 
Moreover, it seems right to argue, as Cassese did, that even the UNSC did not 
know exactly how to respond to 9/11. 101 Undoubtedly, the very fact that such vast support 
for the US was delivered by various states must have caused uneasiness for the UNSC 
regarding the possible ways of dealing with such a pressing issue. Such uneasiness can be 
observed in the adoption of the two resolutions. In addition, firstly the UNSC recognised 
the right of self-defence and then subsequently refered to the atacks as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security, which in turn, suggests the possibility of 
applying the provisions embodied within Chapter VI of the UN Charter.102 By doing so 
‘the Security Council waver[ed] between the desire to take maters into its own hands and 
resignation to the use of unilateral action by the US’.103 What should be emphasised, 
however, is the fact that the UNSC recognised the right of self-defence and thus it might be 
argued that it did in fact acknowledge the occurence of an armed atack. Furthermore, 
from the way in which the Security Council responded to the 9/11 atacks, it can be argued 
that the Council accepted two possible and lawful resolutions of the situation. The 9/11 
atacks could have been dealt with either by the use of force instigated by the US or by the 
implementation of provisions enlisted in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.104 
 
                            
100 Byers (n 50) 402. 
101 Cassese (n 76) 996. 
102 Articles 41 and 42 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter are of special significance as according to them, 
the UNSC may decide to either impose economic sanctions or to instigate an appropriate action including 
military one directed against member of the UN. 
103 Cassese (n 76) 996. 
104 See n 102. See, however: Subedi SP, "The UN Response to International Terrorism in the Aftermath of 
the Terrorist Atacks in America and the Problem of the Definition of Terrorism in International Law " 
International Law FORUM Du Droit International 4 (2001): 160. 
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Notwithstanding the importance of the aforementioned debate surounding the 
meaning of the UNSC resolutions, an indisputable fact is that the right of self-defence was 
recognised. This recognition, as has and wil be further demonstrated throughout the third 
case study, is indispensable for this thesis as it unequivocaly delivers the evidence 
suggesting the shift in international approach towards the use of force in relation to 
terorism. Taking further into consideration the fact that many states decided to assist and 
join the US in Operation Enduring Freedom it can be argued that the intervention in 
Afghanistan was, indeed, seen as a legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence.105 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the UNSC acknowledged the US notification of 
carying out Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7106 and did not condemn it 
subsequently. It can be, thus, argued that even though a statement suggesting an 
acquirement of the UNSC authorisation107 seems to be normatively coherent, it, in a way, 
questions the very meaning of the inherent right of self-defence and places too much 
burden on a victim state. In addition, the UN Charter, apart from requiring a victim state to 
report any use of force undertaken in self-defence, does not invoke an obligation to seek 
formal authorisation. Although, it might be argued that if, in fact, the US had sought the 
UNSC authorisation, it would have further strengthened its case, this requirement cannot 
be found in any of the sources of international law. 
 
 
 
 
                            
105 136 countries offered various military assistance, ’89 countries granted overnight authority for US 
military aircraft, 76 ‘granted landing rights for US military aircraft’, 23 ‘ agreed to host US and Coalition 
forces involved in military operations in Afghanistan’ (US Department of State (n 17) xi). 
106 UN Doc (n 98). 
107 See also: Murphy (n 8); Delbrϋck (n 92); White and Myier (n 81); Subedi (n 104); Bowring (n 94); Byers 
(n 50). 
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c) The Taliban Regime and the Question of Harbouring  
 
Other evidence suggesting that there was a growing international acceptance of a 
wider definition of the right to self-defence can be found in that states have become more 
firm and intolerant towards states, who either wilingly or unwilingly alow their teritory 
to be used as operational bases for non-state actors. This new development is evident when 
Operations of Peace for Galilee in 1982 and Enduring Freedom in 2001 are compared. 
Whereas in relation to the former, international society criticised Israel in a strong form 
and viewed actions of the PLO as not being atributable to the government of Lebanon,108 
it adopted an opposite approach in relation to the later suggesting that the Taliban regime 
might have been responsible for the actions of al-Qaeda. This in turn may imply that 
curently, states, which fail to prevent their territories to be used by non-state actors, can be 
held accountable or can at least face serious consequences resulting in military 
intervention. 
 
As the first case study has shown, Israel failed to convince international society that 
it had a right to use force against the teritory of Lebanon. Although, from the perspective 
of time it can be observed that, in fact, Israel relied upon similar reasoning as the US in 
2001, international society did not recognise this justification as lawful rationale for a 
military campaign. Thus, it may be suggested, that prior to 2001 it was dificult for a 
victim state to build a case for the use of force based on the principle of due diligence, and 
alowance (either wilful or unwilful) of the territory to be used as a base for non-state 
actors, as such. Looking, however, at the US justification and the subsequent international 
recognition of such justification a conclusion can be derived that there has been growing 
                            
108 See chapter three, part two. 
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acceptance of the lowering of the standard of state atribution. Even though the relationship 
between the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, as opposed to Lebanon and the PLO, was 
characterised as close and dependable, it stil would not have been on such a scale as 
triggering the rules of atribution had it happened prior to 9/11. Thus, the way in which 
both the US and international society responded towards the 9/11 atacks strongly 
suggested that the control requirements discussed earlier in this thesis (either “efective 
control”109 or “overal control”110) do not apply anymore or at least they have been 
broadened.  
 
As was demonstrated already, the scholars’ opinion in relation to the US strikes 
against Afghanistan was, however, divided. Some authors claimed that the US intervention 
was lawful. According to one of them, ‘defensive action in the teritory of the host state is 
necessary if this host does not protect the defending state from further atacks emanating 
from its teritory’. 111 Therefore ‘in the case of the Taliban, the de facto government did not 
suficiently protect the US, so that self-defence could be considered necessary’.112 Others 
argued that the military actions should have been directed against al Qaeda only and that 
the 9/11 atacks could not have been atributed to the Taliban.113 One commentator 
suggested that launching an atack against training camps and weapons arsenals and not the 
host state itself would be a legitimate response’.114 
 
When the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime is scrutinised, it 
can be concluded that the Taliban neither controled nor directed the al-Qaeda actions. 
                            
109 Nicaragua case (n 26). 
110 Tadić Case (n 53). 
111 Krajewski (2002) cited in Müler (n 34) 256. See also: Franck (n 72) 840-841. 
112 Müler (n 34) 256. 
113 Schmit (n 24) 51, 53. See also: O’Connel (n 56) 30. 
114 Muler (n 34) 254, 257. 
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Therefore, the criteria established either by Nicaragua or Tadić cases was not fulfiled. As 
pointed earlier, it was al-Qaeda, which financed and provided money and weapons 
therefore it can be argued that al-Qaeda was the superior one in the relationship. Although 
that does not change the fact that the Taliban was responsible for alowing its (de facto) 
teritory to be used by terrorists, it cannot be said that the Taliban controled bin Laden’s 
organisation.115 Such a situation, although controversial in that ‘a private organisation 
constitutes a force superior to the state authorities without striving to exercise 
governmental authority remains a novelty that is hard to assess within the existing rules on 
atributability’,116 does not change the fact that al-Qaeda was not controled by the Taliban. 
In summary, apart from alowing Afghanistan’s territory to be used as al-Qaeda bases, 
there was no credible evidence indicating that the regime was ‘providing arms, money, or 
other material support’ to bin Laden’s organisation. 117 What folows is that in the words of 
one author: ‘the case is probably weaker than the case for US control over Nicaraguan 
contras, who were organized, trained, armed, and financed by the US government’.118 
 
The above findings suggest a new development regarding the threshold for 
atribution of action undertaken by non-state actors to a state. The curent trend indicates 
that a state can not only, be accused of breaching its international obligations when alows 
for its teritory to be used by non-state actors, but also, become a target of a victim state 
exercising its right to self-defence. Although, as it was mentioned earlier in this thesis, 
some states and scholars119 presented this argument before 9/11, their views were not 
                            
115 See, for example: Schmit (n 24) 46 and Müler (n 34) 247. 
116 Müler (n 34) 249. 
117 Malzahn S, "State Sponsorship and Support of International Terrorism: Customary Norms of State 
Responsibility," Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 26, no. 1 (2002): 112-113. 
118 ibid. 
119 According to Wedgwood,‘[i]f a host country permits the use of its territory as a staging area for terrorist 
atacks when it could shut those operations down, and refuses requests to take action, the host government 
cannot expect to insulate its territory against measures of self-defence’ (Wedgwood (1999) cited in Dinstein 
Y, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th edn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 245. 
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supported by the wider international spectrum. In addition, the adequacy of the situation 
changed when international society together with international legal scholars supported the 
above argument. Even though it is argued that states do not have to ‘prevent every act of 
international terorism that originates from [their] teritory’, they are expected, however, to 
‘exercise due diligence in the performance of their international obligations so as to take 
al reasonable measures under the circumstances to protect the rights and securities of other 
states’.120 Though, as was already discussed earlier in the preceding chapter, the duty to 
exercise due diligence was treated by international case law, it had not been generaly 
accepted either by the ICJ or by international legal scholarship that a state which failed to 
exercise its due diligence can become a legitimate target of a state exercising the right to 
self-defence. The 9/11, therefore, has brought a new light to this provision. 
 
The evidence presented by the US and the coalition made it very clear that the 
Taliban failed to exercise due diligence. Although the Taliban alowed Afghanistan’s 
teritory to be used as a base for al-Qaeda’s operations, there was no evidence suggesting 
that the regime had any prior information suggesting the occurrence of the 9/11 atacks. 
Nevertheless, their lack of exercising due diligence can be evident in that the regime 
neither appealed for international support in dealing with terrorist organisation121 nor 
acknowledged its inability to suppress the al-Qaeda actions. This can be further supported 
by the fact that it actualy rejected the US wilingness to provide assistance in dealing with 
                            
120 Maogoto (n 35) 10-11. (emphasis added) 
121 According to Sucharitkul, ‘ if the state cannot prevent unlawful acts that originate from its own territory it 
can however bring international society atention to the mater and ask international authority for its 
assistance’ ("Terrorism as an International Crime: Questions of Responsibility and Complicity," 257.) 
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al-Qaeda.122 Moreover, the Taliban’s lack of desire to act cooperatively can be further 
observed in their refusal to extradite bin Laden.123 
 
Further, it is argued that an action of non-state actors is atributable to a state if 
such a state ‘deliberately created a situation which was a necessary precondition for a later 
event under the condition that the happening of that event was not beyond reasonable 
probability’.124 It can, accordingly, be concluded that if al-Qaeda had not been alowed to 
use the Afghan teritory and if the Taliban regime had, in fact, acted in accordance with 
UN Security Council resolutions,125 the 9/11 atack would not have occured. In addition, 
Taliban’s passive approach towards the al-Qaeda’s actions and its own international 
obligations ‘was one of the indispensable preconditions for the functioning of al-Qaeda 
and of the atack of 11 September 2001’.126 Moreover, considering previous atacks 
undertaken by al-Qaeda it would be very doubtful to assume that the Taliban regime did 
not know about the terorist activity of the non-state actor operating within its teritory. 
Furthermore, resolutions adopted by the UNSC made the Taliban fuly aware of the danger 
al-Qaeda constituted to the western states. In addition, Wolfrum and Philipp argue that 
                            
122 Malzahn (n 117) 112-113. 
123 It is worth mentioning the controversy surrounding the notion of prosecution and extradition of terrorists. 
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international law, it nevertheless ‘demonstrated extreme bad faith and was evidence of the state’s seal-of-
approval’ (ibid 113). However, in a view of Byers ‘extending the right of self-defence to include action 
against States wilingly harbouring terrorists creates a potentialy awkward overlap between the law of self-
defence and the law of judicial co-operation, especialy with regard to extradition’ (Byers (n 50) 413). 
124 Wolfrum R Philipp CE, "The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights under International 
Law," MaxPlanck YUNL 6 (2002): 596. 
125 See, for example: UNSC Res 1214 (8 December 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1214; UNSC Res 1267 (15 
October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267; UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1333; UNSC 
Res 1363 (30 July 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1363. 
126 Wolfrum and Philipp (n 124) 595-6. 
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‘acts caried out by Al Qaeda [were] atributable also to the Taliban and therefore the 
Taliban themselves could be made the target for actions of self-defence’.127 
 
d) The Unparaleled International Solidarity with the United States 
 
As was already mentioned, the international solidarity with the US was, indeed, on 
an unprecedented scale. Not only the UNSC, the UNGA and UN Secretary-General 
expressed their condemnation of the 9/11 atacks but other international and regional 
organizations including NATO,128 EU129 and more surprisingly the Arab League and 
Organisation of African Unity130 also expressed their criticism and support for the US. 
Moreover, many states also decided to assist the US in Operation Enduring Freedom.131 
In order to emphasis this unprecedented support and solidarity, it is important to present in 
this part of the chapter statements issued by representatives of various states and 
international bodies. In addition, the President of the UNSC speaking on behalf of the 
Council on September 11‘unanimously condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the horifying 
                            
127 ibid 596 (emphasis in original). 
128 ‘The atack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shal therefore be 
regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed atack 
against one or more of the Alies in Europe or North America shal be considered an atack against them al’ 
(Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (2 October 2001) reprinted in US Department of 
State (n 19) 163. See also: Statement by the North Atlantic Council (12 September 2001) in 
htp:/www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
129 The EU in its statement dated 8 October (S/2001/967) ‘declared its ful solidarity with the United States 
and wholehearted support for the action it was taking in Afghanistan’ (Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 
55 (2001), 65 (hereinafter UNYB)). This decision was confirmed by the Declaration by the Heads of State or 
Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission, in which it was stated that ‘The 
European Council confirms its staunchest support for the military operations which began on 7 October and 
which are legitimate under the terms of the United Nations Charter and of Resolution 1368 of the United 
Nations Security Council’ (“The Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union 
and the President of the Commission. Folow-up to the September 11 Atacks and the Fight Against 
Terorism” (19 October 2001) EU Doc SN 4296/2/02 REV 2.). 
130 Also known as African Union. OAU in its communiqué states that it ‘[c]ondemns unequivocaly the 
horrific terrorist atacks that have caused enormous loss of human life and destruction’ Communiqué of the 
Seventy-six Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution Held at the Ambassadorial Level (20 September 2001) reprinted in US 
Department of States (n 19) 169. 
131 136 countries offered various military assistance, ’89 countries granted overnight authority for US 
military aircraft, 76 ‘granted landing rights for US military aircraft’, 23 ‘ agreed to host US and Coalition 
forces involved in military operations in Afghanistan’ (US Department of States (n 19) xi). 
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terorist atacks’.132 According to the UN Secretary – General, ‘these atacks [were] 
deliberate acts of terrorism, carefuly planned and coordinated - and as such I condemn 
them uterly’.133 The UK representative stated that the UK ‘is united in deep shock and 
sympathy for the people of the United States and in determination to eradicate terorism 
globaly, in cooperation with and in support of the United States’.134 The representative of 
China said that they were ‘deeply shocked and strongly condemn (..) serious terorist 
atacks’ and ‘support the United Nations in strengthening its work in preventing and 
combating terorism’.135 The President of Russia, Putin in his statement said that ‘I would 
like to say that we are with you, we are in ful solidarity with your feelings of grief and we 
support you’.136 This was folowed by the Russian representative to the UNSC, who stated 
that the US had come ‘up against an unprecedented act of aggression of international 
terorism’.137 The representative of France stated that his country ‘stands side by side with 
the United States in this time of trial’.138 Other non-permanent members of the UNSC and 
members of the UN delivered similar statements.139 
 
What should be also noted here is the response of Rabbani, the President of 
Afghanistan, who brought atention to the preceding terrorist atack directed against Vice-
President and Defence Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan,140 which occured on 
September 9 and said that both the 9/9 and 9/11 atacks ‘wel established how terorism 
                            
132 UNSC, Press Statement by Security Council President on Terrorist atacks in United States (11 September 
2001) Press Release SC/7141.  
133 UNSG Kofi Annan (11 September 2001) UN Doc SG/SM/7948. 
134 Sir J Greenstock, UNSC 4370th meeting (12 September 2001) UN Doc S/PV.4370, 2. 
135 Statement by Mr Wang Yingfan, UNSC 4370th meeting (n 134) 5 
136 V Putin, statement dated 11 September 2001 reprinted in UNSC 4370th meeting (n 134) 5. 
137 Mr Lavrov, UNSC 4370th meeting (n 134) 5. 
138 Mr Levite, UNSC 4370th meeting (n 134) 7. 
139 See: UNSC 4370th meeting (n 134). For the summary of the meeting, see UNSC ‘Security Council 
Condemns, “In Strongest Terms” Terrorist Atack on United States’ (12 September 2001) Press Release 
SC/7143; UNSC (13 September 2001) UN Doc S/2001/864. 
140 Vice-President and Defence Minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan: Ahmad Shah Massoud, 
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constituted a threat to international peace and security, freedom and liberty’. 141 Moreover, 
the President also reminded his ‘earlier warnings of the threats of terorist activities by the 
Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden axis in the Taliban-occupied parts of Afghanistan’.142 This 
statement is very interesting taking into consideration the previous warnings and general 
international agreement about the importance of stopping the al-Qaeda activities and the 
lack of the US initiative to pursue its goals through the possibility of intervention by 
invitation. As already mentioned, the UNSC adopted various resolutions during the late 
1990s, expressing its concern over the situation within the teritory of Afghanistan. 
Moreover, Resolution 1363 determined it as constituting ‘a threat to international peace 
and security in the region’,143 which in turn implied the possibility of implementing Article 
39. Further, the aforementioned statement by the President of Afghanistan and his 
condemning approach towards the Taliban regime could have been used as a foundation 
for initiation of an intervention by invitation. 
 
Another interesting example is the position of the United Arab Emirates, which had 
been one of three countries144 that had had diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. 
In a leter dated September 24,145 the representative of the UAE notified the Secretary-
General about the decision to end the diplomatic relations with the Taliban Government of 
Afghanistan. The reason for this decision was the ‘failure to respond to the Security 
Council’s request to hand over Osama bin Laden to face a fair international trial on the 
                            
141 Annex to the identical leters dated 14 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (17 
September 2001) UN Doc A/56/365-S/2001/870. 
142 UNYB (n 129) 65. 
143 UNSC Res 1363 (30 July 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1363. 
144 Those were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. 
145 Annex to the leter dated 24 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab 
Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (25 September 2001) UN Doc A/56/401-
S/2001/903. 
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accusations made against him in connection with the terorist atacks of 11 September in 
the United States’.146 A similar decision was reached by Saudi Arabia.147 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the second case study of this thesis discussing the 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom instigated by the US within the teritory of Afghanistan. The 
main objective of this chapter was to compare the aforementioned intervention with the 
one examined in the preceding chapter and which constituted the first case study of this 
thesis, namely the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee launched by Israel in Lebanon. As has 
been demonstrated, although both interventions were based upon similar rationale 
international society treated them in diferent ways. This chapter, thus, has provided a 
comparison between the justifications delivered by governments of both states in question 
and subsequently contrasted the ways in which international society responded towards 
these military operations. 
 
As has been shown, the opinions of both international legal scholars and 
international society seemed to support military intervention in Afghanistan. Although 
some scholars have expressed concern about certain issues relevant to the victim state’s 
claim of implementation of the right to self-defence, many scholars, indeed, did not 
question the legality of the US military response towards those responsible for the 9/11 
atacks. Moreover, the concerns expressed by sceptics were, in a way, outweighed by the 
response of international society, which demonstrated an unprecedented solidarity and 
support with the US. In addition, there has been an acceptance at least among states that, 
                            
146 UNYB (n 129) 65. 
147 Murphy (n 8) 245. 
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firstly, the 9/11 was an armed atack. This, in turn, suggests that the term “armed atack” 
no longer naturaly applies only to an atack launched by a state. Although, as discussed 
earlier, even prior to 9/11 the term was not solely applicable to a state but certain, rigid 
requirements had to be fulfiled and this, in turn, made it dificult for a state to use force as 
a response to terorist atack. Secondly, the inherent right of self-defence was 
internationaly recognised. Indeed, for the first time since the adoption of the UN Charter, 
the right of self-defence was recognised in relation to a terorist atack. Thirdly, the 
intervention in Afghanistan was also supported and accepted, signaling a changed 
international approach towards states which wilingly or unwilingly alow their teritory to 
be used as operational bases for non-state actors. As demonstrated, neither the “effective” 
nor “overal” control requirement was proved in relation to the relationship between the 
Taliban regime and al-Qaeda. Although the relationship was undoubtedly close and even 
dependable, it was not the Taliban but al-Qaeda, which was superior in this relationship. 
Indeed, as Garwood-Gowers argued ‘the threshold for atribution may have been lowered 
[to the point] that any level of support, or even merely hosting or tolerating non-state 
terorist groups, is now suficient to make a state responsible for the conduct of those 
groups’.148 
The importance of this chapter can be observed not only in that it provided 
evidence suggesting a changed international approach towards the use of force in relation 
to terorist atacks since 9/11 but also in that it creates a platform for further elaboration on 
whether the way in which international society responded towards Operation Enduring 
Freedom constituted an exception from the existing international approach or, in fact, it set 
up a precedent, that wil be used in future by states, who are victims of terrorism. 
148 Garwood-Govers (n 77) 12. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASE STUDIES FROM THE ANGLES OF IR 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the two case studies discussed in the preceding 
chapters through the lenses of diferent IR theoretical perspectives. As have been 
demonstrated, although the rationale behind the instigation of the military operations in 
Lebanon and Afghanistan was similar, in that both Israel and the United States invoked 
their rights to self-defence thus claiming to act in accordance with international law, 
international society responded towards these interventions in diferent ways in that it 
condemned Israel on the one hand but supported the US on the other. Such a change of 
approach invites an interesting theoretical debate on states’ behaviour, the very nature of 
international society itself and on the role and status of international law. 
The focal point of this chapter is on this variation of ways in which international 
society responded towards these two military operations. As wil be shown, diferent IR 
theoretical standpoints deliver plausible answers to the question why international society 
recognised the US right to self-defence and had not done so in relation to Israel’s claim in 
1982. Although the underlying rationale behind such a decision was similar, the main 
diference lies in the understanding, the meaning and the implications of such rationale on 
world politics. The first step is to look at the mainstream IR perspectives, namely Realism 
and Liberalism. Both theories can deliver plausible explanations to the aforementioned 
variations. The folowing paragraphs wil, thus, discuss crucial concepts embedded with 
191 
each of these traditions, such as the theory of balance of power, the hegemonic stability 
theory, and the theory of democratic peace. This wil be folowed by an analysis of 
writings of scholars associated with Neo-liberalism and their explanation behind the 
aforementioned variation. The last part of this chapter comprises a discussion surounding 
the notion of international society and the explanation delivered by the representatives of 
both the English School of IR and Constructivism. 
Part One: Case Studies Through the Lenses of IR Mainstreams 
1.Realist Interpretations
The variation between international reactions towards the 1982 Operation Peace 
for Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom can be seen as chalenging the 
foundations of the Realist Theory of International Relations. Realist emphasis on the 
notion of continuity, counter-balancing and the on-going reliance on self-interest and self-
help might be regarded as losing its significance in contemporary world politics, especialy 
taking into consideration the changes that have occured in the aftermath of 9/11 and since 
the colapse of Soviet Union in general. However, the folowing paragraphs wil 
demonstrate that it is too soon to discredit realism if the argument is based solely on the 
unprecedented support for the US in 2001. Thus, in order to highlight the adequacy and 
inadequacy of some of the realist claims, the response of international society to the 
military operations in question wil be compared through the lenses of different ofshoots 
of this theory. 
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Balance of power 
 
As already discussed,1 the merits of the balance of power theory rest upon the 
assumption that states tend to balance against the power of other states. This theory of 
balancing is the halmark of Neo-realism and its validity was advocated most widely and 
explicitly during the Cold War era. Indeed, as wil be demonstrated, this theory is plausible 
in relation to the international response towards the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. 
Neo-realists, similarly to Classical Realists, emphasise states’ pursuit of the national 
interest. What they point out, however, is that it is not the sole driving force behind states’ 
actions. According to the leading neorealist theorist Waltz, states, first and foremost, 
pursue their security, ‘since to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they first must 
survive’.2 It is further argued that due to the fact that ‘states have an interest in maximising 
their long-term odds on survival, they wil coordinate to check dangerous concentrations of 
power’.3 Thus, according to this approach, states tend to show restraint in aggressive 
behaviour if such behaviour can threaten their survival or security. The consequence of this 
is that ‘states ought to generaly pursue moderate strategies as the best route to security’.4 
It was widely held that during the Cold War security was mainly based on the 
sustainability of the balance of power between the two blocs.5 Indeed, it is argued that 
during the Cold War ‘the conventional wisdom was that balancing was a universal law of 
international relations’.6 
                            
1 See chapter two. 
2 Waltz KN, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 915. See, for 
example: Barry T, "The US Power Complex: What’s New, " Foreign Policy in Focus (2002): 1-11.  
3 Brooks SG Wohlforth WC, "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism," 
Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 510. See also: David SR, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 
World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 233-256. 
4 Taliaferro JW, "Security Seeking under Anarchy. Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security 25, 
no. 3 (2000/01): 129. 
5 For more information on the neo-realist approach towards the balance of power see chapter three. 
6 Kang DC, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," International 
Security 28, no. 3: 170. 
 193 
Miler states that the reliance on such balancing was evident in relation to the 
approaches of two power blocks towards the Middle East situation during the Cold War. 
His analysis, thus, is very useful in looking at the reasoning behind the non-recognition of 
the Israeli right to self-defence in relation to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee. In 
addition, although both superpowers had to protect their own interests and aliances, they 
tended to do so cautiously, without infringing upon the interests of each other. In relation 
to Operation Peace for Galilee, such reasoning can indeed be observed in that even the US, 
a traditional Israeli aly, did not support the actions of the later.7 Thus, ‘[b]y restraining 
Israel (…) the United States implicitly recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet threats’.8 
The author claims that during this period certain rules were created, which both reflected 
the bipolarity of international system and limited the escalation of the conflict; the 
existence of such rules was crucial for the sustainability of the status quo despite the 
ongoing conflict between the superpowers.9 Miler describes such approach as ‘resolute 
but also restrained; competitive but cautious; security-conscious rather than power-
maximizing’.10 Such a tendency could have been observed during the peaks of the Middle 
East conflict, when ‘each superpower showed resolve in protecting its important interests, 
and restraint with regard to encroaching on the other’s interests’.11 
 
The result of this resolute restraint was persistence in a successful crisis 
management, namely, the containment and termination of regional wars and the avoidance 
                            
7 On the alies’ relationship see, for example: Lake DA, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of 
International Relations," International organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 13. 
8 Miler B, "Competing Realist Perspectives on Great Power Crisis Behaviour," in Realism: Restatements 
and Renewal, ed. Frankel B (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1996), 347. While Israel was the US aly, states such as 
Syria and Egypt had a close relationship with the Soviet Union. A strategic defeat could threaten ‘the 
survival of its domestic regime’ and thus endanger Soviet interests (ibid 346). 
9 ibid 334. 
10 ibid 355. 
11 ibid 346. 
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of an escalation to direct confrontations between the superpowers’.12 And thus, for Neo-
realists the non-recognition of the Israeli right to self-defence was not dictated so much by 
the fact that the instigation of the intervention was not in accordance with international law 
but by the necessity of sustaining the equilibrium, exemplified by the maintenance of the 
balance of power between the West and the East. Such response, thus, reflected the 
international environment of the time and the desire of the two superpowers to maintain 
the balance of power between each other and to sustain the status quo. It is also argued that 
the aforementioned rules of mutual restraint were unchangeable during the Cold War and 
persisted as long as the international system remained bipolar.13 In a support of this claim, 
Miler emphasises the fact that even when the Soviet Union achieved a nuclear second-
strike capability and when its power-projection capability increased, it stil favoured not to 
upset the status quo; this, according to the author, is evident in Soviets’ ‘greater restraint 
during the 1982 Lebanon War’.14 
 
Notwithstanding its merits, the theory of balance of power does not provide an 
insight into why other states, most particularly China, whose tensions with the Soviet 
Union were at the time apparent, did not recognise the Israeli justification for the 
intervention. Most significantly, however, its limits can be observed in relation to the 
response of the international society towards the 9/11 atacks and the subsequent 
intervention in Afghanistan. Although as wil be demonstrated 9/11 can be explained 
through realist lens in terms of gains and states’ interests the situation surounding the 
September 11 atacks proved to be problematic not only for advocates of the balance of 
power theory but also for other scholars afiliated with the realist tradition. On the one 
hand Realists doubted the significance or transformative impact of this event upon 
                            
12 ibid. 
13 ibid 352. 
14 ibid 345. 
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international politics. Some implications of 9/11 on world politics were, however, noticed 
in that even Mearsheimer, a representative of the ofensive realist ofshoot, admits that 
9/11 has altered to a certain degree the direction of US policy, thus admiting that not only 
states but also non-state actors can pose a threat to a security of a state.15 
 
The unprecedented international support for the war in Afghanistan delivers not 
only evidence, that 9/11 was in fact a significant event but also discredits the 
aforementioned pilar of Neo-realism, namely the balance of power. According to the 
premise of this theory, members of the UN Security Council - instead of showing great 
support for the US - they should have expressed balancing tendencies. Not only was the 
US’s right to self-defence recognised but various states also ofered their support and some 
even directly became a part of the coalition and engaged their armed forces in Afghanistan. 
If realist assumption was corect, states, most notably Russia and China, should have 
opposed the US military actions in Afghanistan. Such predicted or expected opposition 
would have been caused by a desire of these states to counterbalance against the US. 
However, as Kane argues, although ‘Russian and Chinese leaders commonly express their 
desire to balance US power (…) they have taken litle overt action to interfere with 
American policies, even diplomaticaly’.16 
 
The lack of balancing against the US has proved to be problematic for Realists 
even earlier, most notably since the end of the Cold War. The demise of the other 
superpower has left the international system with the sole superpower. In the aftermath of 
the end of the Cold War, Realists, mostly those afiliated with its structural strand, 
predicted the revival of other great powers in order to restrain the prominence of the US 
                            
15 Mearsheimer JJ, "Hearts and Minds," National Interest 69 (2002). 
16 Kane TM, "Realism, " in New Directions in US Foreign Policy, ed. Parmar I et al. (Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 10. (emphasis added) 
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within the international system. As states, according to this tradition, usualy are 
suspicious of other states’ policies and intentions, even those which do not signalise a 
tendency for expansion, ultimately would be oriented at the increase of their own power 
and thus balancing the dominant state.17 According to Waltz, ‘[i]n international politics, 
overwhelming power repels and leads others to try balance against it’.18 Such an opinion is 
shared with Layne, who argued that ‘[u]nipolarity is likely to be short-lived because new 
great powers wil emerge as the uneven growth process narrows the gap between the 
hegemon and the eligible states that are positioned to emerge as its competitors’.19 In fact, 
for those authors, the unipolarity is ‘the least stable of al structures’20 as the lack of 
counter-balance is seen as threatening to other states in international system. Consequently, 
an uneven alocation of power is said to be unstable and prone to generate conflict between 
the remaining sole superpower and potential contestants, as the later wil inevitably try to 
repel such dominance. And thus, the unipolarity brought up by the colapse of the Soviet 
Union disrupted the existing status quo and the balance of power, which in turn can bring 
uncertainty and instability. It is widely held that a state in such a dominant position wil 
ultimately use it in order to maximise its power even more as ‘only the most powerful 
states can guarantee their survival’.21 Such a pursuit of a state’s own objectives can lead to 
                            
17 Jervis R argues that ‘a state that is not subject to severe external pressures tends to feel few restraints at al’ 
and thus ‘power is checked most effectively by counterbalancing power’ ("The Compulsive Empire," 
Foreign Policy (2003): 84.) See also, for example: Brooks, Wohlforth (n 3) 509-524. Krasner SD, "Realism, 
Imperialism, and Democracy. A Response to Gilbert," Political Theory 21, no. 1 (1992): 38-52. Waltz (n 2) 
913-917. Wohlforth WC, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994/95): 
91-129. 
18 Waltz KN, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 28. See also 
other works of this author, such as: Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hil, 1979). "Anarchic 
Orders and Balances of Power," in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Keohane RO (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 98-129. 
19 Layne C, "The Unipolar Ilusion: Why New Great Powers Wil Rise," International Security 17, no. 4 
(1993): 11. See also: Cox M, "Is the United States in Decline – Again? An Essay," International Afairs 83, 
no. 4 (2007): 643-653. 
20 Wohlforth WC, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5. See also: 
Mastanduno M, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and Us Grand Strategy after the Cold 
War " International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49-88., Waltz KN, "The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993): 44-79. 
21 Taliaferro (n 4) 128. 
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a conflictual situation and counter-balancing and thus it is advocated that it should pursue 
its interests in a way that ‘communicate[s] restraint’.22 
 
However, the last decade of the twentieth century demonstrated that although there 
are states which can be described as ‘second-rank powers’, the primacy of the US within 
the international arena is unchalenged as ‘it is the only country with the military, 
diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in 
whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself’.23 As expectations and predictions 
of Neo-realists regarding the unavoidability of the revival of great powers and greater 
counter-balancing against the US has been invalidated by during the last decade of the 
twentieth century and most striking in the aftermath of 9/11, it is necessary to turn to the 
writings of Realists, who look at the primacy of the US from yet another angle. For them 
unipolarity is not the least stable but in fact one of the most prone to peaceful international 
structures. 
 
Gilpin, a representative of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, argues that the United 
States position since the end of the World War I enabled the sustainability of ‘an 
international system of relative peace and security’.24 This ability to maintain such order 
together with the preservation of military and economic predominance has inevitably 
ensured American domination within the international sphere. Kennedy’s stark portrayal is 
worth citing at length:  
 
                            
22 ibid 129. 
23 Krauthammer C, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign afairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 24. See also: Wiliams MJ, 
"The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Cox)," International Afairs 83, no. 5 (2007): 945-950. 
24 Gilpin R, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), 145. 
 198 
Because [the  US]  has so  much  power for  good  or evil,  because it is the 
linchpin of the western aliance system and the centre of the existing global 
economy, what it does, or does not do, is so much more important than what 
any of the other powers decides to do.25 
 
The hegemonic position of the US is compared by Gilpin with that of the Great 
Britain’s in the nineteenth century. Both states ‘created and enforced rules of a liberal 
international economic order’.26 They managed to do it through the acquiring 
responsibility of ‘organizing and defending the world market economy’, promotion of free 
trade, provision of investment capital and international curency. 27 Both the Great Britain 
and the US acquired and accepted such a role and responsibility because it was lucrative 
for them.28 What it means is that ‘[t]he benefits to them of a secure status quo, free trade, 
foreign investment, and a wel-functioning international monetary system were greater 
than the associated costs’.29 Their success of sustainability of such order was based firstly 
on the fact that they had compeled ‘their wil on lesser states’ and secondly on the fact that 
other states enjoyed benefits from such situation.30 When the US’s curent preponderant 
position is compared with examples of past empires, the point that comes into mind is that 
these empires eventualy ceased to exist. Kennedy, however, argues that such a ‘reference 
to historical precedents does not imply that the United States is destined to shrink to the 
relative obscurity of former leading powers’.31 
 
                            
25 Kennedy P, The Rise and Fal of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1989), 692. 
26 Gilpin (n 24) 145. 
27 ibid 139. 
28 ibid 139. 
29 ibid 145. 
30 ibid 144. 
31 Kennedy (n 25) 688. 
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Folowing the reasoning of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the expression of the 
supportive stand towards the US in the aftermath of 9/11 was in states’ own interest. 
Russia, for instance, supported the US because Putin’s administration worked towards ‘a 
deal over missile defense’ and acquiring the US support for its own policy towards 
Chechnya.32 Moreover, it is argued that in a situation when the US encompasses such an 
overeaching influence it is more advantageous for states to bandwagon together especialy 
when the administration at the time emphasised that ‘neutrality is not an option’.33 It is, 
thus, more profitable to support the US because at least such states’ interests can be 
protected. 
 
The aforementioned inclination for peace of unipolarity is further advocated by 
Wohlforth, for whom, ‘the curent unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable’.34 For this 
author, the predominance of the US diminishes ‘an important source of conflict’, namely 
the ‘hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system’ common ‘in previous 
systems is absent’.35 Such a situation inclines other states to bandwagoning, rather than 
balancing against the US, at least ‘as long as the expected costs of balancing remain 
prohibitive.36 It is further opined, that the predominant position of the US makes balancing 
pointless and fruitless. As states ‘recognise that balancing against the United States is 
likely to fail’ they tend not to try.37 Others claim that the lack of balancing does derive 
from the fact that the likelihood of a success is very slim. They argue that states do not 
                            
32 Walt SM, "Beyond Bin Laden. Reshaping Us Foreign Policy," International Security 26, no. 3 (2001/02): 
61. Similar argument is presented by Jervis R in "An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has 
Changed and What Has Not?," Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1 (2002): 52. 
33 Walt (n 32) 61. 
34 Wohlforth (n 20) 8. 
35 ibid 7. See also: Wohlforth (n 17) 91-129. 
36 Wohlforth (n 20) 8. 
37 Glaser CL, "Structural Realism in a More Complex World," Review of International Studies 29 (2003): 
405. 
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balance against the US because ‘they believe it is unnecessary’.38 As ‘[t]he major powers 
recognise that the United States is essentialy a benign, security-seeking state’, the current 
hegemon ‘does not pose a threat that warants balancing against’.39 Such an approach is 
linked to the aforementioned claim that it is in states’ own interests to bandwagon with the 
US. As the world hegemon does not constitute a threat to other powerful states in the 
international system these states, in fact, can benefit significantly from such a situation. 
This is noticed by Kugler, who emphasised that even ‘Russia became a closer aly as the 
United States revised its stance on Chechnya by declaring that resistance to be part of the 
war on terror. China, facing its own border chalenges, moved closer to the US position on 
Afghanistan’.40 
 
The preceding paragraphs deliver a plausible explanation surounding the variation 
of international responses towards the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee and the 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom through the lens of the realist theory of International 
Relations. As has been demonstrated the way in which international society responded 
towards the Israeli intervention in Lebanon expressed the international bipolar 
environment of the Cold War in that both superpowers tended to act accordingly to the 
premise of the balance of power theory, not upseting the established status quo. The 
international support for the US in the aftermath of 9/11, on the other hand, delivered 
evidence suggesting the lack of applicability of this theory to the curent international 
seting. Thus, the most reasonable and compeling realist explanation for the variation of 
international responses towards the operations in question can be found through reference 
                            
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 Kugler J et al., "Integrating Theory and Practice: Global Implications of the War in Iraq," International 
Studies Review 6 (2004): 170. 
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to the Hegemonic Stability Theory. As wil be shown in the next section, however, the 
liberal tradition can also deliver a plausible explanation to this variation. 
 
2. Liberal Interpretations 
 
Most authors associated with Liberalism joined various governments in their 
condemnation of the atacks upon the US. Representatives of this theory expressed their 
overwhelming support for ‘the right of Western states to wage war on terorist groups and 
those that alegedly harbour them’ in the aftermath of 9/11.41 They pointed out, that ‘the 
terorist atacks of September 11 were unacceptable and the war against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan is necessary and justified’.42 Indeed, one of the leading Liberals, 
Fukuyama, joined other scholars and expressed his support for the intervention in an 
oficialy writen leter to the President Bush.43 Thus, most liberal scholars joined the wider 
international spectrum and backed the US government. Such overwhelming support raises 
an important question, as to why such support was not expressed in relation to the Israeli 
intervention in Lebanon. Indeed, if Liberals agreed with international society and together 
appraised the war in Afghanistan, the question to be raised is why the Israeli intervention 
                            
41 Dunne T, "Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars," International Relations 23, no. 1 
(2009): 107. See, for example: Slaughter AM Burke-White W, "An International Constitutional Moment," 
Harvard International Law Journal 43, no. 1 (2002): 2. 
42 Ikenberry GJ, “Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 9/11 and American Unipolarity” (2006) in 
htp:/www.scribd.com/doc/7257919/Ikenberry-Liberal-International-Theory-in-the-Wake-of-911-and-
American-Unipoliarity [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
43The leter reads as folow: ‘We write to endorse your admirable commitment to "lead the world to victory" 
in the war against terrorism. We fuly support your cal for "a broad and sustained campaign" against the 
"terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them." We agree with Secretary of State Powel 
that the United States must find and punish the perpetrators of the horrific atack of September 11, and we 
must, as he said, "go after terrorism wherever we find it in the world" and "get it by its branch and root." We 
agree with the Secretary of State that U.S. policy must aim not only at finding the people responsible for this 
incident, but must also target those "other groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted 
atacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests and our alies. "Osama bin Laden We agree that a 
key goal, but by no means the only goal, of the current war on terrorism should be to capture or kil Osama 
bin Laden, and to destroy his network of associates. To this end, we support the necessary military action in 
Afghanistan and the provision of substantial financial and military assistance to the anti-Taliban forces in that 
country’ (Fukuyama F, et al., “Leter to President Bush on the War on Teror” (2001) in 
htp:/www.newamericancentury.org/Bushleter.htm [accessed 1 December 2012].). 
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in Lebanon in 1982 was condemned. As was demonstrated in chapter three, Israel based its 
justification on the same reasoning as the US did in 2001. The response of international 
society was, however, very different. How can this dichotomy be explained through liberal 
lenses? 
 
The aim of this subsection is to test the main arguments of the Liberal Theory of 
International Relations already introduced in chapter two. The application of these 
arguments wil be crucial in determining the extent to which this theoretical perspective 
can explain the diferential response of international society towards the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom. This part thus begins by 
looking at the premise of the Democratic Peace Theory. As wil be demonstrated this 
theory can, to a certain extent, explain why a number of states expressed their support for 
the US in the aftermath of 9/11. However, what needs to be pointed to up front is that such 
support was not limited to democratic states, and thus the DPT does not deliver a 
comprehensive explanation behind the UN Security Council’s recognition of the US right 
to self-defence. As this premise is one of the core liberal pilars, it is, nevertheless, 
important to include it in this analysis. 
 
As outlined in chapter two, one of the crucial liberal arguments is that the 
relationship amongst states with democratic systems of government is one of a cooperative 
and peaceful nature. Ikenbery’s portrayal of an ability of democratic governments to 
cooperate with each other is worth citing at length.  
 
Democracies are unusualy wiling and able to cooperate. Led by the United 
States, these  democracies  built an international  order around 
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multilateralism, aliance  partnership, strategic restraint, cooperative 
security, and institutional and rule-based relationship.44 
 
Thus, the fact that other liberal states recognised the US military response as 
legitimate was based on the fact that an atack occured against a member of the 
established liberal security system and thus, using the wording of the Washington Treaty 
‘an armed atack against one (…) shal be considered an atack against them al’.45 This is 
summarised by Macmilan, according to whom ‘the right of liberal and decent peoples to 
defend their legitimate alies, from which one might infer support for some form of 
colective defence or even colective security’.46 This, however, does not explain why the 
1982 intervention launched by a democratic state was not recognised as lawful use of 
force. Israel with its wel-established and embedded liberal and democratic system of 
government could have been seen as belonging to the aforementioned circle of colective 
defence. It can be argued, however, that the reason behind the criticism in relation to 
Operation Peace for Galilee was that Israel’s intervention was instigated within a teritory 
of another democratic state. Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, on the other hand, was 
regarded as undemocratic and ilegitimate and thus Operation Enduring Freedom was 
deemed to be lawful exercise of the use of force. 
 
Moreover, contrary to Operation Peace for Galilee, which was based solely on the 
right of Israel to defend itself, Operation Enduring Freedom had a broader foundation and 
                            
44 Ikenberry (n 42). Similarly, writing about the merits of liberal order Koivisto and Dunne point out, that 
‘states are taken to be able to overcome constraints of international anarchy and achieve colective ends, 
facilitated by institutions that enhance cooperation’ ("Crisis, What Crisis? Liberal Order Building and World 
Order Conventions," Milennium 38 (2010): 619.) 
45 The North Atlantic Treaty (adopted 4 April 1949, entered into force 24 August 1949) in 
htp:/www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
46 Macmilan J, "Liberalism and the Democratic Peace," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 
186. 
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also included the promotion of democracy. As Liberals, especialy those associated with 
what Sørensen refered to as Liberalism of Imposition,47 advocate a more active approach 
towards the spreading of democracy, including even forceful intervention intended at the 
protection of states’ population and regime change, the removal of the Taliban regime was 
seen as justified and reasonable. Indeed, as mentioned, the support for Operation Enduring 
Freedom was spread across the liberal spectrum. For example, Fukuyama in the already 
mentioned leter to President Bush appraised the aid to anti-Taliban Forces in 
Afghanistan.48 
 
Slaughter, in a more direct form, postulated for the protection of the Afghan 
population. According to this author, ‘the United States, Britain, and other states (…) must 
protect civilian lives in America, Afghanistan and around the globe. Such protection is 
neither obsolete nor impossible. It is necessary and increasingly urgent’.49 Moreover, the 
basis for this support can be found in the fact that the Taliban regime as a non-democratic 
and non-liberal (de facto) government had constituted a significant threat to liberal states 
even prior to 9/11 and in fact since it commenced power during the 1990s.50 Thus, the 
legality of the military intervention should not only be discussed from the angle of 9/11 but 
should also be looked upon through the wider context. In addition, as mentioned in chapter 
four, the UNSC on various occasions stressed the seriousness of the situation in 
Afghanistan under the Taliban rule.  
 
                            
47 Sørensen G, "Liberalism of Restraints and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in 
the New Milennium," International Relations 20, no. 3 (2006). 
48 Fukuyama et al. (n 43). See also: Shani G, "The Liberal Project: Globalisation, Modernity and Identity," 
Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies 14, no. 2 (2003): 48. 
49 Slaughter, Burke-White (n 41) 21. 
50 As shown in chapter four, part two, subsection c, the Taliban - al-Qaeda relationship was very close. As the 
former alowed its territory to be used as operational and training bases, the later was in position to carry out 
its actions against Western states. 
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The problem of the Taliban rule was further associated with the on-going 
suppression of human rights, most profoundly women’s rights as Afghanistan operated 
strictly under Sharia law, emphasising a patriarchal society that limited women’s various 
freedoms. The protection of human rights and individual freedoms constitute fundamental 
pilars of liberal thought and has been widely advocated since the end of the Cold War. 
 
Another issue that Liberals emphasise and which can be viewed as influential in 
explaining the dichotomy between the ways in which international society responded 
towards the two operations in question is a growing interdependence and 
interconnectedness as associated with globalisation, more explicitly evident since the end 
of the Cold War. As Ikenbery points out: 
 
[t]he more economicaly interconnected states become, the more dependent 
they are for the realisation of their objectives on the actions of other states. 
Rising economic interdependence is  one  of the  great  halmarks  of the 
contemporary international system.51 
 
Mansfield, further, claims that economic relations facilitate and intensify contact 
and communication, which ‘in turn, are expected to foster cooperative political relations’.52 
Accordingly, ‘the recognition of mutual benefits through cooperation servers to foster 
peace, as national interests converge’.53 What folows is that, ‘[l]eaders are detered from 
                            
51 Ikenberry GJ, "Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition," International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5 (2005): 148. 
52 Mansfield ED Polins BM, "The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open 
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53 Barbieri K, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?," Journal of 
Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 31. See also: Gartzke E et al., "Investing in the Peace: Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict," International Organisation 55, no. 2 (2001): 391-438. Oneal JR 
Russet B, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trdae Stil Reduces Conflict," 
Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 423-442. 
 206 
initiating conflict against important trading partners for fear of losing welfare gains 
associated with trade’.54 
 
Thus from a liberal perspective as the world of 2001 encompasses a far greater 
interdependence and interconnectedness than the world of 1982 it is understandable that 
states, such as Russia and China, which can be viewed as more liberal in their curent 
outlook as wel and are engaged in a closer economic cooperation with the West, would 
express their solidarity with the US in the aftermath of 9/11 and recognised its right to self-
defence. Indeed, it might be argued from a liberal view that these states would not risk 
their economic relationships with the US and benefits arising from these relationships by 
expressing their criticism. As states have a stake in broader cooperative relationships an 
outright critique could have negative consequences on future relationships. Stil, the 
question should be asked whether a growing economic cooperation solely delivers a 
comprehensive explanation for the change in international approach. That is, would states 
risk the existing order just to sustain the stability of their economic position? As chapter 
six wil demonstrate Israel instigated two other interventions during the 1990s and yet, 
similarly to the 1982 instance, they were not recognised as lawful use of force. 
 
As has been shown the Liberal Theory of International Relations can provide a 
plausible explanation for the variation of international responses towards the operations in 
question. The preceding paragraphs have demonstrated that this shift can be elucidated 
through the premises of the Democratic Peace Theory, a firmer approach towards rogue 
states, a growing economic interdependence and the hegemonic position enjoyed by the 
US. In addition, the DPT can be explanative in relation to overwhelming support for the 
                            
54 ibid. 
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US in the aftermath of 9/11 expressed by Western states as wel as to the on-going 
condemnation of the Taliban regime and its policies. It has been shown that such a firmer 
approach towards non-democratic governments has been more explicit since the end of the 
Cold War. The further liberal argument emphasises a growing economic interdependence 
and interconnectedness. However, despite its insightfulness this point raises a question 
whether states would change their approach towards something so fundamental as an 
embedded order governing the use of force just to secure the closer economic cooperation. 
Thus, as the folowing subsections wil demonstrate for the shift to be explained 
comprehensively, another factor, namely the preponderance of the US needs to be 
evaluated.  
 
3. Neo-liberal Interpretations 
 
Similarly to the aforementioned liberal theorists, the significance of 9/11 and its 
potential consequences have also been emphasised by Neo-liberals. According to one of 
the main representatives of liberal institutionalism, namely Keohane, these atacks ‘have 
incalculable consequences for domestic politics and world afairs’.55 This section wil 
demonstrate that one of these consequences can be seen in a change to the international 
regime governing the use of force in world politics. Such a change can be observed 
through the variation of responses of international society towards the operations in 
question. In addition, while the international reaction towards Operation Peace for Galilee 
resembled the approach towards the use of force envisioned by the international regime 
created in the aftermath of the Second World War, the international response towards 
Operation Enduring Freedom instigated the change in such a regime. Although theorists 
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associated with this strand of Liberalism point to the capacity of the international regime to 
survive even in the event of a shift in the distribution of power in world politics, the 
change ‘of’ or ‘in’ an international regime can occur.  
 
As chapter two of this thesis has demonstrated, when the principles or norms of a 
particular regime change then it is possible to talk about the emergence of a new regime. 
When, however, rules and decision-making procedures change then a change takes place 
within the regime itself.56 Folowing this thought, the next question is whether 9/11 
signaled the change ‘of’ or ‘in’ an international regime. The international regime created 
in the aftermath of the Second World War was based on the principle of non-intervention 
and the general prohibition of the use of force. The exceptions to the later concerned 
instances embodied within Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and refered to the situation 
when a state has to defend itself or when the UN Security Council mandates the use of 
force in the name of the colective security. When we look at the current international 
environment these two limitations are stil upheld. Thus, it cannot be said that the 
international regime itself was changed, as the general prohibition on the use of force stil 
remains the main principle governing this regime. What can be noticed, nevertheless, is a 
change within this regime. The variation of international responses towards the two 
operations in question demonstrates that the changes occurred in regards to the notion of 
self-defence. 
 
In addition, while the response of international society towards the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee can be seen as supporting the narow and restrictive approach to the 
implementation of the right to self-defence, the international approach towards the 2001 
                            
56 Hesenclever A et al., "Interests, Power, Knowledge: The Study of International Regimes," Mershon 
International Studies Review 40 (1996): 180. 
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Operation Enduring Freedom suggests growing acceptance of a wider scope of this right. 
Thus the way in which international society responded towards the 1982 intervention can 
be seen as reflecting a restrictive international regime, accepted by states, and limiting the 
scope of the use of force to the aforementioned instances. As states comply with an 
international regime out of their own interest; such restrictions are regarded as beneficial to 
them to uphold. According to Tarzi: 
 
the more an international regime reflects the preferences of a large number 
of states as self-interested  utility  maximizers, the  more the international 
system tends towards  decentralization,  pluralism, ‘functionalist’ and 
complex interdependence.57 
 
The more, however, ‘the system moves towards hierarchy, the greater the 
centralization of the international system organization and the higher the probability that 
the most powerful state or states impose a high degree of order through international 
regimes as institutions’.58 As wil be demonstrated, such hierarchical characteristics of the 
international system have been observed since the colapse of the Soviet Union and 
particularly in relation to Operation Enduring Freedom. 
 
As was already mentioned, Neo-liberals emphasise states’ tendency to favour the 
sustainability of an existing international regime, especialy if such a regime exists for 
some time and proved to be beneficiary to the maintenance of international order. Thus, 
the question is why would international society accept the change of rules, which proved to 
be workable during the Cold War era? The important point of departure in an atempt to 
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58 ibid 128. 
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provide an answer to this question is the neo-liberal agreement with Neo-realism in terms 
of motives behind states’ actions: states act in their own interest. Thus, the establishment 
or adherence to an international regime should be seen as an embodiment of states’ 
interests. And as such, states create a regime through which they accept certain constraints 
upon their actions because in long term the sustainability of such a regime can be 
beneficial for them.  
 
Therefore, the creation of the international regime and states’ subsequent respect of 
such a regime have its grounds not in the fact that states feel obliged to do so on either 
ethical or moral grounds but because it is in their own self-interest to adhere to the rules of 
the game. Neo-liberals, here, emphasise the importance of the notion of reputation in 
relation to states’ adherence to international regime. Keohane, however, points out that 
there is a certain dificulty regarding the notion of reputation especialy in relation to the 
most powerful state in international system. He notices that:  
 
once the  United  States  became a  great  power, and  particularly after it 
became  hegemonic in the  West,  other countries could  not avoid  dealing 
with it.  The  United  States  was “the  only  game in town”, and even if its 
reputation sufered, other governments had litle choice as to with whom to 
transact.59 
 
Similarly to some Realists, the position of the US is viewed as central and 
dominant. According to Ikenbery, as ‘no geopolitical or ideological contenders are in 
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sight’, the United States ‘dominated the world as no state has’.60 The American ‘global 
military, economic, and cultural power’,61 has led Nye to refer to it as Pax Americana62 
because of the inability of other states to counterbalance it.  
 
This leads to a discussion surounding the notion of hegemony and the relationship 
between the most powerful state and the international regime and the extent to which the 
curent international system can be seen as a hierarchical one. As mentioned in chapter 
two, Neoliberals emphasise the crucial role of the hegemon in both the creation and 
sustainability of an international regime. What Keohane stresses, however, is the 
importance of the international acceptance of American hegemony. In his own words: 
‘American hegemonic leadership in the post-war period presupposed a rough consensus’, 
which ‘can be viewed (…) as the acceptance by its partners of the ideological hegemony of 
the United States’.63 In addition, the US provides ‘public goods, frameworks of 
cooperation, “good ofices”, and an enlightened but US-centered system of rules and 
modes of doing geopolitical business’,64 which makes other states more likely to cooperate 
rather than balance against it. Snyder observes that the US ‘needed to gain the wiling 
cooperation of the vanquished and other weak states by ofering a mutualy atractive 
bargain, codified on an international constitutional order’.65 This in turn has made other 
states less reluctant to the hegemon’s growing power and bandwagons with it rather that 
balances against it.66 
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Moreover, Keohane points out, that ‘hegemonic structures of power, dominated by 
a single country are most conductive to the development of strong international regimes 
whose rules are relatively precise and wel obeyed’.67 The benefits derived from the 
sustainability of the international regime are also acknowledged by dominant states, which 
see ‘an interest in political order, in general and are wiling to pay costs and forego actions 
they might otherwise choose to create and sustain right to rule over others’.68 It is also 
argued that the actions of the US are further restricted by the democratic system of 
conducting foreign policy based on liberal values as wel as international institutions.69 
And therefore, ‘[t]he result has been the most stable and prosperous international system in 
world history’.70 
 
Thus, the way in which international society responded towards 9/11 and the 
subsequent international intervention in Afghanistan were to be expected. In the words of 
Keohane and Katzenstein, [t]here [was] nothing surprising about any of this. German and 
European mass publics and governments [saw] an efective war on terorism and a lasting 
reconstruction of Afghanistan to be very much in their interest.71 
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According to Neo-liberals, the international environment surounding 9/11 points 
to wider reliance on multilateralism. This can be observed in that even the US as the world 
hegemon sought ‘legitimacy for its military actions’.72 In the words of Jentleson: 
 
as the  most  powerful country in the  world the  United  States  has 
responsibilities to support and foster peace as much as possible. Sometimes 
this means acting on its own, unilateraly. At other times it means providing 
the leadership that is critical to forging multilateral eforts.73 
 
Therefore, the fact that Russia and China supported the US in the aftermath of 9/11 
was not something unusual and surprising. Indeed, it confirms the aforementioned 
assumptions that states tend to bandwagon with the hegemon. For Neo-liberals such 
behaviour is to be expected and envisaged, as it is in states’ own interest to do so. States 
recognise the gains of cooperation or folowing the lead of the hegemon is for their own 
benefit. As Owen puts it ‘[a] hegemon is able to maintain its position because its 
subordinate states agree with it on the fundamental ends of society’.74 Such a pivotal role 
fulfiled by the US is compared to that of Bismarck’s Germany, but on global scale. Owen 
states that similar to Bismarck’s Germany, ‘the United States has made itself indispensable 
to order in most regions of the globe; most countries have a strong interest in keeping 
America a global power’.75 
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According to Ikenberry, not only relations between the US and Europe and Japan 
are governed through an established political order based on ‘“liberal hegemonic” 
bargains, difuse reciprocity, public goods provision, and an unprecedented aray of 
intergovernmental institutions and working relationships’.76 The same order governs the 
US relations with other states, most notably with Russia and China. 
 
The variation of international responses towards the 1982 Operation Peace for 
Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom through neo-liberal lenses might be 
explained through the reference to the notion of states’ interest. As has been shown, the 
recognition of the US right to self-defence in relation to 9/11 was conditioned by the fact 
that, firstly it was the hegemon that was atacked and secondly that it was in states own 
interest to express their support for the state in such position. From a neo-liberal 
perspective the fact that the US actions were supported might have an impact on the 
existing regime governing the use of force. Folowing the logic of the regime theory it 
might be argued that although the principle of the general prohibition of the use of force is 
sustained, rules that govern the implementation of the right to self-defence have been 
noticeably modified. 
 
As has been shown, even though Israel in 1982 relied upon similar justifications to 
the one presented by the US in the aftermath of 9/11, international society did not 
recognise its rationale as fulfiling the criteria established by the international regime 
governing the use of force during the Cold War. This change, however, has not occured 
automaticaly or independently from other factors. The growing international acceptance of 
the wider scope of the rights to self-defence has been conditioned by the fact that it was the 
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US and not another state that was atacked. What folows is that Neoliberals, similarly to 
some authors affiliated with Realism discussed earlier, emphasise the importance of the 
hegemonic status of the US. Thus, the analysis of the preponderance of the US is crucial 
and has to be a part of any plausible explanation of the shift in question. The folowing part 
of this chapter wil demonstrate that the notion of hegemony is more complex than the 
utilitarian tradition account for. The more comprehensive understanding of hegemony 
involves looking at notions such as authority, legitimacy and the relationship with other 
states.  
 
What is worth noting and can be viewed as a further support for the folowing 
understanding of hegemony is Ikenbery’s portrait of the US position and role, which in 
turn places this author closer to the approach adopted by the English School of IR. For 
him, the US hegemony is more benevolent than rationalist perspectives account for 
through its ‘unusual capacities to make commitments and restrain power’ and thus in turn 
is regarded by other states as less threatening or intimidating.77 He goes on even further 
and argues that the US should be seen as a world democratic-capitalist empire constructed 
through an inclusive system ‘of order organised around a dominant state – and its laws, 
economy, military, and political institutions’.78 Thus, the US should not be perceived as a 
pursuing only its own interests and objectives but as ‘a producer of world order’.79 
 
As wil be shown, hegemony should be viewed as being more embedded within the 
conception of international society. Being rooted within international society it envisions a 
greater role for other states both in making decisions and in sustainability of the hegemony. 
Thus, the decision of international society to support the US in the aftermath of 9/11 
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should be seen not only through the lens of self-interest but also of righteousness. 
Moreover, it wil be argued that the change of international approach towards the use of 
force in relation to terorism was also conditioned by the developments since the end of the 
Cold War in relation to the use of force in general. These developments signal a 
transformation of the very notion of international society. This change alowed for a 
greater appreciation of cooperation between states based not solely on the notion of self-
interest but also on belonging to and comprising the international society and thus on 
wilingness to act for the wel-being of such society. The subsequent section of this chapter 
as wel as chapter seven wil demonstrate that the ES together with Constructivism can fil 
in the blanks unexplored by scholars associated with IR mainstream theories. 
 
Part Two: Case Studies Through the Lenses of the English School Theory of IR and 
Constructivism 
 
This part of the chapter wil analyse the diferentiated responses of international 
society towards the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom through the lenses of the English School Theory of International Relations and 
Constructivism. It wil be demonstrated that the US was a powerful instigator of change 
which had crucial implications for international order. The two case studies have shown 
that Israel’s right to self-defence, even though it had relied upon the same reasoning as the 
US did in 2001 was not recognised by international society and the later criticised the 
former’s actions. Thus, the linkage between the power relations and hegemony can be 
observed as an underlying factor influencing the change. 
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As has been indicated already this thesis argues that the changed approach of 
international society towards the use of force as exemplified by the 9/11 atacks has been 
conditioned by the fact that it was the US and not another state that was atacked. The 
argument, suggesting 9/11 is a cardinal factor underlying the changed approach towards 
the right of self-defence, can be supported by two operations in question. The fact that 
Israel throughout its conflict in Lebanon could not convince international society of its 
cause, suggests that the shift in international approach towards the use of force in self-
defence was pivotaly influenced by the dominant position of the US within the 
international environment since the end of the Cold War. As demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter, the end of the conflict between the two superpowers created a situation in which 
the US became the sole superpower. 
 
The situation in which the primacy of the US is unquestionable invites a discussion 
on the actual role of the hegemon and other powerful states within the international arena. 
Although previous paragraphs treated these issues through the lenses of the realist and neo-
liberal traditions, the English School of IR can enrich this discussion significantly through 
its conceptualisation of the notion of international society and its relationship with the 
hegemon. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the role of great powers has been seen as 
crucial to the sustainability of international order and international society.80 This 
traditionaly was achieved through the balance of power and constraining of any 
occurence of a single preponderance or dominance within the international system. Thus, 
does it mean that in an international system where the power of a single state cannot be 
counter-balanced the role of other powers and simultaneously the role of international 
society is diminished? This thesis argues that this is not necessarily the case. In order to 
                            
80 See chapter two. 
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understand why, the corelations between the notions of hegemony and legitimacy81 need 
to be addressed. 
 
It is argued that a special position and status enjoyed by great powers within an 
international system is ‘recognized and bestowed by others, not merely a set of atributes 
and capabilities possessed by the claimant’.82 Even though it is asserted that ‘the 
international order sustained by the great powers enjoys a wide measures of support 
throughout international society’83 they are alowed to realise their functions within the 
international arena ‘only if these functions are accepted clearly enough by a large enough 
proportion of the society of states to command legitimacy’.84 Therefore, their rights and 
duties need to be not only accepted but also recognised as legitimate and desired by other 
members of international society. What this means is that they have the right to ‘play a part 
in determining issues that afect the peace and security of the international system as a 
whole’.85 
 
At the same time, however, they have the duty ‘of modifying their policies in the 
light of the managerial responsibilities’.86 What is imperative for the sustainability of 
international order based on the managerial roles of the great powers is that great powers 
need to ‘impose constraints upon their own behaviour’.87 What folows is that in a 
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situation when great powers act against their duty of the sustainability of an international 
order their status may cease to be recognised. Indeed, as has been already argued by Neo-
liberals, the US, in order to pursue its own objectives, needed to acquire international 
support. Although the persistent view is that due to the fact the US is the sole superpower 
it can construct its own policy according to its wishes, as wil be shown this is not an 
entirely accurate observation. In the words of Huntington, a dominant state ‘can only 
exercise authority and influence over other countries if [it] can get them to go along; if 
[these states] need [such dominant state] in one way or another’.88 Thus, the role of other 
powerful states within the international arena cannot be undermined. In fact, he argues 
convincingly that we should not speak of unipolarity or hegemony, but of uni-multi-
polarity. 
 
According to him, the global power should be seen as a four-level structure. The 
first level comprises of the US as the superpower with its overwhelming dominance. At the 
second level, however, are other powerful regional powers, which include but are not 
limited to, states such as those belonging to the EU - with explicit prominence of Germany 
and France, as wel as Russia and China. The third level comprises other regional powers, 
such as the UK in Europe. At the last, fourth level we can find the rest of the world, which 
does not, in comparison with the aforementioned powers, play a significant ‘role in 
shaping global politics’.89 By emphasising the importance of other states within the 
international arena, Huntington argues that ‘[t]he US cannot dictate what goes on al by 
itself. It needs the cooperation of some of these major regional powers to accomplish 
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anything in world afairs’.90 Although Huntington writings at first may not fit easily within 
the paradigm emphasising the role of international society, his understanding of the notion 
of unipolarity is not in contrast to the ES understanding of this notion.    
 
Although Clark advocates the understanding of the curent distribution of power in 
terms of hegemony, his postulations do not contradict Huntington’s arguments and in fact 
can be seen as supportive ones. Similarly to Huntington, Clark emphasises the importance 
of cooperation and good relations between the hegemon and other powerful states. He 
argues that even though at first glance the notion of hegemony may seem to be 
incompatible with the existence of international society as it diminishes its role, in reality it 
should be seen ‘not as the antithesis of international society, but as a possible institution of 
it’.91 
 
For him the situation, which would be incompatible with international society, is 
the situation in which the primacy is unchecked.92 What is important is ‘to ensure that the 
state enjoying primacy behaves in a hegemonic way, in conformity with expectations 
created by the institution of hegemony’.93 He also points to the fact that similarly to the 
position of great powers, the status of the hegemon depends on recognition and its 
sustainability. This is because such a status is not absolute and may cease to exist. In his 
own words, ‘any negotiation of the institution of hegemony wil be permanently 
conditional, and subject to ongoing contestation in terms of legitimacy’.94 Therefore, the 
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power of hegemon is also perceived as ‘the product of legitimacy, of the perception, on the 
part of other social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful’.95 
 
The adequacy of such an understanding of the notion of hegemony can be 
supported when the international environment surrounding 9/11 is scrutinised. As has been 
demonstrated it was the dominant position of the US that influenced the change in states’ 
perception on the use of force in self-defence. However, such a change would not be 
possible if other states did not recognise the compatibility of the US actions in accordance 
with the international legal provision treating the use of force. The legitimacy of the US 
actions can, thus, be observed by looking at the unprecedented degree of support and 
assistance it received in relation to the military intervention in Afghanistan.  
 
The question to be raised is why did international society adopt the restrictive 
approach towards the use of force in the aftermath of the Second World War and continued 
to support such approach during the Cold War? Although the UN Charter includes the 
possibility of the use of international forces when a situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, the provisions embodied within the Articles 39, 41 and 
4296 were rarely executed during the Cold War period. It is plausible to argue that the 
reason for this was not that situations that arose during that time were not in any event 
perceived as threatening international peace and security in the future but because 
international society during that time put an emphasis on the limitation on the use of force 
whenever possible unless it was an absolute necessity. Moreover, taking into consideration 
                            
95 Reus-Smit (2005) cited in Clark (n 82) 204. 
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the condition of bipolarity and existing conflict between the two superpowers the rationale 
behind the limitation of the use of force was more reasonable than an international 
engagement in a situation that may have had serious and unpredictable consequences in the 
future. Such reasoning can be observed in relation to the 1982 Operation Peace for 
Galilee; although the UNFIL forces were established within the teritory of Lebanon in 
March 1978 folowing the Israeli Operation Litani, it was a peacekeeping and not a 
peacebuilding mission. Although the mandate included the restoration of peace and 
security, the UNIFIL’s role, especialy in the aftermath of 1982 Israeli intervention, was 
‘limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the 
extent possible’.97 
 
The fact that there was a limited international engagement in the hostilities between 
Israel and Lebanon on military grounds suggests that either the conflict was not seen as 
constituting a threat to international peace and security or that international society decided 
to emphasize the disapproval of the Israeli policy and treat the intervention as unlawful 
without geting more involved. Taking further into consideration the tensions that arose 
due to continuing Israeli military interventions in Lebanon as wel as the unstable domestic 
situation caused by the on-going civil war and subsequent and continuous discussions on 
the UNSC forum on the mater, it seems plausible to argue that the later explanation is 
more adequate and convincing. 
 
Such a course of events delivers evidence suggesting the adequacy of the 
fulfilment of assumptions afiliated with the pluralist conception of international society, 
where emphases are put on the maintenance of international order and the unity of 
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members of such a society is limited to that of respect of international rules. What needs to 
be noted, however, is that the society as observed during the Cold War was a modified 
example of the pluralist conception of international society. Although, at first glance, 
developments such as the general prohibition of the use of force suggest a dismissal of 
Oppenheim’s postulates, the limitation on the use of force was not necessarily in 
contradiction with the pluralist conception of international society. As was already 
presented Oppenheim emphasized the existence of international legal rules and norms that 
members of international society actualy accepted and recognized as binding upon them.98 
 
Thus, international relations between states were characterized around the notion of 
a minimalist commitment to recognize each others’ right to exist. The notion of justice, so 
pivotal to the solidarist conception of international society, was not emphasised and did 
not constitute a central point of reference within the pluralist international society. In spite 
of, or due to its limitation, this conception of international society was ‘built around the 
goal of coexistence and reflected an ethic of diference’.99 As was elaborated in the 
preceding chapters100 the aim of international society in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, which was articulated and culminated within the framework of the UN Charter was to 
create an international order based on the general prohibition of the use of force. Therefore 
it can be argued that while in the nineteenth century members of the international society 
accepted the use of force as a lawful tactic to achieve their variously defined objectives, 
they adopted an opposite approach in the twentieth century and recognized and appreciated 
the importance of the limitation of the warfare and imposed a general prohibition of the use 
of force.  
                            
98 See chapter one, part one, subsection b. 
99 Alderson K Hurrel A, ed., Hedley Bul on International Society (Basingstoke and London: Macmilan 
Press Ltd, 2000), 7. 
100 See chapter one, part two and chapter two, part four. 
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Here the adaption of the pluralist conception of international society to the changes 
within the international arena that occured in the aftermath of the Second World War is 
visible. The inapplicability of the traditional understanding of the pluralist conception of 
international society, however, was noticed by Bul, when he argued that ‘the normative 
ambitions of international society have expanded dramaticaly so that a limited, pluralist 
conception of international society is no longer adequate, either moraly or 
pragmaticaly’.101 However, the cardinal rules postulated by the pluralist conception, i.e. 
the respect of sovereignty, independence and non-intervention were stil sustained and 
emphasized. The above pluralist assumptions that international society exists because of 
the desire of its members to create a foundation needed for their mutual co-existence can 
be found in the international society of the Cold War period. Although new developments 
such as the aforementioned prohibition of the use of force, the right of self-determination 
and the notion of human rights were embodied within the UN Charter, the maintenance of 
international order rather than the pursuit of justice was stil prioritized. Here the 
minimalist character of the pluralist conception can be observed, in that states could be 
‘united in international society only for certain minimum purposes’.102 
 
This does not necessarily have to be seen as a failure of international society. It 
should, thus, be regarded as a social construction suited for its time. As the notion of 
justice during the Cold War was far from universaly agreed upon in terms of the meaning, 
the pluralist conception of international society was wel suited as it did not seek to 
‘burden international law with a weight it cannot cary’.103 What folows is that it should 
be understood as ‘a conception of international society founded upon the observation of the 
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actual area of agreement between states and informed by a sense of the limitation within 
which in this situation rules may be usefuly made rules of law’.104 Importantly, this 
conception of international society also leaves ‘room for the operation of those political 
forces, beyond the control of law, on which the existence of international society also 
depends’.105 Therefore, international society advocated by this conception has a ‘functional 
character’106 and should not be seen as comprising a high level of unity between its 
members.  
 
However, the fact that these members did express unprecedented support for the 
US in the aftermath of 9/11, which eventualy led to the re-evaluation of international 
provisions on the use of force suggests that the current international society does not easily 
fit the description provided by the pluralist conception. This in turn may suggest that 
society at the beginning of the twenty first century should be seen as resembling a 
solidarist rather than a pluralist conception of international society. For the analysis of the 
nature of international society to be coherent a scrutiny of the third case study, namely the 
2006 Operation Change Direction, needs to be included. 
 
The importance of the above analysis of the notion of international society is 
crucial for the understanding of the role that international law plays in international 
politics. As chapter two pointed out, international law reflects the identity of international 
society. If such an identity changes, a change can also entail an alternation in international 
approach towards international law. In addition, the curent international approach towards 
international law difers from the one observable during the Cold War. Throughout the 
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Cold War the role of international law was limited and might be viewed as resembling to a 
certain extent the neo-liberal characteristics of international regimes. Its function, 
especialy in terms of the use of force, was limited to that of an enforcement of an 
established international rules and reducing the risk of an escalation of a conflict in a 
situation of a bipolar hostility. Nevertheless, even during that time a normative aspect of 
international law could be found. This supports a constructivist view that ‘[r]ationality 
cannot be separated from any political significant episode of normative influence or 
normative change, just as the normative context conditions any episode of rational choice. 
Norms and rationality are thus intimately connected’.107 This can be noticed by refering to 
the first case study. Although a traditional aly of the state of Israel, the US criticised the 
Israeli government and thus risked its close relationship with that state. By doing so the US 
seemed to acknowledge that the actions of its aly were not appropriate ones in a given 
situation. The question of appropriateness brings us to the constructivist understanding of 
international norms. As mentioned in chapter two, Constructivists claim that international 
norms explain an appropriate and an inappropriate behaviour. Nevertheless states’ 
understanding of what action can be viewed as an appropriate one is not straightforward. 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, Constructivists not only claim that international 
norms explain an appropriate and an inappropriate action but they also atach to them a 
virtue of “oughtness”. In addition, ‘norms by definition embody a quality of “oughtness” 
and shared moral assessment’ and because of this ‘norms prompt justifications for action 
and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors’108. Although this “oughtness” 
during the Cold War was overshadowed by the bipolarity and on-going hostility between 
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the West and the East, the fact that for example Israel justified its actions in terms of self-
defence means that it recognised an existence of the principle of the general prohibition of 
the use of force. The end of the Cold War and various developments that occured since 
the 1990s can be viewed as encompassing a rebirth of the virtue of “oughtness”. The 
chapter seven wil demonstrate that a return of natural law thinking, a growing acceptance 
of humanitarian intervention which shakes the notion of sovereignty and a firmer approach 
towards rogue states – al lean towards a more normative aspect of international law. This 
in turn wil support the claim that the curent international society no longer resembles the 
pluralist international society of the Cold War period. 
 
    A further support for the above arguments can be found through the reference to 
the second case study. As demonstrated, the members of international society approached 
9/11 in unprecedented approach. The international solidarity with the US expressed in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 atacks suggests that the actions of the hegemon were seen as 
legitimate and righteous. This can be observed in that even states for whom the recognition 
of the US right to self-defence could not be explained through reference to the theory of 
bandwagoning did express their unity with the US claim and recognised its justification as 
a valid one. The recognition of the US action as appropriate and legitimate has had 
significant implications for the norms governing the use of force. For a comprehensive 
portrait of these implications the third case is nevertheless needed. The 2006 Operation 
Change Direction and an analysis of the current international society are crucial in order to 
present a more in-depth explanation of the status of international law in the wake of 9/11. 
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Conclusion 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that throughout the last decade the 
international arena has witnessed a new development in international law evident through 
the relaxation of legal provisions regarding the use of force. The two case studies presented 
in this thesis aimed to demonstrate that there has been a change in the approach of 
international society towards the instigation of military actions directed against non-state 
actors operating from within the teritory of the hosting state. Such change could be 
observed by comparing two major military operations, namely the 1982 Operation Peace 
for Galilee and the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom. As has been shown, while the 
former was not regarded by international society as a lawful exercise of the right to self-
defence, the later was recognised as being in accordance with international law. 
 
As has been demonstrated various theoretical perspectives can provide a plausible 
explanation for the variation of international responses triggering the changed international 
approach towards the implementation of the right to self-defence. However, for an 
explanation to be comprehensive the analysis of the preponderant position of the US needs 
to be included. This delivers evidence of limitation of the Liberal Theory of IR as it does 
not account for the role of hegemon. 
 
The fact that the US is the most powerful state in the world bears consequences in 
that ‘it creates expectations in the rest of’ international society.109 It is true that such strong 
position of the US within the international society also implies that its actions ‘carry 
greater weight and have deeper efects on the foundations of international law than similar 
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actions by other governments’.110 This is evident in that it was not Israel but the US that 
managed to influence the perception of what is to be meant by “an armed atack” and the 
right to self-defence.111 However, as has been demonstrated, the US dominance within the 
international arena alone did not guarantee international support and the US sought to 
obtain legitimacy for its actions thereby acknowledging the limitation upon the scope of its 
own capabilities. 
Although at first glance the hegemonic position of the US may not seem 
compatible with the postulates of IR theory which emphasise the existence and special role 
of international society, as this chapter tried to argue, this is not a valid observation. In 
addition, the notion of international society and hegemony can co-exist as long as the later 
respects its rights and duties deriving from its special status and does not pursue objectives 
which threaten international order. 
The claim that there has been a change in the approach of international society wil 
subsequently be strengthened by an analysis of the 2006 Operation Change Direction, 
which constitutes the third case study of this thesis. As wil be demonstrated this 
intervention delivers evidence suggesting that the response of international society towards 
the events associated with the 9/11 atacks was not an example of a “double standard” but 
indeed can be associated with the emergence of new principles governing the use of force 
and rules of atribution. This chapter shows that, although as some would argue that 9/11 
should not be perceived as marking a new era in world politics, it should nevertheless be 
seen as an important factor shaping the post-Cold War order. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE 2006 OPERATION CHANGE DIRECTION 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the third case study of this thesis, namely the 2006 Operation 
Change Direction instigated by the Israeli Armed Forces within the teritory of Lebanon 
on August 11, 2006.1 The rationale behind the choice of this operation as a case study is 
that it constituted the first Israeli military intervention in Lebanon since the 9/11 atacks as 
wel as the first instance in which Israeli right to self-defence was internationaly 
recognised. Thus, this operation wil demonstrate that not only has there been a shift in 
international approach towards the use of force, in that the wider scope of the right of self-
defence tends to be more widely accepted, but also that such a shift was caused in a 
significant part by the fact that on September 11, 2001 it was the US, and not another state, 
that was atacked by non-state actors, which in turn has had a crucial impact on the change 
in international approach towards the use of force in relation to terorism. 
This chapter comprises of two parts. The first part is divided into three subsections. 
The first one introduces the reader to the subject through the presentation of background 
information on Hezbolah and Operation Change Direction itself and 
1 See: Appendix 5. For additional information, see, for example: Byman D Simon S, "The No-Win Zone. An 
after-Action Report from Lebanon," National Interest (2006): 55-61. Kreps SE, "The 2006 Lebanon War: 
Lessons Learned," Parameters (2007): 72-84. Levy Y, "The Second Lebanon War: Examining 
"Democratization of War" Theory," Armed Forces & Society 20, no. 10 (2010): 1-18. Mathews MM, "We 
Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbolah-Israeli War," US Army Combined Arms Center (2008): 1-95. 
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also looks briefly at interventions launched by Israeli forces that constituted their response 
to the atacks launched by Hezbolah during the last decade of the twentieth century. The 
reason for the reference to these operations is that they were not recognised as constituting 
lawful exercises of the right to self-defence although, as it wil be shown, they were based 
on the same justification as the 2006 Operation Change Direction. This is folowed by the 
second subsection, which focuses on the Israeli justification delivered at international 
forums. This part is crucial as it demonstrates that the Israeli rationale for launching 
military operations within Lebanese teritory has been constant and has not changed since 
the first intervention in 1968. Such continuous reliance on the same justification wil be 
indispensable for the claim of this thesis that the 9/11 event was a crucial factor in the 
change of international approach towards the use of force in relation to terrorism. The last 
subsection of this part scrutinises the response of international society itself and involves 
looking firstly at the statements delivered by the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council. 
 
In order to emphasise the argument that there has, indeed, been a shift in the 
approach of international society towards the use of force directed against non-state actors, 
the statements delivered also by other international forums wil be provided. The analysis 
presented in this part wil be undertaken from the angle of comparison with the two case 
studies with special emphasis on the change that occured in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
second part of this thesis comprises of an analysis of whether developments that have 
occured in relation to states’ perception of the use of force have been translated into 
similar developments in the framework of international law. Such scrutiny wil involve 
looking at the international case law and opinions expressed by various international legal 
scholars. Similarly to the first part of this chapter, the analysis within this part wil be 
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conducted through a comparison with the two case studies discussed in the preceding 
chapters. 
 
Part One: Operation Change Direction and the Response of International Society 
 
a) Background Information 
 
 Operation Change Direction was instigated in the middle of July 2006 as a 
response to Hezbolah’s Operation True Promise launched on July 12. The name of the 
operation relates to the statement of Hasan Nasralah, the Hezbolah’s Secretary General, 
in which he opted ‘to capture Israeli soldiers in order to exchange them for Lebanese 
prisoners in Israeli jails’.2 The Hezbolah’s atack was aimed at the Israeli patrol along the 
border with Lebanon. As a result eight Israeli soldiers were kiled and two others were 
captured. Israel responded quickly and in his statement, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert 
caled the Hezbolah action ‘an act of war’ and declared it would be met with ‘very painful 
and far-reaching response’.3 In addition, throughout the month of fighting, Israel’s 
intervention into Lebanon comprised of various atacks ‘from land, sea, and air’ against the 
whole of Lebanese teritory. 4 As a result one thousand civilians were kiled. At the same 
time northern Israeli setlements were under constant Hezbolah’s rocket atacks, which led 
to the death of forty three civilians. Moreover, both operations led ‘several hundred 
thousand’ Israeli and around one milion Lebanese civilians to become displaced persons.5 
Taking into consideration the casualties, destruction of housing and infrastructure 
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Operation Change Direction was considered as ‘the most devastating wars in Lebanon’s 
history’.6 
 
The military operation in question was not, however, the first military response 
directed against Hezbolah militia undertaken within the teritory of Lebanon. As wil be 
shown, there had been two other interventions, namely Operations Accountability and 
Grape of Wrath, conducted by Israeli forces in Lebanon during the 1990s, which had been 
based on the same justification and were oriented at the suppression of Hezbolah activity.7 
However, prior to looking at these operations it is useful to highlight some background 
information on Hezbolah itself. Known as the Party of God and comprised of Shia 
Muslims was created in 1982 ‘in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran’ as wel 
as 1982 Israeli intervention in Lebanon.8 Being influenced by the rhetoric of Ayatolah 
Khomeini, one of the main goals of this organisation was to change the political system of 
Lebanon and in its place establish an Islamic republic resembling the one which had been 
created in Iran. An ultimate aim of this organisation was an eventual destruction of the 
state of Israel. According to Hezbolah, the freely elected Islamic government ‘would be 
the most capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty and of halting imperialist aggression’.9 
Another and more achievable aim of Hezbolah, at least in its eyes, was to free the 
Lebanese land from Israeli forces that were situated in the “security zone” established after 
the 1982 invasion.10 Subsequently with its increased power and influence, Hezbolah, like 
the PLO in the past, created their own “Hezbolahland” in the South Lebanon, from which 
the organisation has continued initiating atacks against Israel. Moreover, the South, being 
                            
6 Salem P, "The Future of Lebanon," Foreign afairs 85, no. 6 (2006): 14. 
7 See chapter three, note 1. 
8 ibid 15. 
9 Harik P, "Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s 
Hizbalah " Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996): 45. 
10 Shahin M, "Bombs of Wrath." See also: chapter three. 
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populated by the majority of Shia Muslims, eventualy became its recruitment base11 and 
indeed the main source of its support. In addition, apart from being a quasi-
military/guerila formation, it was a political and social force that was oriented at 
improving the lives of the Southern Lebanese population and was able to create various 
social welfare programs.12 
 
As already mentioned, apart from the 2006 Operation Change Direction, the Israeli 
force instigated two other military campaigns during the 1990s as responses to Hezbolah 
atacks. In addition, the first major operation since the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee 
was code-named Operation Accountability, which began on July 25, 1993. It resulted in a 
destruction of ‘dozens of (…) vilages in a 50-km arc from the Mediterranean coast to the 
slopes of Mount Hermon’.13 The operation was launched using heavy artilery, atack 
helicopters, jet fighters and navy warships. Without doubt it was the biggest and most 
‘devastating atack’ on Lebanese teritory by Israeli forces since the invasion in 1982.14 
The intervention was a response to the increased guerila activities of both Hezbolah and 
Palestinians, which had been undertaken against Israeli forces stationed in the “security 
zone” and had led eventualy to the death of seven Israeli soldiers in July.15 The increase of 
Hezbolah’s atacks since 1990 had been seen as a rationale and reason for launching the 
military action.16 According to the UN observers, during only the first week of the 
operation twenty-two thousands howitzer shels and one thousand rockets were fired by 
Israelis against Hezbolah north of the security zone. In comparison, Hezbolah militia 
                            
11 Zisser E, "The Return of Hizbulah " The Middle East Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2002). 
12 Salem (n 6) 15; Zisser (n 11). 
13 Silver E, "A War of Wils." 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 According to Murden, there were 19 Hezbolah atacks in 1990, 52 in 1991, 63 in 1992, 158 in 1993, a 187 
in 194, and 344 in 1995’ ("Understanding Israel’s Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative 
Approach to Security During the Peace Process," 35.) 
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fired two hundred seventy five Katyushas rockets.17 As a result, more than one hundred 
Lebanese were dead, out of which ten belonged to Hezbolah and another five hundred 
were wounded.18 
 
Within the period of three years Israeli forces launched yet another military 
campaign, namely Operation Grapes of Wrath, whose name refered to ‘a phrase derived 
from biblical references to the vengefulness that can grow from the seeds of a distressing 
situation’.19 This operation was instigated by Israel on April 11, 1996 against the same 
target, namely Hezbolah militia. As some of the previous interventions, Operation Grapes 
of Wrath was launched in response to frequent Hezbolah rocket atacks against setlements 
in northern Israel. Hezbolah actions, in turn, originated as a reaction to the preceding 
‘Israeli episodes involving the death of several Lebanese civilians outside’ the “security 
zone”. 20 The operation lasted seventeen days and resulted in deaths of over one hundred 
people and soon after the initiation of the operation approximately one hundred thousand 
Lebanese became internaly displaced after they sought shelter up north.21 Moreover, 
Israel’s forces targeted a UN compound at Qana on April 18; at the time of the atack at 
least 800,000 Lebanese civilians, for whom the compound constituted a shelter, were 
present within the premises and as a result one hundred and two civilians were kiled and 
many more wounded, including UN personnel.22  
 
As wil be demonstrated, both of the Israeli interventions launched in the 1990s 
were criticised by international society and were not seen as constituting a lawful use of 
                            
17 Steele, Silver (n 13). 
18 Beyer L, "What’s Peace Got to Do with It." 
19 Morris, Shahin (n 10). 
20 Beyer L, "Operation Grapes of Wrath," 67. 
21 ibid. 
22Amnesty International, "Israel/Lebanon. Unlawful Kilings During Operation “Grapes of Wrath”," (Al 
Index: MDE 15/42/96: 1996), 15. 
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force in accordance with the UN Charter and the criteria needed for justification based on 
the right to self-defence. In addition, the UN Security Council in relation to the 1993 
Operation Accountability adopted Resolution 852, in which it reiterated ‘its strong support 
for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its 
internationaly recognised boundaries’.23 Moreover, in his statement, the President of the 
UN Security Council stated that ‘any State shal refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the teritorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’.24 
 
Similarly, the 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath was not recognised as constituting a 
lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. During the meeting of the UN Security Council 
there were few atempts to provide a response in the form of the drafting of a resolution. 
One of these atempts was a draft resolution submited by Arab states that would have 
‘caled on Israel to (..) withdraw its forces from al Lebanese teritory’ and ‘strongly 
condemned the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, which had brought about high tols of 
civilian casualties’ as wel as ‘caled for redress to Lebanon for the destruction sufered 
from the Israeli aggression’.25 The draft resolution sponsored by the nineteen Arab states 
was not, however, adopted. At the voting only four other countries were in favour with 
eleven abstentions.26 Subsequently the UN Security Council adopted unanimously 
Resolution 1052 in which it stated that it was gravely concerned both ‘at the consequences 
which the ongoing fighting could have for the peace and security of the region’ and ‘at al 
atacks on civilian targets, including residential areas, and at the loss of life and sufering 
                            
23 UNSC Res 852 (28 July 1993) UN Doc S/RES/852. 
24 Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 47 (1993), 547. 
25 UN Doc S/1996/292 cited in Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 50 (1996), 429. 
26 States in favour: China, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia.  
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among civilians’. 27 It also stressed ‘the need for al concerned to respect fuly the rules of 
international humanitarian law with regard to the protection of civilians’.28 
 
The representative of China in his statement expressed his concern regarding ‘the 
large-scale military action’ undertaken by Israel and ‘was shocked at the large number of 
casualties’. 29 He also ‘condemned any action that violated international law’ and caled for 
the exercise of ‘restraint and work for a cease-fire’.30 The representative of France refered 
to the situation as ‘the intense drama’ and caled for an immediate cessation of hostilities.31 
In the opinion of the Russian representative, ‘Israel’s actions were undermining the 
integrity of Lebanon, hurting its civilian population, and threatening the peace process’.32 
The representative of the United Kingdom appraised the UNSC for the adoption of ‘a 
clear, strong and balanced resolution that would underpin the efforts being made to resolve 
the crisis’. 33 Moreover, he also ‘condemned the rockets atacks by Hezbolah in northern 
Israel, which had led to civilian casualties and started the present crisis’.34 In a similar 
manner, the representative of the US stated that ‘the process needed restraint from the 
parties, and a wilingness to confront directly the source of violence’. 35 Furthermore, ‘[i]t 
would require from the Council a sense of fairness and balance that was present in the 
resolution that had been adopted, but not in the one that had not been approved’.36 
 
                            
27 UNSC Res 1052 (18 April 1996) UN Doc S/RES/1052. 
28 ibid. 
29 Qin Huasun, Representative of China to the UN, cited in UNSC ‘Security Council cals for Immediate End 
to Hostilities in Lebanon, Expresses Support for Diplomatic Eforts’ (18th April 1996) Press Release 
SC/6208. 
30 ibid. 
31 Alain Dejammet, Representative of France to the UN, cited in UNSC (n 29). 
32 Gennadi M. Gatilov, Representative of Russian Federation to the UN, cited in UNSC (n 29). 
33 Derek Plumbly, Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN, cited in UNSC (n 29). 
34 ibid. 
35 Madeleine Albright, Representative of the United States of America to the UN, cited in UNSC (n 29). 
36 ibid. 
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A stronger response came from the General Assembly, which in a way echoed the 
draft resolution proposed by the Arab states at the meeting of the UNSC. The General 
Assembly in Resolution 50/22c condemned 
 
the Israeli  military atacks against the civilian  population in  Lebanon, 
especialy against the  United  Nations  base at  Qana,  which  violate[d] the 
rules  of international  humanitarian law  pertaining to the  protection  of 
civilians, and expresse[d] its grave concern and sorow over the loss of lives 
and serious injuries to innocent men, women and children.37 
 
However, apart from Israel, the US voted against an adoption of this resolution.  
 
b) Israeli Justification  
 
The justification behind the 2006 Operation Change Direction did not difer from 
the ones delivered by Israel at the UN forum in relation to previous operations launched 
within the teritory of Lebanon since 1968. In a similar manner, Israel claimed it had been 
atacked and thus had the right to exercise its inherent right to self-defence in accordance 
with international law.  
 
In addition, on July 14, 2006, the Israeli representative to the UN stated that the 
actions of the state of Israel ‘were in direct response to an act of war from Lebanon’ and 
that Israel for six years had shown ‘unparaleled restraint (..) while bearing the brunt of 
countless atacks’ and that his government ‘had to respond to this absolutely unprovoked 
                            
37 UNGA Res 50/22 C (25 April 1996) UN Doc A/RES/50/22. 
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assault, whose scale and depth was unprecedented in recent years’. 38 The representative 
also stressed the fact that while Israel held the Lebanese government responsible, it was 
‘concentrating its response carefuly, mainly on Hizbolah strongholds, positions and 
infrastructure’.39 
 
The Lebanese representative, in contrast, in a leter to the President of the UNSC, 
accused Israel of commiting ‘acts of aggression’,40 which destroyed ‘Lebanon’s 
infrastructure’ and caused ‘the deaths of innocent civilians in ful view of the international 
community’. 41 Moreover, despite the fact that Lebanese government immediately 
‘declared that it was not aware of the incident that occured on the Blue Line’ and that ‘it 
did not take responsibility for it’ and ‘it did not endorse that act’, Israel held the Lebanese 
government responsible for these actions.42 He continued saying that Israeli aggression 
targeted innocent civilians ‘thereby violating al human rights’ and was ‘a flagrant 
violation of al international resolutions, laws, norms and conventions’.43 
 
c) The Response of International Society Towards Operation Change Direction 
 
The folowing paragraphs presents statements delivered by various states 
surounding the instigation of Operation Change Direction by Israeli armed forces. It is 
noteworthy that there has been a shift in the language of many of the most powerful states. 
As wil be demonstrated the way in which international society responded towards this 
intervention difers substantialy from its reaction towards the 1982 Operation Peace for 
                            
38 Gilerman (Israeli representative to the UN) UNSC 5489th meeting (14th July 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5489, 6. 
39 ibid. 
40 C Ziade (Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN) Leter (13 July 2006) 
UNSC Doc S/2006/517. 
41 Mahmoud (Lebanese representative to the UN) UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 4. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid 5. 
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Galilee or in fact al other Israeli interventions in Lebanon throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century. Indeed the folowing statements demonstrate international support 
for Israel’s claim, which in turn delivers further evidence of a changed approach towards 
the use of force in relation to terorist atacks observable since 9/11. In fact, this operation 
constitutes the first intervention instigated by Israeli forces within the teritory of Lebanon, 
that was recognised as a lawful exercise of the right of self-defence.  
 
The recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence was delivered during the summit in 
St Petersburg, when states participating in the event declared that  
 
it is (..) critical that Israel,  while exercising the right to  defend itself be 
mindful of the strategic and humanitarian consequences of its actions. We 
cal  upon Israel to exercise  utmost restraint, seeking to avoid casualties 
among innocent civilians and  damage to civilian infrastructure and to 
refrain from acts that would destabilize the Lebanese government.44 
 
The Permanent Members of the UNSC responded in a similar manner in that the 
actions of Hezbolah were condemned and the Israeli right to defend itself was recognised. 
Although Israel was criticised for noncompliance with the principle of proportionality,45 its 
right to self-defence was not questioned: for the whole operation to be seen as in 
accordance with international law, the use of force should have been proportional to the 
threat by Hezbolah. What is significant for this thesis is the fact that the initial rationale 
for the use of force, i.e. the right to self-defence, was recognised as a justification within 
                            
44 G7/G8 Summit ‘St Petersburg Summit Documents: Middle East’ (16 July 2006). (emphasis added) 
45 For a discussion, see, for example: Botoms JB, "When Close Doesn't Count: An Analysis of Israel's Jus 
Ad Belum and Jus in Belo in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War," Army Lawyer (2009): 23-54. Gross ML, "The 
Second Lebanon War: The Question of Proportionality and the Prospect of Non-Lethal Warfare," Journal of 
Military Ethics 7, no. 1 (2008): 1-22. 
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the scope of international law. In addition, the representative of Russian Federation stated 
that ‘Russia strongly condemn[ed] the kidnapping of the soldiers and the firing on Israeli 
teritory’. 46 However the scale of Israeli response was viewed as ‘disproportionate and 
inappropriate’.47 
 
The representative of the US refered to the Hezbolah actions as ‘deliberate and 
premeditated’, which were ‘intended to undermine regional stability and [were] contrary to 
the interests of both the Lebanese and Israeli peoples’.48 He also brought atention to the 
concern caused by ‘the presence of terorist groups on’ the Lebanese soil and ‘the periodic 
atacks against Israel from groups and individuals in southern Lebanon’. 49 He further 
caled for an immediate disarmament and disbandment of al militia operating in 
Lebanon.50 
 
The representative of China condemned the atacks undertaken by Hezbolah by 
saying that his government was ‘against the practice of Hizbolah militias who cross the 
borders to atack Israel and launch rockets on Israeli cities’.51 At the same time, however, 
he declared that the Israeli military actions were regarded as disproportionate and had 
‘caused massive destruction of infrastructure in Lebanon’.52 In the view of the United 
Kingdom: ‘Israel has every right to act in self-defence. But it must exercise restraint and 
ensure that its actions are proportionate and measured, conform to international law and 
avoid civilian death and sufering’. 53 The representative also stated that ‘[d]isproportionate 
                            
46 Dolgov, UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 7. 
47 ibid. 
48 Bolton, UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 10. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 Zhengmin, UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 11. 
52 ibid 11. 
53 Sir E Jones Parry, UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 12.  
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action wil only escalate an already dangerous situation’.54 The representative of France 
pointed out that Hezbolah ‘bears responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities’ and that 
‘Israel has the right to defend its teritory and its citizens when they are atacked – and they 
[had] been atacked’.55 Nevertheless France condemned ‘the disproportionate nature of the 
response, which has already claimed many civilian victims and [had] caused significant 
material damage’. 56 Additionaly, ‘[t]he Lebanese people must not be taken hostage’.57 
 
What needs to be further pointed and what might be important for the unbiased 
claim suggesting a changed approach towards Israel’s justification is the fact that even the 
Arab League openly criticised Hezbolah’s actions. 58 In addition, during the summit in 
Cairo states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt together with other Gulf States, and the 
Palestinian Authority condemned Hezbolah for ‘unexpected, inappropriate and 
iresponsible acts’.59 
 
In summary, this part of the chapter has demonstrated that although Israel was 
criticised for non-compliance with the principle of proportionality,60 its right to self-
defence was internationaly recognised. This, in itself, delivers evidence suggesting that 
the international approach towards the use of force in relation to terorism has changed 
significantly since 9/11. As has been and wil be further argued, this change was not only 
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55 De La Sablière, UNSC 5489th meeting (n 38) 17. 
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58 See for example: Fatah HM, "Arab League Criticizes Hezbolah for Atacks," International Herald 
Tribune 17th July 2006. 
59 Cited in Fatah (n 58). 
60 For example, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs speaking on the behalf of the Secretary-
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visible in relation to 9/11, which, as it has been argued by some, might have been regarded 
as constituting an armed atack but actualy in relation to acts of terorism in general.  
 
As has been demonstrated, the 2006 Operation Change Direction was instigated as 
a response to the Hezbolah atack that would not have amounted to an armed atack 
traditionaly understood. Yet, international society recognised Israel’s right to self-defence. 
This thesis thus, argues that what has been witnessed since 9/11 is the growing acceptance 
of a new customary principle relating to the implementation of the right to self-defence 
made explicit in the relaxation of international rules governing the use of force in relation 
to terorism. The analysis of this shift would not be complete, however, without 
investigating whether such a changed approach is also visible within international case law 
and international legal scholarship. In addition, for a particular policy to become a part of 
international customary law it needs to be consolidated within state practice. Such 
consolidation inevitably requires evidentiary repetition and thus can take a substantial 
amount of time. Thus the confirmation shown by these other sources of international law 
would unquestionably speed-up the process of consolidation. This scrutiny is also 
important when taking into consideration the limits and scope of this thesis, in that it 
focuses only on two cases when the right of self-defence in relation to terorism was 
recognised.  
 
Part Two: The 2006 Operation Change Direction Under the Scope of International 
Law 
 
This part of the chapter treats Israel’s justification from the angle of international 
law. It analyses, in particular, whether the rationale delivered by Israel’s government 
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fulfiled international legal requirements necessary for a state to act lawfuly in self-
defence. Thus, it is firstly oriented at answering the question of if the Operation Change 
Direction had been launched prior to 9/11 would it have been regarded as lawful? 
Secondly, it looks at changes that occurred since 9/11 and whether they have been 
acknowledged by international case law and international legal scholarship. 
 
As has been demonstrated, Israel’s right to self-defence was, for the first time, 
internationaly recognised. There are a few possible reasons for the change in this 
approach. First, it might be argued that Israel acted in accordance with the international 
legal order governing the use of force as known even prior to 9/11. In addition, it might be 
implied that Hezbolah actions met the “gravity” requirement and the relationship between 
the government of Lebanon and Hezbolah was established, which subsequently meant that 
Lebanon was held responsible for Hezbolah actions. The second scenario may imply that 
the Israel actions were lawful because they were directed against the bases of Hezbolah 
militia and not the property of Lebanon. Thirdly, it might be suggested that Israel had the 
right to use force in accordance with Nadelstichtaktik theory. As wil be argued, however, 
the shift in the response of international society towards Israel’s actions can also be 
explained, most convincingly, by a change in the general international treatment of cases 
involving atacks by non-state actors. Indeed, as wil be shown, the international 
recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence has been caused by a change in the 
international approach towards the use of force in relation to terorism, which has been 
observed since 9/11. Thus, suggesting an emergence of a new trend towards the broader 
right to self-defence evident through recent state practice. 
 
 245 
However, before delivering evidence supporting the aforementioned argument, it is 
necessary to evaluate other possible explanations mentioned above. In relation to the first 
scenario it is dificult to understand why the deaths of eight soldiers and the abduction of 
two would amount to an armed atack. Considering the fact that some of previous 
interventions were responses to atacks of non-state actors, which resulted in far greater 
deaths of civilians than in comparison with the casualties in 2006, this assumption sounds 
unreasonable.61 As demonstrated, neither the assassination atempt nor atacks upon the 
civilian population of Northern Israel had been recognised as constituting atacks 
amounting to an armed atack traditionaly understood. Thus, looking at Operation Change 
Direction from the angle of previous military operations instigated by Israel within the 
teritory of Lebanon, it can be argued that the terorist atack launched by Hezbolah in 
2006 did not meet the “gravity requirement” necessary for an implementation of the right 
to self-defence. 
 
In relation to the possible responsibility of the government of Lebanon, it was 
argued that ‘[t]he efective behaviour of Hezbolah in South Lebanon suggests an infered 
link between the Government of Lebanon and Hezbolah’.62 Moreover, ‘Hezbolah is a 
legaly recognised political party, whose members are both nationals and a constituent part 
of its population’.63 This in turn, could mean that Hezbolah whose party is in the 
parliament was acting on behalf of Lebanon when launching atacks against Israelis. This 
argument is further based on the fact that the Lebanese government, in its statement 
                            
61 For a diferent view see, Schmit MN, "”Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the 
International Law of Self-Defence," Michigan Journal of International Law 29 (2008): 150. 
62 UNHRC, "Human Rights Council: Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution S-2/1," (UN Doc A/HRC/3/2 23 November 2006), 22. 
63 ibid. 
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regarding the continuing occupation of Shab’s farms,64 expressed support for the fight 
against Israel.65 Although Israel withdrew its armed forces from most of the Lebanese 
teritory, including the “security zone”,66 in 2000 folowing the voting in the cabinet on 
March 5 Israelis remained present in the aforementioned smal strip of Lebanese 
teritory.67 
 
In addition, the Lebanese government claimed that ‘the Lebanese resistance [is] as 
a true and natural expression of the right of the Lebanese people in defending its teritory 
and dignity by confronting the Israeli threat and aggression’.68 Considering the fact that 
this area of Lebanon was unlawfuly occupied by Israelis and the resistance of such 
occupation can be understandable, it is therefore reasonable that the government provided 
such an approach. 
 
However, such solidarity with the population opposing Israel’s occupation cannot 
in itself be seen as enough evidence necessary for triggering the right to self-defence. As 
has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the international legal order governing the 
use of force throughout the second half of the twentieth century necessitated a delivery of 
                            
64 The Shab’s farms are a smal part of the territory in the Southern Lebanon amounting to approximately 
22 km², which has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. For more information see, for 
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indisputably have a technological and logistic superiority over the Hezbolah, for their failure ‘to supply a 
decisive answer to the Katyusha threat’ (ibid.). See also: Zisser (n 11). 
68 UNHRC (n 62) 23. 
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evidence pointing to a close relationship between a state and a non-state actor. The 
international case law explored the requirements further and claimed that it must be proved 
that a state either has had the “effective” or “overal” control over the non-state actors in 
order for a victim state to act lawfuly in self-defence.69 The evidence colected suggests 
that the “effective control” requirement explicit in the Nicaragua case was not satisfied 
and overal the proof that Hezbolah was acting on behalf of the Lebanese government was 
not delivered. In addition ‘there [was] no evidence that Hezbolah parliamentarians or 
cabinet members directed or were otherwise involved in the atacks, or that the Lebanese 
government controled the organisation’.70 What folows is that the criteria established by 
international treaty law and judgments delivered by international courts, particularly the 
ICJ judgement in Nicaragua case and the ICTY judgement in Tadić case were not met and 
therefore Lebanon could not be held responsible for Hezbolah actions. 
 
Moreover, a lack of credibility in the evidence suggesing the responsibility of 
Lebanon can be further observed by looking at the ILC Articles on Responsibility, which 
according to the Genocide case obtained the status of customary law.71 In addition, it was 
argued that Hezbolah ‘did not qualify as an “organ” in the meaning of the [art 6-
responsibility]’72 i.e. it did not possess authority granted by the state of Lebanon, ‘nor was 
that situation in southern Lebanon of the nature envisioned by [art. 9 ]’, which refers to de 
facto governmental authority.73 However, it was also pointed that ‘[e]ven when actions 
                            
69 See chapter three, part one and chapter four, part one, subsection c and part two, subsection c. 
70 Schmit (n 61) 142. 
71 Further explained in the subsequent paragraphs.  
72 This article reads: ‘The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shal be 
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qualify as acts of State for responsibility purposes, Article 50 bars the use of forceful 
countermeasures in response to a breach short of an “armed atack” under Article 51’.74 
What folows is that even when such responsibility is established an occurence of an 
armed atack is pivotal in order for the use of force to be lawful. 
 
What is also crucial in relation to this scenario is the fact that soon after the atacks 
on July 12, Israelis retracted their statement regarding the responsibility of the Lebanese 
government; on July 16, the Israeli Cabinet in its communiqué stated that ‘Israel is not 
fighting Lebanon but the terorist element there, led by Nasralah and his cohorts, who 
have made Lebanon a hostage and created (..) terorists enclaves of murder’.75 As a 
support for this statement the Ministry of Foreign Afairs noted that ‘Israel did not atack 
the government of Lebanon but rather Hizbulah military assets within Lebanon. Israel 
avoided striking at Lebanese military instalations, unless these were used to assist the 
Hizbulah’.76 This is undoubtedly in contradiction to the previous statement when the 
Israeli government ‘authorised “severe and harsh” retaliation on Lebanon’.77 Moreover, 
the lack of responsibility of the Lebanese government was also recognised by the UN 
Secretary-General who said that ‘Hizbolah’s provocative atack on 12 July was the trigger 
for this crisis. It is clear that the Lebanese Government had no advance knowledge of the 
atack’.78 And in fact, he pointed out that ‘whatever Israel’s operations may be doing to 
Hizbolah’s military capabilities, they are doing litle or nothing to decrease popular 
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75 Israeli Cabinet Communiqué (16th July 2006) in 
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support for Hizbolah in Lebanon or the region but are doing a great deal to weaken the 
Government of Lebanon’.79 
 
The argument suggesting that Israel’s actions were lawful because they were 
directed against the bases of the Hezbolah militia and not the property of Lebanon can 
also be discredited. Although Israel’s oficials and some authors claimed that the IDF 
aimed at Hezbolah bases, it was soon proven that the consequences for the whole country 
would be far reaching.80 The Israeli military response resulted in an obliteration of a 
military airport, radar instalations and the army baracks.81 The destruction of the property 
of the Lebanese Armed Forces and engagement in fights with Lebanese soldiers further 
discredited the Israeli argument that the IDF military actions were not undertaken against 
the Lebanese state. Moreover, as highlighted earlier, the Israeli army did not even 
distinguish between the militia and the UN. Accordingly, the atack launched by the IDF 
upon the United Nations Observer post in southern Lebanon on 25 July ‘caused the death 
of four United Nations military observers’.82 The continuing presence of Israelis and far 
reaching destruction caused by the war made it very dificult for the UNIFIL to conduct 
their work especialy in relation ‘to provide humanitarian escorts for displaced persons’.83 
Further, the excessive use of force was condemned by the UN Secretary-General who 
                            
79 ibid 3. 
80 According to Remba, ‘Hezbolah is legaly (and moraly) responsible for any Lebanese civilian casualties 
which result from Israeli bombardment of vilages, homes or urban areas containing missiles, rockets or 
armed Hezbolah guerrila forces – so long as Israeli is aiming at these military targets, as it has’ ("Are 
Israel’s Military Operations in Lebanon Proportional? Is Israel Guilty of War Crimes? What International 
Law Realy Says?, " (2006) in htp:/www.zionism-israel.com/log/archives/00000170.html [accessed 1 
December 2010]). 
81 UNHRC (n 62) 22. 
82 UNSC Presidential Statement 34 (27 July 2006) UNSC Doc S/PRST/2006/34. 
83 UNSG (n 78) 2. 
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argued that ‘[w]hile Hizbolah’s actions are deplorable and, as I have said, Israel has a 
right to defend itself, the excessive use of force is to be condemned’.84 
 
In relation to the possible explanation using the Nadelstichtaktik theory, it may be 
argued that Israel had a right to use force as a response to the continuing atacks 
undertaken by Hezbolah against Northern Israel. As has been shown, Israel has been 
relying on this rationale since the beginning of the conflict with Lebanon and as the second 
case study demonstrated there has been a growing acceptance of the merits of this theory 
during the first decade of twentieth first century.85 Indeed, this scenario ofers the most 
plausible reasoning. In a support of this, it can be reminded that the Hezbolah’s tactic of 
kidnapping and launching rocket atacks is not novel. In addition, both Operations 
Accountability and Grapes of Wrath were undertaken as a response to Hezbolah’s rockets 
atacks. Moreover between 1996 and 2006 there were also several atacks that did not 
result in major Israeli military operations. Finaly, in October 2000 Hezbolah kidnapped 
three Israeli soldieries and exchanged their bodies for Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. 
The bodies of the captured soldiers were returned in 2003.86 As Schmit observes, 
‘[h]istory seemed to be repeating itself’.87 Accordingly, ‘the Hezbolah actions of July 12 
must be assessed contextualy. The organisation had been atacking Israel for a period 
measured in decades; no indication existed that it would desist from doing so in the 
future’.88 In a similar light, Reinold states that: 
                            
84 ibid 3. For a discussion, see, for example: Makdisi K, "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for 
Lebanon in the Shadow of the “War on Terror”," International Peacekeeping 18, no. 1 (2011): 4-20. 
85 Indeed, the ICJ judgement in Congo Case suggests the acceptance of the accumulation of events theory 
(Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep. section 146, 53). See also: Reinold T, "State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the 
Right to Self-Defence Post-9/11," American Journal of International Law 105, no. 2 (2011): 259. 
86 UNSG ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East’ UNSC Doc S/2006/956, 8. 
87 Schmit (n 61) 152. 
88 ibid 156. For a diferent view see, for example: Heinze EA, "Nonstate Actors in the International Legal 
Order: The Israeli-Hezbolah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defence," Global Governance 15 (2009): 87-105. 
According to Katan, ‘[i]f Israel is permited to invoke the Nadelstichtaktik theory, it could just as easily be 
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the international community seems to  viewed [Hezbolah’s actions] in the 
context  of [its]  broader campaign against Israel,  which cumulatively 
qualified as an armed atack.  While states  did  not explicitly embrace the 
accumulation doctrine their acquiescence in Israel’s invocation of the right 
to self-defence could be read as tacit acceptance of the doctrine.89 
 
The recognition of the accumulation of events theory can reasonably be seen as a 
part of the bigger picture, namely the shift in general international approach towards the 
use of force in relation to terorism, delivering evidence suggesting an acceptance of the 
broader notion of the right to self-defence. What needs to be emphasised is that such 
recognition was conditioned by the US reliance upon it in delivering its justification behind 
the intervention in Afghanistan. 
 
In addition, this thesis argues that there has been a change in procedures or in the 
evolution of principles of international law regarding the treatment of cases involving 
atacks by non-state actors. For the first time in the history of conflict between Israel and 
the militia operating from Lebanon, the right to self-defence of the former was 
internationaly recognised. As was mentioned earlier various states expressed their support 
for Israel and ‘gingerly accepted Israel’s need to defend itself against the increasing 
frequent Hezbolah atacks’90 as wel as condemned Hezbolah actions. The UN Secretary-
General also recognised Israel’s right to self-defence.91 Thus, the folowing paragraphs 
investigate why international society’s response towards the Operation Change Direction 
should be seen as delivering evidence suggesting the relaxation of the legal provisions 
                                                                                    
used by Lebanon, for Israel frequently enters Lebanon’s territorial waters without its consent’ ("The Use and 
Abuse of Self-Defence in International Law: The Israel-Hezbolah Conflict as a Case Study," 44.) 
89 Reinold (n 85) 266. 
90 ibid 139. 
91 UNSG (n 78) 3. 
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established in the aftermath of the WWI and governing the use of force throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. 
 
As has been demonstrated, neither the “efective control” requirement of the 
Nicaragua case nor the “overal control” requirement of the Tadić case was met. The 
majority of states and scholars refered to throughout this chapter agreed that the 
government of Lebanon could not have been accountable for the action of Hezbolah as 
their relationship was not on a scale that triggered the responsibility of the former.92 What 
folows is that the criteria established by international customary law as wel as by the 
international court judgments were not met and therefore had the Operation Change 
Direction been launched before 2001 it would have very likely been regarded as unlawful. 
What needs to be mentioned is that some commentators argue that if the provisions of 
international law have been relaxed and the right of self-defence has become wider in 
scope then Lebanon could have been held responsible for Hezbolah actions as the Taliban 
regime had been held responsible for the actions of al-Qaeda. According to Schmit: 
 
 [l]ike the Taliban, the Lebanese  government alowed Hezbolah sanctuary 
when it failed to  move south (…) [w]ith  organised armed forces  under its 
control,  Lebanon  presumably  had  more capacity to  deny sanctuary to 
Hezbolah that did the Taliban vis-à-vis al Qaeda.93 
 
This, however, would be in contradiction with the UN Secretary-General who 
argued that ‘any analogy with Afghanistan under the Taliban is wholy misleading. Mr 
                            
92 See, for example: Schmit (n 61). Katan (n 88). For a diferent view see, for example: Ducheine P Pouw E, 
"Operation Change Direction: A Short Survey of the Legal Basis and the Applicable Legal Regimes," NL-
ARMS (2009): 51-96. 
93 Schmit (n 61) 144. 
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Siniora’s Government clearly espouses democratic value. It deserves, and must receive, al 
possible support from the international community’.94 He supported this claim by saying 
that ‘Hizbolah’s provocative atack on 12 July was the trigger for this crisis. It is clear that 
the Lebanese Government had no advance knowledge of the atack’.95 
 
Although from the case studies presented throughout this thesis it may be assumed 
that there has been a relaxation of provisions treating the use of force, international case 
law provides a different though ambiguous view. The International Court of Justice in the 
Genocide case delivered an important judgment in 2007, crucial for the claim that suggests 
a relaxation in the international principle governing the use of force. The Court deliberated 
on the question of Srebrenica massacres commited by the Bosnian Serbs military groups 
that occured in 1995 on the teritory of Former Yugoslavia. Once it was established that 
the massacres were in fact acts of genocide the ICJ contended whether these acts were 
atributable to the state of Serbia and Montenegro. The Court decided that although the 
state in question was responsible for not preventing the occurrence of genocide, it was 
neither directly responsible for the Srebrenica massacres nor it was complicit in its 
commission.96 From its judgment it can be observed that the ICJ continues to uphold the 
rules governing states’ responsibility for actions of non-state actors, which were 
recognised and applicable throughout the second half of the twentieth century.97 And, as 
                            
94 UNSG (n 78) 3. 
95 ibid. 
96 For a commentary and a discussion about the case, see, for example: Gil TD, "The Genocide case: 
Reflections on the ICJ’s Decision in Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia, " The Hague Justice Portal (2007) in 
htp:/www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=7266 [accessed on 1 December 2012]. Shany Y, "Bosnia, 
Serbia and the Politics of International Adjudication," Justice 45 (2008): 21-26. Talmon S, "The 
Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acs of Secessionist Entities," International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 58 (2009): 493-517. 
97 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep. (Merits) section 406, 144-
145. See also: Plücken M, "New Developments Regarding the Rules of Atribution? The International Court 
of Justice’s Decision in Bosnia V. Serbia," 320. See, however: Milanović M, "State Responsibility for Acts 
of Non-State Actors: A Comment on Griebel and Plücken," 307-324. 
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such, the Court brought atention to the importance of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility as reflecting international customary law: 98 of special importance for this 
chapter is Article 8, which treats conduct directed or controled by a state.99 Accordingly, a 
state may be held responsible for an action of non-state actors if it instructed, directed or 
controled such actors. Moreover, the Court also emphasised the authority of the 
Nicaragua case and the on-going relevance of the “efective control” test, at the same time 
that it negated the applicability of the “overal control” test adopted by the ICTY in the 
Tadić case.100 The judgment in the Genocide case has been met with some criticism,101 of 
which the most sound is the one delivered by Cassese.102 According to him, the Court in 
the Nicaragua case when seting the “efective control” test did not analyse it in reference 
to either ‘state practice or (..) other authorities’ and therefore ‘the grounds on which it was 
based’ are not known.103 In his view, the overal control test adopted by the ICTY is ‘a 
valid standard for making those states accountable’.104 What should be mentioned, 
nevertheless, is that these tests (i.e. “effective” and “overal” control) might be viewed as 
applicable to two diferent actors, i.e. state and individuals. Moreover, taking into 
consideration the development of international criminal law since 1990s and the creation 
                            
98 Genocide case (n 97) section 406, 145.  
99 The Article reads: ‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shal be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct’ (ILC Articles (n 72)). 
100 Genocide case (n 97) section 404, 144. 
101 See, for example: Schmit MN, "21st Century Conflict: Can the Law Survive?," Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 8 (2007): 443-476. 
102
 Cassese’s opinion might be seen as controversial as he participated in Tadić Appeal. Nevertheless, his 
analysis was sound and coherent as wel as explanatory. Thus an inclusion of his critique is reasonable.  
103 Cassese A, "The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgement in Bosnia, " 
European Journal of International Law 18, no. 4 (2007): 653. See also: Cassese A, "A Judicial Massacre," 
The Guardian (27 February 2007) in 
htp:/www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/27/thejudicialmassacreofsrebr [accessed 1 December 
2012]. 
104 Cassese (n 103) 665. Cassese criticised the “efective control” test on the grounds that it applies state’s 
control of each action undertaken by non-state actors. In his opinion, the very nature of non-state actors 
makes it ‘virtualy impossible to prove the issuance of instructions or directions relating to each terrorist 
operation’. In comparison, the “overal control” test implies more reasonably the need to ‘demonstrate that 
certain terrorist units or groups are not only armed or financed (..) by a specific state or benefit from its 
strong support, but also that such state generaly speaking organizes or coordinates or at any rate takes a hand 
in coordinating or planning its terrorist actions (not necessarily each individual terrorist operation)’ (ibid 
666). 
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of various international courts and tribunals treating the cases of individual responsibility, 
it might be argued that individuals themselves might be held accountable for actions that 
traditionaly had to be atributed to a state. Thus, the argument that non-state actors 
responsible for acts of terrorism should be dealt with under international criminal law 
sounds more reasonable than in the past.105 
 
 The judgment in the Genocide case was also under the scrutiny of Griebel and 
Plücken, who criticised the Court for its lack of regard for the recent development in state 
practice and that ‘it is regretable that the Court did not see the international community’s 
need for less restrictive atribution rules as wel as the need to address this problem’.106 
What the authors had in mind is the changing international approach towards the use of 
force as observed since 9/11. The fact that the Court ruled that the failure to prevent the 
commission of genocide was not enough to trigger the responsibility of Serbia and 
Montenegro suggests that in the Court’s view the “efective control” test remains the 
fundamental factor in determining whether a state might be held accountable for the 
actions of non-state actors. The continuity in the ICJ’s reliance upon the judgement in the 
Nicaragua case might be viewed as surprising especialy taking into consideration the 
overwhelming support for the US intervention in Afghanistan evident both in the 
statements delivered by various states and in the legal scholarship. As this case study has 
demonstrated the recognition of Israeli right to self-defence in 2006 can be seen as an 
example of the consolidation of this shifted approach. The controversy surounding the 
judgement in the Genocide case was enhanced by the fact that the decision was not reached 
unanimously.107 
                            
105 See chapter four, part one, subsection c. 
106 Griebel, Plücken (n 97) 620. See, however: Milanović (n 97) 307-324. 
107 By thirteen votes to two, the Court decided that ‘Serbia has not commited genocide, through its organs or 
persons whose acts engage its responsibility under customary international law, in violation of its obligations 
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This chapter has demonstrated that Operation Change Direction can be seen as an 
example of the growing acceptance of the relaxation of international rules governing the 
use of force in relation to terorism. Although international case law does not deliver 
evidence of the recognition of such consolidation, the two case studies presented in this 
thesis together with the response of international society and scholars’ opinion demonstrate 
that indeed the international approach towards the broader notion of the right of self-
defence has changed significantly since 9/11. This is in agreement with Schmit, who 
argues that the 2006 military intervention in Lebanon serves firstly as ‘further evidence of 
an operational code extending the reach of self-defence to armed atacks conducted by 
non-State actors’ and secondly as ‘an excelent ilustration of the growing acceptability of 
cross-border counter-terorist operations when the State in which terorists are located fails 
to comply with the duty to police its own teritory’.108 This is in agreement with Tams and 
Devaney according to whom, ‘recent practice indicates that acts of self-defence can even 
be considered necessary where the host state is merely unable to suppress terorist 
activities on its teritory’.109 
 
Conclusion 
 
The two first case studies delivered evidence suggesting a shift in the international 
approach towards the use of force in relation to terrorism observed since 9/11. This claim 
has been strengthened by an analysis of the 2006 Operation Change Direction which 
demonstrated that the response of international society towards the events associated with 
                                                                                    
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide’ Case Concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep (Summary). 
108 Schmit (n 61) 164. 
109 Tams CJ Devaney JG, "Applying Necessity and Proportionality to Anti-Terrorist Self-Defence," Israel 
Law Review 45, no. 1 (2012): 100. 
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the 9/11 atacks was not an exceptional instance or an example of a “double standard” 
approach but indeed can be viewed as giving a place for the emergence of new principles 
governing the use of force and rules of atribution. As has been claimed, the change, 
although not yet consolidated in international case law, has been observed in recent state 
practice and opinio juris. As has been shown, not only international society but also 
various scholars, whose writings were refered to throughout this chapter, recognised, for 
the first time, Israel’s right to self-defence. This, in itself, suggests a growing acceptance of 
the broader notion of the right to self-defence. Moreover, it also supports the claim that 
international society has adopted a stronger and pertinacious approach towards states, 
which wilingly or unwilingly alow for their teritory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states. 
This chapter also serves as a basis for the analysis that wil be conducted 
subsequently. Indeed, the fact that Operation Change Direction supports the claim 
suggesting the changed international approach towards the right to self-defence as response 
to terorism is necessary for the broader contextual analysis of the focus of this study, 
namely the status of international law in curent world afairs, which wil be scrutinised in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE 2006 OPERATION CHANGE DIRECTION AND THE NATURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the change in international approach towards the use of force 
evident since 9/11 and confirmed by the members of international society in 2006 in 
relation to Operation Change Direction instigated by Israeli forces within the Lebanese 
teritory. It begins by looking at the international approach towards the 2006 Operation 
Change Direction and the way in which firstly it difered from the one observed in relation 
to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee and secondly it resembled the international 
response towards the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom. This is folowed by an analysis 
of such shift conducted from the angles of traditional IR theoretical perspectives, namely 
Realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism. 
 It wil be demonstrated that the most comprehensive understanding of the change 
in international approach towards the use of force can be found in the symbiotic approach 
of the English School of IR and Constructivism. While the later is influential due to its 
distinctive understanding of notions such as identity and interest, the former’s extensive 
definition and analysis of the idea of international society is crucial for explaining not only 
why the international changed approach happened but also why it has been sustained. 
Thus, the final part of this chapter wil analyse the 2006 Operation Change Direction 
through the premises of the very conception of international society. In addition, it 
investigates the developments that have occured since 9/11 and whether these 
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developments have given a rise to the emergence of the solidarist conception of 
international society. 
Part One: Operation Change Direction Through the Angles of Earlier Case Studies 
As the preceding chapter has demonstrated the 2006 Operation Change Direction 
delivers further evidence supporting the claim that international society has changed its 
approach towards the use of force in relation to terrorism during the first decade of the 
twenty first century. It has been shown that international society, for the first time, 
recognised Israel’s right to self-defence exercised in response to a terorist atack instigated 
by non-state actor operating from a foreign state. Although the rationale behind the 2006 
military intervention in Lebanon did not difer from the one delivered in relation to other 
interventions, most notably the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, the approach of 
international society altered significantly. While the former was treated as justifiable use of 
force (yet stil disproportional) and in accordance with requirements governing the 
implementation of the right to self-defence, the later had been seen as unlawful 
intervention. 
As the second case study, that is the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom, has 
demonstrated such changed approach was influenced firstly by the September 11 atacks 
and secondly by the fact that the victim of these atack was the US. This case study can be 
seen as the first example of the recognition of the state’s right to self-defence in relation to 
terorism since the adoption of the UN Charter and the establishment of the modern 
international legal order governing the use of force. The international approach towards the 
9/11 atacks and the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan has demonstrated that 
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international society was prompted to re-evaluate its approach towards the use of force. In 
addition, what can be observed since 9/11 is a trend suggesting relaxation of international 
rules governing the right to self-defence. This refers, firstly to the fact that a terorist atack 
can amount to an armed atack and thus implying that a victim state can justifiably use 
force in response to such an atack. This, in turn, suggests that the threshold for what 
actions constitute an armed atack in a traditional sense has been lowered. The recognition 
of Israeli right to self-defence may also suggest that the merits of the accumulation of 
events theory upon which Israel had relied in relation to the earlier interventions have 
found a certain level of recognition or acceptance. Secondly, it also suggests that 
international society has adopted a firmer approach towards states that wilingly or 
unwilingly harbour non-state actors or are not able to efectively suppress their activities 
within their own borders. This can be observed in that the victim state can justifiably 
instigate a military operation within their teritory. 
The third case study also shows, however, that 9/11 alone cannot be treated as the 
sole reason for such shift in international approach. As has been demonstrated this shift 
was influenced by the dominant position of the US within international arena. The 
implication of the US preponderance can be observed in the fact that although Israel had 
been the victim of various atacks instigated by non-state actors operating from within the 
teritory of hosting state, it was not capable of convincing international society that its 
actions were justifiable and lawful. The two case studies, thus demonstrated that even 
though both victim states relied upon similar justifications, international recognition was 
only present in relation to Operation Enduring Freedom. 
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Although the 2001 intervention has in itself delivered evidence supporting the 
aforementioned arguments the inclusion of the third case study was necessitated by a 
number of factors. It was needed in order to show that the response of international society 
towards 9/11 was not an example of a “double standard” but can be seen as suggesting an 
emergence of new principles governing the use of force and rules of atribution. In 
addition, for the 2001 Operation not to be seen as an instance of exception from 
international rules and norms governing the right to self-defence, another example of the 
recognised and justified use of force in self-defence had to be presented. Evidentialy the 
2006 Operation Change Direction can be seen as constituting such an example. 
 
Part Two: Operation Change Direction From the Angles of Traditional IR 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
1. Realist Interpretations 
 
For authors associated with the Realist Theory of International Relations1 the way 
in which states responded to the 2006 Operation Change Direction was to be expected as 
                            
1 Although the folowing analysis in this part of the chapter focuses on a more traditional realist approach to 
international politics the newly established Democratic Realism is worth mentioning. This theoretical strand 
is said to be ‘the marriage of realism and liberalism’ in that it links liberal promotion of democracy with 
realist reason d’être. Democracy promotion for these realists has ‘ultimately not just moral but geopolitical 
value’ (Krauthammer C, "In Defence of Demorcatic Realism," National Interest (2004): 16.). 
Representatives of this strand, most particularly Krauthammer, advocate a more active or even aggressive 
policies aimed at not only terrorist organisations but also states, which wilingly or unwilingly harbour such 
organisations. For these authors, ‘democracy was the antidote to terror’ (Ish-Shalom P, ""The Civilisation of 
Clashes": Misapplying the Democratic Peace in the Middle East," Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 4 
(2007-08): 539.). Such a firmer approach assumes that al states, particularly democratic ones, should join the 
struggle aimed at the total suppression of terrorism. An explicit and clear massage can be found in the Bush 
doctrine. The 2006 Operation Change Direction therefore was widely regarded by democratic realists as an 
adequate and necessary response and step to supress Hezbolah’s terrorist activity (Lieber KA Alexander G, 
"Waiting for Balancing Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30, no. 10 (2005): 109-
139.). Although this strand of Realism relies upon certain principles derived from liberalism, most 
particularly those associated with democratic peace theory and democracy promotion, the fact that Lebanon 
is a democracy did not constrain these authors from postulating the aforementioned more active if not 
aggressive approach. For more information on Democratic Realism, see for example: Dumbrel J, "The 
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most states support the idea of terorism’s suppression. Indeed, the solidarity with Israel 
can be seen as miroring the one observed in the aftermath of 9/11 and which was 
associated with an idea that for other states ‘Islamist radicalism [is also seen] as a genuine 
threat’.2 In fact, for some authors the 2006 Operation Change Direction can be seen as ‘a 
defining batle, even a proxy war, in the “war on teror”’.3 
 
From this view, the operation in question can be seen as a continuation or a part of 
the global war on teror and thus the explicit US support for Israel was not surprising and 
indeed to be expected. The war on teror has tightened an already close and special 
relationship and aliance between the US and Israel. This relationship has been further 
strengthened by the more ofensive stand towards non-state actors and harbouring states so 
advocated by democratic realists.4 From a neo-realist perspective, however, the way in 
which other states responded towards Operation Change Direction should not be seen as 
straightforward and instead should encompass a certain level of balancing. Although as 
chapter five demonstrated the events surounding the 9/11 atacks has questioned the 
applicability of the theory of balance of power, certain realist theorists have continued to 
advocate its relevance even in the aftermath of 9/11. 
 
This balancing, however, does not involve traditional tactics but its lighter version, 
namely “soft-balancing”, which refers to ‘actions that do not directly chalenge US military 
                                                                                    
Neoconservative Roots of the War in Iraq," in Inteligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq, ed. 
Dumbrel J (Manchester: Manchester Univeristy Press, 2008). Mearsheimer JJ, "Hans Morgenthau and the 
Iraq war: Realism versus neo-conservatism, " in www.openDemocracy.net [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
Muravchik J, "The Future Is Neocon," National Interest (2008): 20-25. Vaïsse J, "Why Neoconservatism 
Stil Maters," Foreign Policy 20 (2010): 1-11. 
2 Lieber, Alexander (n 1) 134. 
3 Makdisi K, "Constructing Security Council Resolution 1701 for Lebanon in the Shadow of the “War on 
Teror”," International Peacekeeping 18, no. 1 (2011): 12. See also: Perthes V, "Analytical Perspectives on 
the War in Lebanon," International Spectator 12, no. 1 (2007): 115. 
4 See, however: Mearsheimer JJ Walt SM, The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2007). Authors present a diferent perspective on Israel-US aliance and argue that the US support 
for Israel instead of improving US position in the region it actualy worsen it. 
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preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive 
unilateral US military policies’.5 These policies tend to be undertaken through the usage of 
‘international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arangements’, which could 
be noticed in relation to the US planning to invade Iraq.6 What should be pointed out, 
however, is that the tactic of ‘soft balancing is likely to become more intense if the Unites 
States continues to pursue an aggressively unilateralist national security policy’.7 
 
Although Neo-realists admit that the initiation of the war on teror was widely 
supported, the broadening of the scope of what this fight actualy included, i.e. forceful 
change of an established regime, was not welcomed and in fact was widely criticised. 
Moreover, an expressed support for Israel would mean an indirect green light for the more 
active US campaign, which in turn could have weighty consequences for other states’ 
aliances and interests in the region. 
                            
5 Pape RA, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 10. 
6 ibid 10. The rationale behind the occurrence of such policies is that other powerful states do not deem it 
necessary to engage in “hard balancing”, based upon ‘countervailing aliances and arms buildups’, which in 
fact is said to be abandoned by these states. They abandoned these traditional tactics ‘primarily because they 
do not fear losing their sovereignty for such balancing to occur’ (Paul TV, "Soft Balancing in the Age of Us 
Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 47.). This does not, however, mean that these states wil 
tolerate any behaviour and wil cooperate with the US on every occasion. It is argued that these states have 
become increasingly concerned about the unilateralist shift, in particular the US ‘post-September 11 tendency 
to intervene militarily in sovereign states and forcibly change regimes that pursue anti-US policies’ (ibid). 
However, the fact that the balancing occurs does not mean that other states are threatened by the US 
preponderance but ‘rather because they sincerely disagree with specific US policies’ (Brooks SG Wohlforth 
WC, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 80.) It is also argued that 
these states want ‘to be in a beter position to bargain over the appropriate responses to security chalenges 
from other states or actors’ (ibid 105). 
7 ibid 10. It is also postulated that although the policies of soft balancing do not chalenge the US 
preponderance, they eventualy make it dificult for the US to exercise its power. According RA Pape they 
‘impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of US power by entangling the United States in 
diplomatic maneuvers, reducing the pressure on regional states to cooperate with its military plans, and 
bolstering the claims of target states that US military threats justify the acceleration of their own military 
programs’ (Pape (n 5) 40). Even though at this time there are no serious contestants who could chalenge the 
US hegemonic position, the continuing disdain can eventualy have negative consequences. It is observed 
that the hegemon can folow this path at least in relation to significantly less powerful states but ‘the situation 
changes when discontent is to be found within a great power or when a discontent power starts to rise’ 
(Rauch C Wurm I, "”It’s the Hegemony, Stupid”. Why a Sophisticated Power Transition Theory Needs 
Liberal Hegemony," Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2010): 8). According to Jervis, the unilateralist 
shift in the US policies is said to confirm the assumption that states, particularly the European powers, ‘fear a 
world in which their values and interests are served only at Washington’s suferance’ and thus reasonably 
wil atempt to balance against the US power (Jervis R, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy (2003): 
85). 
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An engagement in the tactics of soft balancing in relation to the 2006 Operation 
Change Direction is not however so explicit and in fact it can be coupled together with 
another realist claim, namely the pursuit of self-interest. Although the Israeli right to self-
defence was recognised the intervention exemplified certain diferences amongst 
especialy those states, which saw the intervention as having potential consequences for 
their interests in the region. These diferences arose mostly in relation to the cal for an 
immediate ceasefire and actions in accordance with the principles of the law of armed 
conflict. In addition, France due to its longstanding relationship with Lebanon as the 
former colony ‘maintains a special relationship with the state and considers itself, in a 
sense, the country’s protector’ and thus opted for an immediate cessation of hostilities.8 
Chirac, the French President at the time urged not only for the ending of the conflict but 
also for a more active and ‘accentuated role’ for the EU in its resolution.9 
 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, chose to back up its Atlantic partner and 
to distance itself from the EU co-members. According to Podrazik, ‘Britain’s traditional 
aliance with America prevented it from pushing for an immediate ceasefire, while that 
was exactly what France demanded from the beginning on account of its special 
relationship with Lebanon’.10 The way in which Germany and France responded to the 
2006 intervention shows that especialy since 2003 these states seek to ‘create a European 
counterweight’ for the US position.11  
 
                            
8 Podrazik P, "Reluctant to Lead: The Lebanese Conflict and the EU’s Common Security Policy, " Yale 
Journal of International Afairs (2007): 9. 
9 Lindholm Shulz H, "Security as an Interregional Concern: The EU and the Middle East, " Bruges Regional 
Intergration and Global Governance Papers 1 (2010): 10. 
10 Podrazik (n 8) 11. 
11 Layne C, "America as European Hegemon," National Interest (2003): 25. See also: Oest KJN, "The EU 
and the Promotion and Stabilisation of Conflict Setlements, " The British Acdemy, Specialist Group 
Ethnopolitics (2007): 1-20. 
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Chapter five has demonstrated the theory of balance of power, either in this or in a 
more traditional understanding, does not provide a compeling explanation as to why 
international society decided to change its approach towards the use of force. Even though 
the premises of this theory can to a certain degree be applicable to the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee, its insightfulness for an analysis of the growing international acceptance 
of the broadening of the scope of the right to self-defence is questionable. As has been 
shown, states, even those from which some form of balancing should have been expected, 
expressed their solidarity and support for the US in the aftermath of 9/11. Although certain 
evidence of soft balancing might be apparent in the relation to the 2006 Operation Change 
Direction, what is crucial for this thesis is the fact that the Israeli right to self-defence was 
recognised, which in turn suggests the lack of an expected balancing. Although the theory 
of soft balancing is useful in looking at the way in which states responded towards the 
Israel’s actions once the conflict already started, it does not explain why the 
aforementioned states and most particularly Russia did recognise for the first time Israeli 
right to self-defence. According to the theory of balancing, Russia with its close 
relationship with Syria12 most likely would have condemned Israel’s intervention as it did 
in 1982 in relation to Operation Peace for Galilee. Such condemnation did not however 
occur and instead Israel’s right to self-defence and its military response was deemed to be 
in accordance with principles of international law.  
 
2. Liberal Interpretations 
 
The way in which Liberals approached the 2006 Operation Change Direction is 
somehow puzzling and in fact can be seen as exemplifying a certain inconsistency in 
                            
12 See, for example: Drezner DW, "Dear Realists: Please explain Russia, " (2012) in 
htp:/drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/28/dear_realists_consevatives_running_russian_foreign_poli
cy_too [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
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liberal reasoning and thinking. On the one hand, looking at this intervention from the angle 
of 9/11 and an unprecedented support for the global war on teror the way in which 
international society responded was to be expected. In addition, the recognition of Israeli 
right to self-defence can be viewed as an example of solidarity among democracies with 
Israel’s cause and a broader support for the suppression of terorism. Indeed, as was 
already mentioned, the fight against Hezbolah can be viewed as a part of the global 
struggle to suppress terorist activity. Shortly after 9/11 some Liberals, including 
Fukuyama, advocated a more active and firm approach towards terorist organisations and 
states that wilingly or unwilingly alow for its terrorist to be used as bases for these 
organisations. Such an uncompromising position was noticed by Shani, 
 
societies  without liberal-democratic institutions whose leaders  prefer to 
remain insulated from the fluctuations of the world  market, stand “outside 
of  history”  waiting to  be  brought in,  perhaps coercively,  by those  more 
“advanced” states which best embody liberal ideals.13 
 
Such support for a felow democracy does not explain why other states, most 
particularly Russia, despite its more liberal outlook, with its continuous interest in the 
Middle East and traditional support and aliance with Arab states, also recognised Israel’s 
right to self-defence. 
 
Moreover, this argument is controversial as Lebanon is considered one of a few 
examples of democracies in the Middle East. And according to the Liberal Theory of 
International Relations democracies do not fight with each other. Some authors argued that 
                            
13 Shani G, "The Liberal Project: Globalisation, Modernity and Identity," Ritsumeikan Annual Review of 
International Studies 14, no. 2 (2003): 48. 
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Lebanon should not be considered a state with a democratic system of government that is 
comparable to other wel-established world democracies. Nevertheless, such an argument 
is disputable as the Lebanese government was recognised internationaly as legitimate and 
democratic.14 This is in agreement with the statement of UN Secretary-General, 
highlighted in the previous chapter, for whom the state of Lebanon should not be 
comparable with the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. Moreover, the process of 
democratisation in Lebanon through elections strengthened Hezbolah as a recognised 
party and a legitimate political actor. This, in turn, questions the liberal argument that 
democracies do not fight each other. On the other hand, the fact that Hezbolah participated 
in elections and won seats in the Parliament could also increased Israeli incentive to 
intervene. The recognition of Hezbolah as a legitimate party in the parliament could be 
viewed as a legitimisation of its fight against Israel and thus threatened a possible 
resolution of the conflict in the future. Nevertheless, the fact that Israel continues its 
occupation of Shab’s farms, which constitutes the reason behind Hezbolah’s atacks and a 
basis for wider support within Lebanese territory, further questions the basis of the liberal 
argument that democracies tend to cooperate with each other and seek to resolve their 
disputes peacefuly. 
 
    Another argument associated with Liberalism, namely a growing economic 
interdependence, influential to a certain degree when an international response towards 
9/11 was analysed,15 can also be disputed by looking at an international reaction towards 
the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Taking into consideration an established and 
explicit relationship between the US and Israel this argument can be persuasive in 
                            
14 According to Fukuyama and McFaul, whose writings appear to support this claim ‘[i]n the long term, the 
consolidation of democratic regimes in the greater Middle East would be expected to increase the legitimacy 
of the governments and thereby reduce the appeal of antisystemic movements such as al Qaeda’ ("Should 
Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted? ," The Washington Quarterly (2007-08): 26.) 
15 See chapter five, part one, subsection 2. 
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explaining why the former supported the later in 2006. The limitation of its premise can 
be observed, however, by looking at other states, most notably Russia and France and their 
expressed recognition of Israeli right to self-defence. Both countries have developed close 
ties within the region. France, as a former colonial power has a close and lasting 
relationship with Lebanon. Thus, folowing the logic of this liberal argument, which 
emphasises benefits derived from a sustained economic and trading relationships, it would 
be unprofitable for France to risk close ties with Lebanon. In a similar manner, it would 
not be beneficial for Russia to put into jeopardy an established relationship with various 
Arab states in the region, usualy hostile towards Israel’s policies. 
 
Thus, the most convincing liberal explanation for the international response 
towards Israel’s intervention can be found in its firmer stand towards the protection of 
international rules and states’ obligations. As chapter five has showed the overwhelming 
support for the war on terror was based on international agreement that terorism cannot be 
tolerated and states, even those which cannot suppress terorist activity within their own 
borders, wil not be immune from actions, even military ones. Although this support 
seemed to be unconditional in the aftermath of 9/11, the controversial and far reaching 
Bush doctrine has led even the most expressive supporters of the global war on teror to 
question the rationale behind such approach. Indeed, although at the beginning Liberals, 
most profoundly Fukuyama, expressed their support for the doctrine, during the debate 
surounding the 2003 war in Iraq, the majority of Liberals distanced themselves from the 
Bush administration and in fact argued that ‘the model of external intervention to produce 
democratic regime change in Iraq is inconsistent with most of what we know about 
democratization as wel as with the theory of democratic peace’.16 Indeed, such a unilateral 
                            
16 Russet B, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 397. 
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shift in the US policy has led some Liberals to opt for the abandonment of the so-caled 
“active” promotion or spread of democracy, afiliated with liberalism of imposition and 
instead, ‘return to fundamental liberal principles of non-intervention and a commitment to 
free trade’.17 
 
Such inconsistency in the liberal treatment of a more active engagement in the 
promotion of democracy and the fight against terrorism is visible in relation to the 2006 
Operation Change Direction. As Anderson observes ‘the administration faithfuly teed up 
the Fukuyamian footbal of liberal democracy in Iraq and the Middle East only to have 
Fukuyama himself snatch the bal away at the last moment’.18 Indeed, during the debate 
surounding the war in Lebanon, he expressed the view that the US should not 
unconditionaly support Israel. According to him, ‘siding so openly and closely with the 
Israelis in their war against Lebanon does the US no favours’.19 What is more he also 
argues that: 
 
[w]ithout coherent states in places, the use of hard military power does not 
have the same kind of political efect, because you cannot deter or coerce or 
compel states to act on the actors that operate out of their teritory. Lebanon 
is a good example.20 
 
                            
17 Boetke PJ Coyne CJ, "Liberalism in the Post-9/11 World, " (2005) in 
htp:/www.ccoyne.com/liberalism_in_the_post-9-11_world.pdf. [accessed 1 December 2012]. 
18 Anderson K, "Goodbye to Al That? A Requiem for Neoconservatism " American University International 
Law Review 22, no. 2 (2007): 285. 
19 Ruiz Devesa D, "Fukuyama: “Europe’s ‘Soft Force’ Disappears Outside Its Borders, " (2007) in 
htp:/www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/fukuyama-europes-soft-force-disappears-outside-its-borders.html 
[accessed 1 December 2012]. 
20 Fukuyama F, "US Foreign Policy after the Bush Administration, " Cornel International Affairs Review 2, 
no.1 (2008): 16. 
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This does not mean that Liberals have abandoned the so-caled “liberal project”.21 
Indeed, they stil advocate promotion of democracy. According to Fukuyama and McFaul: 
 
[t]he Unites States (…) has a moral interest in promoting democracy and a 
strategic interest to be on the side of moral policies. If democracy is the best 
system of government and demanded by the majority of people around the 
world, then the United States should help promote its advance.22 
 
Their promotion of democracy is no longer, however, consistent with the Bush 
doctrine but with a more balanced multilateral approach. In the light of this changed stand 
on the “liberal project” both authors argued that ‘democracy promotion does not imply the 
imposition of liberalism or democracy on a society’.23 On the other hand, they stil admit 
the possibility of the use of force in such an instance. Such use of force, however, is 
conditioned by external circumstances, i.e. whether or not such action wil be 
internationaly supported.24 Indeed, Fukuyama argues that suppression of terrorism can 
only be achievable through international cooperation. In his own words, ‘[the] lesson that 
we should have learned from the experience of the last few years is that one needs to deal 
with this series of foreign policy chalenges in a much more multilateral way’.25 And thus 
curently Liberals appraise more expressly Europe’s active policy based around the notion 
of diplomatic intervention rather than a military one.26 
 
 
                            
21 Shani (n 13) 45. 
22 Fukuyama, McFaul (n 14) 33-34. 
23 ibid 28. 
24 Macmilan J, "Liberalism and the Democratic Peace," Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 
180. 
25 Fukuyama (n 20) 18. 
26 Moravcsik A, "Europe: The Quiet Superpower," French Politics 7, no. 3/4 (2009): 410. 
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3. Neoliberal Interpretations 
 
Neo-liberals in their approach towards the way in which international society 
responded towards the 2006 Operation Change Direction would emphasise a consolidation 
of a change within the international regime governing the use of force instigated by the 
hegemon. In addition, as chapter five demonstrated, the role of the hegemon in a creation 
of international regimes or in an initiation of a change within an existing regime is crucial. 
Due to its predominant position within international system the US was able to influence 
other states in that its right to self-defence in relation to the 2001 Operation Enduring 
Freedom was recognised. This in turn prompted an emergence of a change within the 
international regime governing the use of force established in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. Thus, the way in which international society responded towards the 2006 
intervention confirms the possible neo-liberal interpretation about the change within the 
aforementioned international regime. What is more, it actualy signals a certain level of 
consolidation of such change in that Israel’s right to self-defence was recognised.  
 
As stated earlier in this thesis,27 international regimes tend to be established or 
initiated by a hegemonic state however, what is significant is that once the international 
regime is consolidated that states (including the hegemon) tend to restrain themselves 
‘from pursuing short-terms interests at the expense of shared long-term goals’.28 And thus 
such regimes embody a certain level of continuity. In addition, the continuity remains as 
long as a particular regime ‘stil reflect[s] shared purposes’.29 It is further argued that once 
                            
27 See chapter two, part three and chapter five, part one, subsection 3. 
28 Hathaway OA, "Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law," University of 
Chicago Law Review 72 (2005): 479. 
29 Ruggie JG, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order," International organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 404-405. 
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a regime acquires ‘its own dynamic’ it expresses ‘only incompletely the interests and 
purposes of the hegemonic state’.30 
 
Moreover, although the role of the hegemon in a creation of an international regime 
is, indeed, important, the consolidation of such a regime necessitates international 
recognition and rests upon the principle of reciprocity. What is crucial here is that once an 
international regime is recognised and embedded within the international arena then states 
tend to protect the existing regime and prevent any substantial change, i.e. precedent from 
occuring or being legitimised. If, however, a particular state acts not in accordance with 
the rules established by such regime then there is an increased likelihood that members of a 
particular regime ‘wil atempt to punish defectors’.31 
 
Neo-liberals stress further the role of institutions in sustaining and enforcing 
international regimes. For instance, Keohane and Nye emphasise the role of institutions in 
giving legitimacy to states’ actions. In addition, they point to the fact that even the 
hegemon seeks legitimacy for its actions, as was explicit in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
importance of acquiring such legitimacy can be observed in that ‘people wil voluntarily 
support a legitimate policy, without requiring material inducements’.32 States’ support for 
such a legitimate policy should not, however, be linked to the persuasion that, for example, 
the UNSC action is that ‘of the wisdom or righteousness’.33 Thus Neo-liberals tend to 
                            
30 Katzenstein PJ, "Analyzing Change in International Politics: The New Institutionalism and the Interpretive 
Approach," MPIFG Discussion Paper Guest Lecture 90/10 (1990): 15. 
31 Axelrod R Keohane RO, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Baldwin DA (New York and Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 94. 
32 Keohane RO Nye JS, "The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic 
Legitimacy (2001)," in Power and Governance in a Partialy Globalized World, ed. Keohane RO (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), 279. 
33 ibid 279. 
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analyse such policy through the reference to costs and benefits. As the aforementioned 
authors suggest: 
 
[t]o explain the impact of Security Council resolutions, we need also to look 
for self-interested  benefits for leaders.  Even if the leaders are entirely 
cynical, the adoption  of a legitimate  UN resolution  wil change their 
calculations.34 
 
From the neo-liberal perspective, the way in which international society responded 
towards the 2006 Operation Change Direction is not surprising. It can be viewed as an 
example of a consolidation of the change that occured in the international regime in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 atacks. Although a certain controversy arose in relation to the Israeli 
adherence to the principles governing the jus in belo, most importantly the principles of 
proportionality, what is significant is that the Israeli right to self-defence was recognised 
and thus the use of force was deemed to be perceived as a legitimate response. As was 
shown, the change in international regime governing the use of force was initiated by the 
US, the most dominant state in the system. Scholars associated with this theoretical 
perspective appreciate the role of hegemon in a creation of international regime and view it 
as a stabilising factor. As mentioned for a particular regime to be consolidated other states 
need to recognise it as a valid and necessary one.  
 
This brings the question why would other states see such a change as a necessary 
one? Neo-liberals argue that, in essence, states’ actions are based upon national interest. As 
the cooperation with the hegemon in the aftermath of 9/11 was in states’ own interest so is 
                            
34 ibid 279. 
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the consolidation of such a change. Such assumption invites a discussion about the 
meaning of the term national interest. Neo-liberal approach resembles the realist one in 
that it resides within the notion of the Self. George and Keohane classify three national 
interests – ‘physical survival or life’, ‘autonomy or liberty’ and ‘economic wel-being or 
property’.35 Wendt, however, importantly for this thesis, add one more, namely colective 
self-esteem. He defines it as ‘a group’s need to feel about itself, for respect or status’.36 
This notion of interest places Constructivism closer to the English School of IR in that it 
assumes that states should not be seen merely as autonomous actors but as comprising a 
group or in the language of the ES a society. Rational understanding of the idea of interest 
does not appreciate the fact that states’ identity and interests should also be seen through a 
colective lens. This is in an agreement with Finnemore and Sikkink, for whom: 
 
[n]eorealist and neoliberal theories that flowed from economic approaches 
to social analysis tended to understand interests consistently as self-interest; 
other-regarding behaviour was an anomaly to be explained.  Consequently, 
social construction  projects that  were  not  obviously self-interested (…) 
were difficult for dominant theories to explain.37 
 
The neo-liberal explanation of the way in which international society responded 
towards Operation Change Direction resides within the thin understanding of the notion of 
interest and emphasising the self. States recognised the Israeli right to self-defence because 
it was in their own interest. For example, the US, Russia, and some European states had 
                            
35 George A Keohane RO, "The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in Presidential 
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, ed. George A (Westview: Boulder, 1980), 217-391. For a discussion, see, 
for example: Wendt A, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 233-238. 
36 Wendt (n 35) 237. 
37 Finnemore M Sikkink K, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations 
and Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 403. 
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been targets of terorist organisations, thus the support for Israel was understandable as in 
the future they may need to rely on a similar justification and would expect the same 
support. However, there are three questions that need to be raised and that make such an 
interpretation of notion of interest problematic. Firstly, why would states, which in the past 
had not been targets of acts of terorism support first the US and then Israel, especialy 
taking into consideration that in the future such support might put them on the list of target 
states? Secondly, why would states, such as Russia and France, which have had wel-
established interests within Middle East, express their support for Israel? Thirdly, why 
would some Arab states, which had a history of conflict with Israel, condemned Hezbolah 
actions? Such international response questions the notion of interest understood purely 
through a reference to the Self. It suggests that in certain, vital to the international security, 
instances, states actions reflect also the interests of international society. According to 
Wendt:  
 
[s]elf-interest is about motivation, not behaviour. As long as cooperation is 
purely instrumental – a state  helps another state  only  because its  own 
security is also threatened, for example – then it is egoistic.  On the  other 
hand, if a state  helps another  because it identifies  with it, such that even 
when its own security is not threatened it stil perceives a threat to the Self, 
then it is acting from colective interest.38 
 
The fact that states expressed firstly such an unprecedented solidarity with the US 
in 2001 and secondly for the first time recognised Israel’s right to self-defence suggests 
that they identified with them and perceived their behaviour as an appropriate one. This 
                            
38 Wendt (n 35) 240. 
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also gives credit to the ES perception that states belong to international society and that in 
situations pivotal for international order they wil pursue the objective of such society. 
Such a development further chalenges the existence of the narow, pluralist conception of 
international society.  
 
Part Three: Operation Change Direction From the Angle of the English School 
Theory of International Relations and Constructivism 
 
The international support for Israel surounding the 2006 Operation Change 
Direction evident in international recognition of its right to self-defence not only gives 
further evidence of the changed approach towards the use of force but also supports the 
claim that the very notion of international society has altered since the end of the Cold War 
and most particularly since 9/11. This part of the chapter wil demonstrate that this 
reasoning is based upon the folowing, complementary factors. Firstly, the unity amongst 
members of international society exemplified in an overwhelming support for the US in the 
aftermath of 9/11 indeed leads to a suggestion that that curent international society can no 
longer be seen as identical to the society of the Cold War period. Secondly, although the 
shift in relation to the use of force has been instigated by the US, other members of 
international society had to recognise such change. Thirdly, the Operation Change 
Direction delivers certain level of consolidation of this perception as Israel’s right to self-
defence was for the first time recognised.  
 
Before looking at the current international society it is important why such a 
conceptualisation is needed for an analysis of the status of international law in the 
aftermath of 9/11. A study of the nature of international society is crucial because it 
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provides a more in-depth understanding of the process of norms’ formation and 
consolidation. Norms at the international level similar as at the domestic level are 
embedded within a society. Such a society decides which norms are valid at the particular 
time and which need to be changed. In a constructivist view norms are defined as ‘a set of 
intersubjective understanding and colective expectations regarding the proper behaviour 
of states and other actors in a given context or identity’.39 Björkdahl, in agreement with the 
ES, further argues that ‘[w]hat is appropriate is known only by reference to a social 
community.’40 What folows is that without looking at the society within which norms are 
embeded the portrait of international norms and thus international law is not complete. The 
international society therefore gives a background for an understanding of the role of 
international law and ofers a broader, more in-depth perspective. 
 
As wil be shown in the folowing paragraphs, if the nature of international society 
changes the likelihood that international norms change is increased. The changes that occur 
within the nature of international society as wel as changes of international norms are best 
observed by looking at state practice. As Frederking notices, ‘[s]ocial rules are constantly 
negotiated and mediated through the actions of many agents’.41 In addition, ‘[n]orms 
played a key role in the formation and transformation of states identities, and hence their 
interests. Thus (…) “the emergence or strengthening of a global (…) norm is likely to lead 
to change in actors’ interests and identities”’.42 According to Wendt, ‘[s]tructure change 
occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want’.43 This argument can be 
                            
39 Björkdahl A, "Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections," 
Cambridge Review of International Afairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 15. (emphasis added) 
40 ibid 15. 
41 Frederking B, "Constructing Post-Cold War Colective Security," American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (2003): 376-377. 
42 Clark I, International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 177. 
43 Wendt (n 35) 336. See also: Klotz A, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and Us 
Sanctions against South Africa," International Organisation 49, no. 3 (1995): 460. 
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used in relation to the changes that occur within the nature of international society. As 
mentioned in chapter five and what wil be explored later in this chapter, the end of the 
Cold War created a suitable platform for a re-definition and a re-formation of the nature of 
international society and what the aims of such a society would be. Before proceeding to 
the explanation of the nature of the curent international society, it is important to remind 
the basic features of international society that existed during the Cold War. 
 
Chapter five of this thesis argued that the conception of international society, which 
could best describe the society during the Cold War was a pluralist one. As has been 
shown, this conception sees the relationship between states on a basic level. As this 
relationship is based on the very fundamental rules of international conduct, the very idea 
of international society is based on the same principle. The role of such society is, quite 
straightforwardly, to limit the scope of possible conflict, maintain the status quo and 
sustain internationaly accepted rules of behaviour. This conception, thus, does not suggest 
that its members are bonded together to pursue a higher level of solidarity, unity or 
universal values. 
 
The preceding chapter together with chapter five demonstrated that there has been a 
growing unity among states relating to the firmer approach towards non-state actors and 
states that wilingly or unwiling alow for their territories to be used as shelters for these 
actors. What is crucial here is the question of whether such unity and solidarity 
exemplified by a firmer approach gives basis for the claim suggesting that the 
contemporary society be described as fulfiling the criteria set up by the solidarist 
conception of international society?  In order to answer this question, the very idea of 
solidarist international society needs to be elaborated. 
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As mentioned in earlier chapters various interventions since the end of the Cold 
War give evidence of growing international acceptance of the implementation of the 
provisions embodied within Chapter VI of the UN Charter as wel as intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.44 This, in turn, suggests that the last decade of the twentieth century 
should be seen as giving evidence supporting the notion of solidarist conception of 
international society, which confirms and upholds certain liberal assumptions. As was 
already mentioned, such society is based on the assumption ‘of solidarity, or potential 
solidarity, of states comprising international society, with respect to the enforcement of the 
law’.45 It emphasises that members of the international society ‘share a common 
commitment to the maintenance of the society and its institutions against chalenges to 
them’.46 
 
This conception puts emphasis on the protection of human rights, as it places them 
‘at the centre of its ethical code’,47 which entails a burden on the notion of sovereignty 
because the ultimate goal is the wel-being of the international society as a whole rather 
than ‘the independence of the states of which it is made up’.48 The traditional 
understanding of sovereignty involved an absolute freedom and right of state to act within 
its own borders. The perception of this conception of international society, however, 
                            
44 For more information see chapter one, note 104. See also: Bul H, ed., Intervention in World Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Davis C et al., ed., International Intervention in the Post-Cold War 
World. Moral Responsibility and Power Politics (Armonk: M.E Sharpe, Inc., 2004). Hurrel A, On Global 
Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). Minear L, The Humanitarian Enterprise. Dilemmas & Discoveries (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc., 
2001). Ramsbotham O Woodhouse T, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict. A 
Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
45 Bul H, "The Grotian Conception of International Society (1966)," in Hedley Bul on International Society, 
ed. Alderson K Hurrel A (Basingstoke and London: Macmilan Press Ltd, 2000), 97. See also: Buzan B, 
From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Linklater A Suganami H, The English School of 
International Relations. A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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prioritises the rights of individuals rather than those of states. Thus, the wel-being of a 
society is linked to the wel-being of individuals. This is reflected in the Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, where it is stated that 
‘[s]tate sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection 
of its people lies with the state itself’.49 The report further stresses that ‘[w]here a 
population is sufering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwiling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’.50 Thus, it 
advocates the shift in the notion of sovereignty so that it alows international society to act 
in order to protect these rights, even if it involves the use of force. From here it may be 
suggested that sovereignty should not be treated only as a right of internal and external 
independence but also as a duty to govern the internal afairs in accordance with 
international law. Here the constructivist contribution to this study can be highlighted. As 
already explained throughout the thesis, a constructivist understanding of norm entails a 
normative aspect, i.e. the virtue of “oughtness”. The notion of intervention to uphold 
human rights presents an excelent example of such “oughtness”. In addition, a notion of 
humanitarian intervention is not to be found in any international treaty or international case 
discussed by international courts, a growing international acceptance of such a notion 
means that states believe they are moraly obliged to act when severe atrocities occur. The 
shift in understanding of the principle of sovereignty visible since the end of the Cold War 
demands an inclusion of the notion of responsibility. It refers not only to the state’s 
responsibility towards its own population but also towards other states. According to 
Reinold, ‘[s]overeign states have a responsibility not only to protect their own citizens, but 
also to protect – within their own teritory – the rights and fundamental security interests of 
                            
49 ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect, " (International Development Research Centre: Otawa, 2001), xi. 
50 ibid. 
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other states’.51 The inclusion of the notion of responsibility within the definition of 
sovereignty strengthens the claim that the current international society stresses to a greater 
extent the importance of states’ adherence to the rules and principles of international law. 
This emphasis has been reinforced in the aftermath of 9/11, especialy in relation to weak 
or failed states. The scrutiny of the whole problématique relating to the notion of 
humanitarian intervention and failed states is beyond the objectives of this thesis. What is 
crucial, however, is that the shift in perception of the principle of sovereignty has 
important implication on the understanding of the right to self-defence. According to the 
aforementioned author, ‘[t]he global fight against terorism (…) has strengthened the 
notion that sovereignty entails responsibility for the efective control of one’s teritory and 
that failure to discharge this obligation legitimate a military response’.52 
 
Such developments influence the concept of international society in general. 
This, in turn, has certain implications. Firstly, it gives evidence of the existence of a 
diferent type of international society when compared with the international society 
explicit during the Cold War. The international society during the Cold War emphasised 
the incontrovertibility of the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention. At the time states 
tended to be reluctant to the possibility of acceptance of the use of force on bases diferent 
than those embodied within Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, the stronger 
emphasis on the adherence and enforcement of international law since the end of the Cold 
War suggests that the identity of international society changed and that states deem to 
actualy comprise international society on a higher level. This indeed indicates that, at least 
in relation to the issues pivotal to states’ security, there is wider cooperation and dialogue 
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52 ibid 245. 
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between members of “international society” and that there are certain bonds that bind these 
members together. 
 
Such a development may have potentialy both strengthening and dangerous 
consequences on international order, which has been built upon the very notion of non-
intervention within the domestic afairs of a sovereign state.53 Secondly, it suggests that 
international society has adopted a stronger approach towards law-breaking or the so-
caled “rogue” states. The events during the 1990s showed that the violations of cardinal 
principles and norms might result in serious consequences including the use of force. This 
indicates that international society in a more explicit way acts as a judge and an agent. It 
might decide that when a situation cannot be resolved internaly it might adopt a more 
active approach and choose the kinds of measures, which should be adopted. It, thus, gives 
power to members of international society to act as the guardian of that law and to enforce 
it through various means including most importantly even the use of force. Therefore the 
colective wil of states constitute the main determinant behind their chosen path.54 By 
doing so it vests in members of international society the power to act as a judge and as an 
agent. Therefore, it is the role of states to decide which actions ‘violate the cardinal rules 
and norms of the society of states’ and what actions should be taken against states, which 
break these rules.55 By this, the solidarist conception entails that certain states should act 
as ‘local agents of a world common good’,56 which would mean that ‘international law and 
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morality are not merely the instruments of dominant powers to be upheld only when it suits 
them, but are the cement that binds the society of state together’.57 
 
This conception also indicates that international anarchy can be mitigated when 
international society decides to take the enforcement of international law in its own hands. 
This brings a constructivist argument that international anarchy is what states make of it. 
What folows is that ‘[s]tructures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, 
but structures are also produced, reproduced, and altered by the discursive practices of 
agents’.58 Such a changed approach towards the law-breaking states and the possibility of 
the use of force gave suitable grounds for further developments. And as has been argued 
throughout this thesis it created a foundation for broadening the notion of the right to self-
defence in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The very fact that in a case, when a 
state commits atrocities within its own borders, other states may decide colectively to 
intervene in order to stop the violence from happening or continuing supports the 
aforementioned notion of the solidarist conception of international society.  
 
As was indicated the unity among states in supporting the US in the aftermath of 
9/11 suggests that the existence of special bonds between members of international society, 
so emphasised by this conception, is indeed evident. The solidarity with the US was on 
such a scale that it has led to the restructuring of the scope of the right to self-defence. 
Moreover, such unity was further strengthened by international reaction towards the 2006 
intervention in Lebanon instigated by Israel. This level of unity is linked to the 
understanding of interest adopted in this thesis. As elaborated earlier, the notion of interest 
                            
57 Wheeler, Dunne (n 53) 102. 
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understood through the reference to the Self so explicit in writings of authors afiliated 
with both realist and neo-liberal traditions do not give suficient grounds for that kind of 
unity to occur. Such unity or solidarity from the theoretical perspective advocated in this 
thesis should be viewed as reflecting the identity of the curent international society. Such 
society differs from the one of the Cold War era, when the notion of the Self was given a 
priority and resembled the pluralist conception of international society. This change has 
influenced the way states portray themselves. For example, in relation to Russia ‘[t]he 
“peaceful influence of liberal ideas” completely reoriented [its] perspectives on the 
world’.59 Eventualy it 
 
renounced regional  hegemony,  withdrew troops from  neighbouring states, 
slashed defence budgets, sought aliance with the European powers and the 
United States, and in general shaped its foreign policies on the premise that 
its interests were the same as those of the West.60 
 
As has been demonstrated, the relaxation of international rules has alowed the US 
and subsequently Israel firstly to use their armed forces in self-defence and subsequently to 
legitimately intervene within teritories of sovereign states. The fact that the right to self-
defence of these states was recognised in relation to terorism suggests that since 9/11 
states’ action is no longer as constrained as it was during the Cold War. Such change was 
influenced by the fact that in 2001 the victim of the terorist atacks was the world’s most 
powerful state. This is in agreement with Hurel, according to whom: 
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it is likely that the US actions have helped to crystalize the legality of more 
expansive notions of self-defence in response to terorist attacks – providing 
a clear ilustration of the particular power of a hegemonic state to influence 
the character of customary legal norms.61 
 
The fact that it was the US and not Israel, which instigated the changed approach 
towards the use of force, does not negate the aforementioned argument about a 
transformation of international society. As chapter five showed a certain level of inequality 
is to be expected. As Dunne puts it, ‘[i]n a system characterised as anarchic, order requires 
a stable distribution of power and a commitment on the part of the great powers to manage 
the system. An anarchical society therefore requires some inequality’.62 Clark, further 
argues that ‘international society is most efective precisely because it offers the prospect 
of the successful institutionalisation of disparities of power’.63 Therefore, such inequality 
is generaly accepted ‘but not to such an extent that, in Vatel’s words, one state is able to 
“lay down the law to others”’.64 
 
The fact that international society first expressed an unprecedented support for the 
US in the aftermath of 9/11, which eventualy has led to the evaluation of international 
provisions treating the use of force and second recognised for the first time Israeli right to 
self-defence suggests that the curent international society does not easily fit the 
description provided by the pluralist conception either. These changes coupled with 
aforementioned developments that have occured since the end of the Cold War questions 
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the pluralist idea of a society based only minimal commitment to basic rules of co-
existence.  
 
As has been demonstrated, the colapse of the Soviet Union has created a platform 
for not only the broadening of cooperation between states but also for the increasing and 
widening of policies intended not only to provide a basis for co-existence. The growth in 
support for the implementation of provisions embodied within the Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter together with an explicitly firmer approach towards non-state actors and rogue 
states gives evidence that the relationship between members of international society has 
reached a higher level. This is supported by the way in which international society 
responded towards the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. In addition, Operation Change 
Direction and the recognition of Israeli right to self-defence shows that the change in 
international approach towards the use of force has been sustained. 
 
What this thesis demonstrated is that the current international society does not fit 
within a thin, pluralist conception of international society, which resides around the notion 
of co-existence. Instead, it embodies certain characteristics of the solidarist conception. 
However, the scope of the problématique of this thesis does not alow for the forthright 
answer whether the current international society resembles this conception. The al-
encompassing analysis of the curent international society would involve an in-depth 
analysis of the notion of human rights and their protection. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of the third case study was to deliver further evidence that there has been a 
change of international approach towards the use of force observed since 9/11.  
This chapter confirms that the response of the international society towards the 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom was not an example of a “double standard” approach but 
indeed can be viewed as giving a place for the emergence of new principles governing the 
use of force and rules of atribution. This changed approach, however, was conditioned by 
the fact that it was the US and not another state that was a victim of a terorist atack. 
Although as conflict between Israel and Lebanon has shown terorist atacks were not 
novel, the implementation of the right to self-defence by Israel was not perceived by 
international society as legitimate. 
 
The 9/11 atacks, on the other hand, triggered unprecedented international support 
and led members of international society to re-evaluate its approach towards non-state 
actors and states that either wilingly harbour them or are not able to suppress their 
activities within their own teritory. This changed approach, as the third case study 
demonstrated, has been sustained. The 2006 Operation Change Direction can be seen as 
the clearest example of the sustainability of this change as the Israeli right to self-defence 
has been recognised for the first time in relation to terorist atack instigated from 
Lebanese teritory. 
 
This chapter has also demonstrated that such a changed approach has certain 
implications upon the very notion of international society. The fact that majority of states 
backed the US and supported the claim that it is necessary to adopt a firmer approach to 
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both non-state actors and hosting states suggested a certain level of unity. This claim can 
be supported by the way in which international society responded towards the 2006 
Operation Change Direction. The third case study indeed delivers evidence that a certain 
level of unity and solidarity amongst members of international society does exist. Thus this 
thesis argues that it is more accurate to portray international society as in a transitional 
stage, i.e. no longer pluralist but not yet in the stage embodying solidarist features. As has 
been already mentioned the analysis of the very nature of international society is crucial 
for the understanding of the status of international law. Thus, this chapter, especialy its 
last part is treated as a foundation for the portrait of international law at the begining of 
the twenty first century. 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis conducted in this thesis via reference to case studies and the way in 
which they can be seen as being crucial in the scrutiny of not only the standing of 
international law in world politics but also the role and understanding of international 
society. The preceding chapters have looked at three similar military interventions 
instigated within teritories of sovereign and foreign states. This thesis argues that 9/11 has 
marked a change in the approach of the UNSC and the international society towards the 
use of military force as a response to non-state actors responsible for terorist atacks. Such 
a change in approach has had an impact on the existing rules governing the use of force in 
international politics. More specificaly, the threshold of what actions can constitute an 
armed atack and, therefore, the basis for exercising the right of self-defence in accordance 
with the Article 51 of the UN Charter has been lowered. Moreover, this change of 
approach has also had an impact on the rules governing the atribution of acts commited 
by non-state actors to a state. While prior to 9/11, the UNSC had been reluctant to 
recognise the legality of the use of force against the teritory of a state, which wilingly or 
unwilingly alowed its teritory to be used as a base for non-state actors, in the aftermath 
of 9/11 there has been growing acceptance of the lawfulness of such use of force. 
As has ben demonstrated justification delivered by both Israel and the US was 
based on the same reasoning yet international society chose to respond to these operations 
in diferent ways. The 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee was treated as an ilegal and 
ilegitimate abuse of the use of force, and thus not in accordance with international rules 
and principles governing the use of force. Al five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council were in agreement that Israel did not have legitimate grounds for intervening 
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within Lebanese teritory. Even though Israeli justification was, as 9/11 demonstrated, 
similar to the one relied upon by the US, it was not recognised as constituting a legitimate 
use of force in self-defence.  
 
    Although Israel has had a long practice in dealing with international terorism, it 
was not able to convince the international society to change its approach and opt for the 
acceptance of a wider definition of the right to self-defence. The recognition was 
forthcoming, however, when the US was atacked by al-Qaeda and the subsequent military 
intervention in Afghanistan was seen as a legitimate and lawful reaction. The 2001 
Operation Enduring Freedom marks the first instance when a state’s right to self-defence 
was recognised in relation to a terorist atack. Although as chapter one showed, 
international rules governing the use of force did not preclude an action in self-defence in 
such instances, it had been very dificult prior to 9/11 for a victim state to achieve an 
international recognition of the lawfulness of its military actions. What this implies is that 
none of the terrorist atacks commited prior to 9/11 were seen as being of such gravity as 
to amounting to an armed atack traditionaly understood. Moreover, none of the states, 
which wilingly or unwilingly alowed their teritories to be used as bases for terorist 
activity, were treated as being responsible for such activity. 
 
    The analysis of the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom has shown that currently a 
state, which breaks its international obligation, i.e. alows for a terorist activity to be 
instigated from within its teritory can be seen as being indirectly responsible for such 
activity. Although various cases, mostly notably the Nicaragua case already treated the 
notion of state responsibility for a wrongful act, the threshold for atribution was much 
higher, in that it had to be proved that an accused state instigated such terorist activity or 
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had an ultimate control over the non-state actor in question. The Taliban control over al-
Qaeda was, however, not proved: it was suggested that the later sponsored the former. The 
international recognition of the US right to self-defence delivers, thus, evidence that the 
rules of atribution have indeed been lowered. 
 
    This argument has been further supported by an analysis of the 2006 Operation 
Change Direction, which presents the first instance in which Israel’s right to self-defence 
in relation to a terorist atack instigated from within Lebanese teritory was recognised. 
The significance of this operation can be seen in that it not only delivers evidence 
supporting the changed approach towards the use of force, but it also confirms the claim 
that international support for the military intervention in Afghanistan was not merely a 
reply on a one-of basis to the US postulates, but, in fact, international society recognised 
the necessity of changing the rules governing the use of force in relation to acts of 
terorism, and states that wilingly or unwilingly permit the non-state actors to operate 
within their teritories. Thus, the 9/11 atacks should, indeed, be seen as setting a new 
precedence.   
 
Chapter five and seven have demonstrated that only some mainstream theories of 
International Relations can provide a plausible explanation for the variation of 
international responses triggering the changed international approach towards the 
implementation of the right to self-defence. What is significant is that scholars, associated 
Neo-liberalism and the symbiotic approach of the English School of IR and Constructivism 
cited throughout those chapters emphasise the hegemonic position of the US and its ability 
to instigate and force through various policies, which eventualy can have long-lasting 
efects on international order. The foundation behind such a preponderant position can be 
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seen as being influenced by the change of international system in the aftermath of the end 
of the Cold War. The international system based on the notion of balance of power was 
replaced by a unipolar world with only one state, that can be classified as a superpower. 
Such a precondition has generated suitable and favourable grounds for the US to pursue its 
policies and convince other states about the adequacy and necessity of such policies. This 
is evident in that it was not Israel but the US that managed to influence the perception of 
what is to be meant by “an armed atack” and the right of self-defence.1 
 
As has been argued, however, although the status of hegemon places the US in a 
favourable position it nevertheless needs, as the war on terror exemplified, the cooperation 
between itself and other members of the international society. Although the US is capable 
of forcing through its views and policies, international society stils necessitates the need 
for evidence supporting the claim that policies, which aim to change existing rules, are 
indeed essential for maintenance of international order. What needs to be emphasised 
further is that the US predominance on the world stage alone did not guarantee 
international support. As has been shown, the US seeks to obtain legitimacy for its actions 
and thus, acknowledging the limitation upon the scope of its own capabilities. 
 
Even though the notion of the US’s hegemonic position may seem incompatible 
with the postulates of IR theory which emphasises the existence and special role of 
international society this is not an accurate reflection. The notion of international society 
and hegemony can co-exist as long as the later respects its rights and duties deriving from 
its special status and does not pursue objectives, which threaten international order. What 
is more, hegemony can in fact be seen as the institution of international society, possessing 
                            
1 Hurrel A, "”There Are No Rules” (George W. Bush): International Order after September 11," 188. 
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a special role and duty to sustain international order and ensure an enforcement of 
international rules. 
 
This thesis argues that change in the international approach towards the use of force 
evident in the way in which international society responded towards 9/11 and its 
overwhelming support and engagement in the war on teror gives evidence of a 
transformation or reinvention of international society itself. It supports the claim that the 
notion of international society no longer encompasses characteristics of the pluralist 
conception of international society. A more realist or utilitarian reading would question 
such an interpretation. As was pointed out in chapter five some of the mainstream theories 
of International Relations would argue that taking into consideration the US international 
position it is not surprising that in contrast with Israel its right to self-defence was 
recognised. This is because states calculated that their lack of support for the US might 
have possible negative repercussions in the future and thus it was in their own self-interest 
to recognise the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom as a lawful use of force. This thesis 
argues, however, that such a reading does not alow for a thorough understanding and 
appreciation of a comprehensiveness of the topic in question. Accordingly, it is submited 
that the narow perception of interest understood purely through a reference to the Self is 
limited. Moreover, an international recognition of the right to self-defence in the aftermath 
of 9/11 should not be viewed as an exception reserved for the US. The fact that Israel’s 
right to self-defence was recognised for the first in relation to the 2006 Operation Change 
Direction supports this claim and can be viewed as delivering evidence suggesting a 
certain level of consolidation of international acceptance of the broader right to self-
defence. 
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A modified version of the pluralist conception was explicit during the Cold War 
period when the predominant role of such society was to maintain international order and 
protect as wel as enforce basic and fundamental international rules and principles 
governing the relations between states. As chapter five demonstrated, international 
relations during that period can be the most accurately described as surounding the notion 
of a minimalist commitment to recognize each others’ right to exist. Although the conflict 
between the East and the West did exist, an emphasis on the limitation on the use of force 
whenever possible unless it was an absolute necessity was one of the predominant features 
of such society. The existence of such a minimalist approach means that the objectives of 
international society were limited to a desire of its members to create a foundation needed 
for their mutual co-existence. Although new developments such as the right of self-
determination and the notion of human rights, which can be seen as expressing objectives 
of the solidarist conception of international society were embodied within the UN Charter, 
the maintenance of international order rather than the pursuit of justice was stil prioritized. 
 
An unprecedented solidarity with the US and an expressed support for the 
instigation of the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom and the wider war on teror, which 
eventualy has led to the re-evaluation of international provisions treating the use of force 
suggests that the curent international society does not embody the assumptions of the 
pluralist conception. Indeed, the fact that members of international society expressed their 
support for the implementation of the broader notion of the right to self-defence gives 
evidence of an adoption of the firmer approach towards law breaking states and other 
international actors. This in turn reflects certain characteristics of the solidarist conception 
of international society. 
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The fact that the majority of states backed the US and supported the claim that it is 
necessary to adopt a firmer approach to both non-state actors and hosting states suggested 
a certain level of unity. Indeed an observed wider and closer cooperation between 
members of international society since 9/11 gives evidence that there are certain bonds that 
bind these members together. The existence of these special bonds between members of 
international society, so emphasised by this conception, is indeed evident in an expressed 
solidarity and unity among states in supporting the US in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
solidarity with the US was on such a scale that it has led to restructuring the scope of the 
right to self-defence. Moreover such unity was further strengthened by international 
reaction towards Operation Change Direction launched by Israel in 2006 within Lebanese 
teritory. The acceptance of the relaxation of international rules has alowed firstly the US 
and then Israel firstly to use their armed forces in self-defence and subsequently to 
legitimately intervene within teritories of sovereign states. The fact that the right to self-
defence of these states was recognised in relation to terorism suggests that since 9/11 
states’ manoeuvre is no longer as constrained as it was during the Cold War. 
 
The argument suggesting an existence of international society on a higher level can 
be strengthened by a reference to a greater emphasis on the adherence and enforcement of 
international law observed since the end of the Cold War. It has been shown throughout 
this thesis that international society in a more explicit way acts as a judge and an agent in 
that it decides what kinds of measures need to be adopted in a crisis situation. Such an 
active approach can be observed not only in the way international society responded 
towards the military interventions in question but also in decisions to instigate various 
interventions since the end of the Cold War, which in turn has given evidence of a growing 
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international acceptance of the implementation of the provisions embodied within Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter as wel as intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
 
Moreover, the 2006 Operation Change Direction leads to a suggestion that a certain 
level of unity and solidarity amongst members of international society does exists and thus 
minimalist, pluralist conception of international society no longer provides an adequate 
understanding of the contemporary international society. This thesis argues, thus, that it is 
more accurate to portray the curent international society as exhibiting elements of both, 
i.e. pluralist and solidarist conceptions. Nevertheless, the focus of this study does not give 
a suitable ground for a straightforward answer whether the curent international society 
resembles the solidarist conception in its in-depth understanding. 
 
As the scope of this thesis was limited only to those instances in which states used 
force in resonse to terrorist atacks it did not alow for a comprehensive and a more in-
depth scrutiny of the hegemonic status of the US and whether international law possesses a 
constraining power over the most dominant state in the international society. Such an 
analysis could constitute an interesting area of future research and enrich the study of the 
curent status of international law. As wil be noticed the 2003 war in Iraq would be crucial 
in such an analysis. Although this intervention was beyond the scope of this study a certain 
introductory assumptions can be derived from a concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 
As has been demonstrated throughout the thesis although the status of hegemon 
places the US in a favourable position it nevertheless needs, as the war on teror 
exemplified, the cooperation between itself and other members of the international society. 
There is evidence suggesting that international rules and institutions do constrain actions 
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even of the most powerful state. International society, as the 2003 war in Iraq 
demonstrates, does not remain passive towards the actions of the US. The reasons 
underpinning the decision of the US to launch a military campaign in Iraq were not 
accepted by the UNSC as strong and convincing and thus the operation was not sanctioned 
by the UN Security Council. Although the US is capable of forcing through its views and 
policies, international society stils necessitates the need for evidence supporting the claim 
that policies, which aim to change existing rules, are indeed essential for maintenance of 
international order. What needs to be emphasised further is that US predominance on the 
world stage alone did not guarantee international support. The US seeks to obtain 
legitimacy for its actions and thus, acknowledging the limitation upon the scope of its own 
capabilities. 
 
Although such a special role has acquired international legitimacy it remains a 
conditional structure subject to recognition. It means that when the primacy is unchecked 
and the hegemon continues to pursue its unilateral policies, such legitimacy may cease. 
Indeed, the debate surrounding the 2003 war in Iraq can be viewed as an example of 
questioning such legitimacy. The US by deciding to act unilateraly with disregard for 
other states’ opinions demonstrated that its dominant international position gives it a 
choice in deciding what type of policy should be adopted. From the other angle, however, 
the fact that prior to the intervention, the US atempted to acquire support from other states 
means that it pursued legitimacy for its own policy. This, in turn, gives further evidence 
that the most powerful state is not immune and indeed recognises that it is bound by 
international law. Although the debate surrounding the war in Iraq exhibited the dangers of 
an unchecked hegemony, it also showed that unity amongst members of international 
society could survive a problematic environment. This can be observed in that the newly-
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established approach towards the use of force adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 has been 
sustained. And the 2006 Operation Change Direction with the recognition of Israel’s right 
to self-defence can be viewed as an explicit example. 
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Appendix 1: The 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee 
    Available at htp:/israelipalestinian.procon.org/files/1982lebanon.gif 
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Appendix 3: Litani River 
CRS Report for Congress: ‘Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbolah Conflict’ (2006) 
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Appendix 4: The 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom 
      Air University available at htp:/www.au.af.mil/au/aul/maps/enduring.htm 
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Appendix 5: The 2006 Operation Change Direction 
Available at 
htp:/www.habeeb.com/lebanon.photos.18.beirut.war.destruction.html 
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